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ABSTRACT
In this paper I defend a standard mechanistic model of our linguistic competence against a
skeptical argument by Donald Davidson ("A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," appearing in Truth
and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson). Taking as his point of
departure our ability to interpret malapropisms and other misspeakings, Davidson argues that
we cannot give an adequate, rule-governed account of our ability to interpret utterances.
I begin by addressing Davidson's views on the role of convention in language.
I then argue that (1) the mechanistic program outlined by Chomsky and others can
satisfactorily accommodate the interpretive phenomena which Davidson claims threaten
standard descriptions of our linguistic competence; (2) we need not expect that the mechanistic
model will necessarily accommodate every observed interpretive phenomenon; a satisfactory
explanation of the Interpretive ability in question may, for example, fall outside of what
Chomsky has called our cognitive capacity; (3) Davidson is mistaken in suggesting that there
are good grounds for extending his skepticism about rule-governed accounts of interpretation
from malaprops to all utterances of a language.
Finally, I examine our ability to interpret malapropisms, unfamiliar words, and grammatically
garbled utterances in the light of current linguistic theorizing.
I conclude that Davidson's skeptical conclusions are not well-motivated.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. James Higginbotham, Professor of Philosophy
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Over the years, philosophers have launched a number of skeptical
attacks against the possibility of there being an adequate rule-governed
account of our ability to produce and understand language.
As against this picture of language use, Quine, for example, has
argued that it is unclear what criteria we can use to decide whether or
not linguistic behavior is being guided by internal rules. He argues that
"Behavior fits a rule whenever it conforms to it; whenever the rule truly
describes the behavior. But the behavior is not guided by the rule unless
the behaver knows the rule and can state it."1 Quine leaves unchallenged
the notion of unconscious compliance with a rule, but only "when this is
merely a question of fitting"2:
Bodies obey, in this sense, the law of falling bodies, and
English speakers obey, in this sense, any and all of the
extensionally equivalent systems of grammar that demarcate
the right totality of well-formed English sentences. These are
acceptably clear dispositions on the part of bodies and English
speakers. The sticking point is this Chomskian midpoint
between rules as merely fitting, on the one hand, and rules as
real and overt guides on the other; Chomsky's intermediate
notion of rules as heeded inarticulately.3
This "inarticulate" heeding of rules, Quine says, is a notion "deserving of
close methodological attention."4
Kripke's celebrated analysis of Wittgenstein's "private language"
argument 5 has yielded yet another assault on rule-governed explanations
of language use. Kripke has argued that Wittgenstein's skeptical argument
about rule-following can be naturally extended to the notion of
7
rule-following endorsed, for example, by the Chomskyan linguist.6 Thus
he writes:
... if statements attributing rule-following are neither to be
regarded as stating facts, nor to be thought of as explaining
our behavior..., it would seem that the use of the ideas of rules
and of competence in linguistics needs serious
reconsideration, even if these notions are not rendered
'meaningless'. ...These questions would arise even if... we deal
with rules, like addition, that are stated explicitly. These
rules we think of ourselves as grasping consciously; in the
absence of Wittgenstein's sceptical arguments, we would see
no problem in the assumption that each particular answer we
produce is justified by our'grasp' of the rules. The problems
are compounded if, as in linguistics, the rules are thought of
as tacit, to be reconstructed by the scientist and inferred as
an explanation of behavior.7
Thus, unlike Quine, the Wittgensteinian skeptic calls into question the
notion of "implicit and unconscious conformity to a rule" whether or not
this conformity is merely a matter of "fitting."
Other philosophers, whom I will not discuss here, have attacked a
number of subsidiary assumptions made by the rule-attributing language
theorist.8
In 1986, Davidson published a paper9 in which he offered what
was essentially a new kind of skeptical argument against the enterprise.
Citing such phenomena as our ability to recover the meaning of a
malapropism, Davidson argued that a rule-governed account of
interpretation was inadequate to the task of accounting for many of the
8
ways that we recover meanings from utterances. He argued that such
phenomena as our ability to interpret malaprops and other slips of the
tongue, our ability to interpret grammatically garbled utterances, and our
ability to interpret new words, threatened "standard descriptions of
linguistic competence... ."10
In this paper, I will defend a standard mechanistic model of our
linguistic competence against Davidson's skeptical claims. I will, in the
process, explore the extent to which our interpretive abilities might
"reach beyond" what mechanist accounts of interpretation can deliver. The
"mechanistic account" which I have in mind is one that seeks to explain
our linguistic capacities in terms of a shared knowledge--on the part of
both speaker and hearer-of the rules and principles that govern a
language. The mechanist attributes to each competent language-user the
knowledge of some language L, and attempts to characterize this
knowledge by constructing a theory of the language-user's grammatical
competence. According to the mechanist, our language faculty can be
thought of as;. kind of cognitive "machine" which, on the production side,
translates an intention to express a thought with content C into a phone
sequence (or other symbolic string) with meaning C, and which, on the
interpretive side, translates incoming strings of formatives into
representations of meaning. This machine is assumed to be for the most
part cognitively impenetrable-to use an expression coined by Pylyshyn.
The mechanistic account which I have in mind supplements the proposed
production/interpretation machine with a number of pragmatic rules that
govern how the meaning of an utterance varies as a function of its literal
9
meaning and its context of utterance. Strictly speaking, I should call this
the "mechanistic/pragmatic" account of language use, but I will opt for
the shorter moniker "mechanistic account" when there is no danger of
confusion, and I will refer to the proponent of this modei simply as the
"mechanist."
I present Davidson's argument in Part I.
In Part II, I assess Davidson's challenge and argue that his
skepticism is not well-motivated. After briefly considering Davidson's
argument against the role of convention in language (§1), 1 argue that (1)
the mechanistic program outlined by Chomsky and others can
satisfactorily accommodate the phenomena which Davidson claims
threaten standard descriptions of our linguistic competence; (2) we need
not expect that the mechanistic model will necessarily accommodate
every observed interpretive phenomenon; a satisfactory explanation of the
interpretive ability in question may, for example, fall outside of what
Chomsky has called our cognitive capacity; (3) Davidson is mistaken in
suggesting that there are good grounds for extending his skepticism about
rule-governed accounts of interpretation from malaprops to all utterances
of a language.
In Part III, I explore some of the details of my response to
Davidson, and the assumptions that underlie this response. I take a closer
look at the model of sentence and utterance interpretation which I believe
answers Davidson's demand for "a machine which, when fed an arbitrary
10
utterance (and certain parameters provided by the circumstances of the
utterance), produces an interpretation." 1 1
In Part IV I examine Davidson's list of abilities which he claims
threaten standard descriptions of our linguistic competence. I pay
particularly close attention to our ability to recover the meanings of
grammatically garbled utterances. I end by concluding that these abilities
constitute no real challenge to the mechanist's enterprise.
.
d
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Part I
Presentation of Davidson's skeptical argument
12
Introduction
In a much discussed paper titled "A Nice Derangement of
Epitaphs," 1 Davidson comes to some rather heady conclusions:
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned,
mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and
then apply to cases. And we should try again to say how
convention in any important sense is involved in language; or,
as I think, we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we
communicate by appeal to conventions.2
I will not here attempt to reconcile these conclusions with views that we
might attribute to Davidson on the basis of his other works on language.
Nor will I attempt to reconstruct how Davidson's ideas have changed or
evolved in the time since his paper was first published. I am not so much
interested in Davidson's current theories on language, as i am in the kind
of skeptical argument that he outlines, and the linguistic data that he
adduces in its defense. I do not believe that Davidson's argument is very
good; I hope to show, however, that his argument fails in some rather
interesting ways. In challenging Davidson, the philosopher of language is
compelled to sharpen his account of a number of linguistic notions that he
might otherwise take for granted--among them, the distinctions between
core and periphery, competence and performance, the notion of a linguistic
rule, and the very concept of a language.
The premise that lies at the heart of Davidson's skeptical
13
argument is this: There can be no adequate rule-governed description of
our ability to interpret utterances. Davidson essentially wants to argue
that our interpretive abilities far outstrip anything that theory can
deliver. The exact senses of these propositions will become clearer in the
course of my discussion.
§1 Some preliminaries
As the passage quoted above suggests, Davidson has a specific
model of linguistic performance (and competence) in mind. This model
will emerge in the course 'of my exposition, and I will extract its salient
features from the context of Davidson's argument rather than from any
assumptions that we might be tempted to make about his own theory
preferences.
Davidson begins by drawing our attention to a language-user's
native ability to interpret utterances that contain one or more
malapropisms. (This ability is "native" insofar as it is acquired without
explicit training-although in keeping with standard usage we should say
that it is the capacity for acquiring this ability that is native, rather than
the ability itself.) Imagine for a moment that Mrs. Malaprop3 and I are
walking beside the soon-to-be-dismantled Berlin Wall, admiring the
fanciful graffiti. Feeling herself overcome by a strange curatorial mood,
Mrs. Malaprop points to an artful section of the wall and exclaims, "What a
14
nice derangement of epitaphs!" Before she has a chance to correct herself
- if, indeed, she has noticed her own error - I correctly recover her
intended meaning (nice arrangement of epithets). According to Davidson,
my ability to do this falls into a very peculiar category of linguistic
phenomena, a category that may also include "our ability to perceive a
well-formed sentence when the actual utterance was incomplete or
grammatically garbled, our ability to interpret words we have never heard
before, to correct slips of the tongue, or to cope with new idiolects."4
These phenomena, as we shall see, are what motivate Davidson's skeptical
conclusions about language. According to Davidson, these special
linguistic abilities "threaten standard descriptions of linguistic
competence ... ,"5 a claim that I will assess in some detail in Part II.
Davidson makes it clear from the beginning of his paper that he
does not intend to "obliterate or even blur the distinction between
speaker's meaning and literal meaning."6 He notes, however, that the term
literal meaning "is too encrusted with philosophical and other extras to
do much work."7 Here I take Davidson to be referring to the question of
whether or not we can coherently talk about the meaning of a sentence in
abstraction from any cocasion of its utterance, a question to which I will
return. Davidson skirts this issue by positing what fhe calls first meaning.
According to him, the concept of first meaning "applies to words and
sentences as uttered by a particular speaker on a particular occasion," 8
with the added proviso that the occasion, speaker, and audience be
"normal" or "standard" in some unspecified way.9 Given that these
normality conditions hold, "the first meaning of an utterance will be what
15
should be found by consulting a dictionary based on actual usage..." 10
First meanings are obviously intended to serve as palatable substitutes
for the disreputable literal meanings - palatable to those theorists who,
for example, countenance only speaker meanings.
We may, of course, question the propriety of this move. We are
told that in order to recover the first meaning of a sentence s, we must
imagine the meaning that s would have if uttered by a standard speaker to
a standard audience on some standard occasion. But how are we to decide
what constitutes a standard or normal context of utterance? Suppose that
we were to try using Davidson's prescription to recover the first meaning
of the following sentence:
[1] The ham sandwich barked at my wristwatch.
Is it possible to specify a "standard" context of utterance for sentence
[1]? If not, do we then conclude that [1] has no first meaning or, casting
caution to the wind, no literal meaning? I take it that a standard context
of utterance for sentence [1] would be one in which the speaker can utter
[1] and mean it literally. A plausible candidate for a standard context of
utterance for sentence [1] might be something like the following:
[2] Occasion: A possible world in which an animate ham sandwich -
that thinks he's a dog - barks at my counterpart's
wristwatch.
Speaker: My possible world counterpart
Audience: My counterpart's audience
16
Here we have a context in which we might be tempted to say that the
speaker utters sentence [1] and means it literally--insofar as we can
trust our intuitions about possible worlds and possible world
counterparts. It appears, however, that we have already appealed to our
intuition of sentence [1]'s literal meaning in reconstructing its standard
context of utterance. Suppose that we were to try "impoverishing" the
context given in [2] as follows:
[3] Occasion: Any occasion will do, as long as a ham sandwich and
a wristwatch are present.
Speaker: The owner of the wristwatch
Audience: Anybody
This "standard" context has the advantage of being much more general than
the context given in [2]: it does little more than assemble the cast of
characters suggested by. the noun phrases in sentence [1]. But now it is
unclear what Davidson's elaborate prescription buys you, above and beyond
the requirement that we take sentence [1] literally. Davidson's
prescription may of course simply be intended as a means of excluding a
number of "non-standard" occasions of utterance-occasions, for example,
in which we utter sentence [1] and mean it metaphorically, or ironically,
or sarcastically, etc. But even here it is doubtful that we can escape
acknowledging the literal meaning of sentence. [1], for it appears that the
criterion of membership in our list of non-standard occasions of utterance
is that the occasion be one in which we utter sentence [1] and mean it
non-literally. The moral of this excursus: literal meanings may be suspect
theoretical constructions, but first meanings create more problems than
17
they solve. In Part III, §2 1 will present what I believe to be a
non-question-begging account of first or literal meaning, one which has
the added advantage of preserving Davidson's intentions.
§2 The Three Plausible Principles model
Having thus tabled our concerns about first meanings, we turn
now to the question of what role they play in Davidson's skeptical
argument. Davidson articulates three principles that plausibly govern
first meanings in language. Together these principles suggest a kind of
model for interpretation - more specifically, a model of how a competent
language-user successfully interprets the utterances of other
language-users. In order to restrict our attention to first meaning, as
Davidson suggests, we should imagine that the speaker and his interpreter
exchange words in as neutral, or "standard," a context as possible
(whatever that means). Davidson's three principles are as follows:
(1) First meaning is systematic. A competent speaker or
interpreter is able to interpret utterances, his own or those of
others, on the basis of the semantic properties of the parts, or
words, in the utterance, and the structure of the utterance.
For this to be possible, there must be systematic relations
between the meanings of utterances.
(2) First meanings are shared. For speaker and interpreter to
crmmunicate successfully and regularly, they must share a
method of interpretation of the sort described in (1).
(3) First meanings are governed by learned conventions or
regularities. The systematic knowledge or competence of the
18
speaker or interpreter is learned in advance of occasions of
interpretation and is conventional in character. 11
In the discussion that follows, I will refer to the model of interpretation
suggested by these principles as the Three Plausible Principles (TPP)
model.
Principle (1) is, I believe, fairly straightforward: it is little more
than the claim that the interpreter has a system for interpreting the
utterances of other language-users. Davidson suggests that we think of
this system as a "machine which, when fed an arbitrary utterance (and
certain parameters provided by the circumstances of the utterance),
produces an interpretation." 12 The "parameters" to which Davidson
alludes may include those properties of the context of utterance that help
"fix" the indexical elements of the sentence used to make the utterance.
They may also include those context parameters that help the interpreter
determine the referents of the names and definite descriptions used by
the speaker, etc.
Principle (3) requires some explanation, for the notion of
convention figures quite prominently in it. Davidson's interest in the role
of convention in language is underscored by another passage in the
Epitaphs paper:
According to [the account of linguistic competence given by
principles (1) - (2)], each interpreter (and this includes
speakers, since speakers must be interpreters) comes to a
successful linguistic exchange prepared with a 'theory' which
constitutes his basic linguistic competence, and which he
19
shares with those with whom he communicates. Because each
party has such a shared theory and knows that others share his
theory, and knows that others know he knows, (etc.), some
would say that the knowledge or the abilities that constitute
the theory may be called conventions.13
It is not entirely clear to me that the shared and symmetric knowledge
alluded to in this passage in any way constitutes a convention. We can,
for example, be reasonably certain that others share our "theory" of vision
(e.g. that what looks square to me from this vantage point will also look
square to someone else who occupies my vantage point), and others can
know that we know this, etc. Nevertheless we would not say that the
special abilities that constitute vision are in any way conventional.
Something extra is needed if we are to separate the notion of a convention
from that of a felicity condition, or irom a very natural assumption about
other people's abilities - lingiistic and otherwise. I will consider
Davidson's argument against the role of convention in language in Part II,
§1.
And now we close the circle: Davidson does not believe that
principles (1) and (2) are incompatible with the existence of
malapropisms,1 4 although these principles survive only "when understood
in rather unusual ways." 15 Our troubles begin, he claims, when we
attempt to combine these two principles with principle (3).16 According
to Davidson, Mrs. Malaprop is a kind of linguistic criminal who has gotten
away with her crime:
... the interpreter comes to the occasion of utterance armed
with a theory that tells him (or so he believes) what an
20
arbitrary utterance of the speaker means. The speaker then
says something with the intention that it will be interpreted
in a certain way, and the expectation that it will be so
interpreted. In fact this way is not provided for by the
interpreter's theory. But the speaker is nevertheless
understood; the interpreter adjusts his theory so that it yields
the speaker's intended interpretation. The speaker has 'gotten
away with it'. The speaker may or may not ... know that he has
got away with anything; the interpreter may or may not know
that the speaker intended to get away with anything. What is
common to the cases is that the speaker expects to be, and is,
interpreted as the speaker intended although the interpreter
did not have a correct theory in advance.1
It is this last assertion that provides us with the key to this passage, and
indeed to Davidson's argument as a whole. If in fact the speaker has
gotten away with her linguistic crime, it is only because she was aided
and abetted by her interpreter. How was it possible, Davidson asks, for
Mrs. Malaprop's interpreter to understand that by uttering "a nice
derangement of epitaphs" she in fact meant "a nice arrangement of
epithets"? According to Davidson, this interpretation "is not provided for
by the interpreter's theory." 18 Principle (3) of the TPP model cannot
stand side by side with pi'inciples (1) and (2) because it asserts that the
interpreter's linguistic competence is prepared in advance of the occasion
of interpretation, and is conventional in nature. Here is what I take
Davidson to mean. Although he acknowledges that speaker and hearer do in
fact come to agree on their interpretation of the malaprop, so that the
interpretation is in some sense "shared," Davidson does not believe that
the hearer comes to agree with the speaker by appealing to, or making use
of, any interpretive competence that he shares with the speaker, and
which can be adequately modeled as some set of rules governing the
21
interpretation of particular utterances. There is, furthermore, a sense in
which the very utterance of the malaprop ruptures a convention that some
theorists believe is essential to any adequate description of
communication by language-or so Davidson believes. (I will address the
role of convention in language in Part II, §1.)
Principle (3) does not appear to jive with the fact that a
competent language-user can successfully interpret malaprops,
grammatically garbled sentences, words he has never heard before, slips
of the tongue, and new idiolects.19 These are not, according to Davidson,
abilities that have their point of origin in a fixed, shared "interpreting
machine" that we carry around with us and deploy as the need arises.
These are, rather, complex abilities that depend in good measure on our
own "wit, luck, and wisdom." 2 0 Being prepared in advance to interpret a
malaprop would be like preparing an answer to a question that we have not
yet been asked.
The successful interpretation of the malaprop, Davidson would
like to argue, poses a special problem for the rule-attributing theorist
that is quite different from the problem posed by the interpretation of
other non-literal forms of speech, like irony, for example. The
interpretation of ironic utterances is usually explained by the
rule-attributing theorist as a two stage process: (1) the interpreter's
linguistic competence (modeled as a set of rules and principles) delivers
to him a sharply restricted range of possible meanings for the utterance;
(2) the interpreter's general intelligence, together with his knowledge of
22
the maxims and principles governing the use of nonliteral speech, allow
him to infer that the speaker was speaking ironically and thereby to
choose the speaker's intended meaning from the utterance's range of
possible meanings. Davidson wants to argue that there is no
rule-governed competence which we can attribute to the interpreter on
the basis of which he can generate a range of possible meanings to the
malaprop. In other words, Davidson believes that there is no first stage of
a two stage interpretive process possible for the malapropism. I should
also note in passing that unlike the case of speaking ironically, or
metaphorically, etc., the malapropper intends that his utterance be taken
literally. I will explore the special significance of this fact in Part II, §1.
We might also note that at several points in the Epitaphs paper
Davidson tips his hat to Paul Grice. He writes, for example:
... [Paul Grice] has shown why it is essential to distinguish
between the literal meaning (perhaps what I am calling first
meaning) of words and what is often implied (or implicated) by
someone who uses those words. He has explored the general
principles behind our ability to figure out such implicatures,
and these principles must, of course, be known to speakers
who expect to be taken up on them. Whether knowledge of
these principles ought to be included in the description of
linguistic competence may not have to be settled ...21
And in the very next passage Davidson says, "I dip into these matters only
to distinguish them from the problem raised by malapropisms and the like.
The problems touched on [in the passage above] all concern the ability to
interpret words and constructions of the kind covered by our conditions
(1) - (3)."22 I will not here explore the question of how Grice's program
23
might fit into or connect with the TPP model of sentence-interpretation.
As Davidson sees it, the conversational implicatures that Grice has
written about are governed by "general principles" - leaving open the
question of whether or not these principles should be included in a
description of the speaker's linguistic competence. Malapropisms, on the
other hand, are intrinsically "wild," fettered neither by the rules of a
compositional semantics, nor the rules and heuristics that govern the
interpretation of nonliteral or indirect speech. Malaprops are conceived in
linguistic sin, and the fact that they can be interpreted presents a special
problem for the theorist.
The special problem presented by malapropisms is highlighted by
a passage in "Communication and Convention" (Davidson, 1984), where the
issue is not so much our ability to interpret malaprops, as it is our ability
to "shift ground appropriately" in the process of interpretation:
... formal methods are at their best applied to syntax; here at
least there is good reason to expect the same model to fit a
number of speakers fairly well. And there is no clear reason
why each hypothesized method of interpretation should not be
a formal semantics for what we may in a loose sense call a
language. What we cannot expect, however, is that we can
formalize the considerations that lead us to adjust our theory
to fit the inflow of new information. No doubt we normally
count the ability to shift ground appropriately as part of what
we call 'knowing the language'. But in this sense, there is no
saying what someone must know who knows the language; for
intuition, luck, skill must play as essential a role here as in
devising a new theory in any field; and taste and sympathy a
larger role.23
24
Davidson echoes this same theme in the Epitaphs paper when he asserts
that the theory used by the hearer to interpret the malapropping speaker
is "derived by wit, luck, and wisdom." 24 He is skeptical about the
possibility of "regularizing" this process of interpretation 25; likewise, in
the above passage, he is skeptical about the possibility of giving a formal
account of our ability to "shift ground appropriately" in order to
accommodate the inflow of new linguistic information. In Mrs. Malaprop's
case, it is not her utterance that is "new," but rather the connection
between her utterance and its intended meaning. According to Davidson, a
language-user's ability to recover this connection cannot be explained by
what he calls "formal methods." This connection is established by a
combination of luck and pluck, and formal methods - whichever these
might be - will fare about as well in this domain as they now do in
helping us to explain matters of personal taste.
We should note, before proceeding any further, that Davidson
equivocates between first meaning and utterer meaning, at least in the
malaprop case. He often speaks as if the meaning recovered by the
interpreter of the malaprop were in fact the utterance's first meaning.
(Hence the stipulation that principles (1)-(3) govern first meanings in
language.) This cannot be right, for, as we have seen, Davidson intends his
notion of first meaning to correspond to the linguist's notion of literal
meaning; and what the interpreter of the malaprop recovers, if he is
indeed successful, is the speaker's intended meaning, which, as a matter
of fact is not the literal meaning of the sentence that the speaker actually
succeeds in producing. I will not pursue this matter any further because I
25
do not believe that it affects the substance of Davidson's argument.
Summarizing the argument thus far: Davidson proposes three
principles that govern first meanings in language and which constitute or
suggest a model of our linguistic competence (what I have elsewhere
called the TPP model). The first and second of these principles are
compatible with the existence of malaprops, in a sense that I will explain
in Part II, §1; the third, however, is not. The competent language-user's
ability to interpret malapropisms cannot be formally modeled as a set of
rules or principles which he acquires in advance of the occasion of
interpretation. Therefore the Three Plausible Principles model of our
linguistic competence - the model widely held by linguists and
philosophers - is in error.
Notice that Davidson is not so much challenging the details of a
well-articulated theory of linguistic competence, as he is questioning the
assumptions that underlie a very general framework of linguistic inquiry.
Conspicuously absent from our discussion, however, is the model or
framework that Davidson would have replace the TPP model discussed
above.
In the following section I will continue to develop Davidson's
argument by describing his own picture of what transpires between
speaker and interpreter.
26
§3 The Prior Theory/Passing Theory model
Davidson presents what he calls a "highly simplified and
idealized proposal"6 about what goes on between speaker and interpreter:
An interpreter has, at any moment of a speech transaction,
what I persist in calling a theory. (I call it a theory, as
remarked before, only because a description of the
interpreters competence requires a recursive account.) I
assume that the interpreters theory has been adjusted to the
evidence so far available to him: knowledge of the character,
dress, role, sex, of the speaker, and whatever else has been
gained by observing the speakers behavior, linguistic or
otherwise. As the speaker speaks his piece the interpreter
alters his theory, entering hypotheses about new names,
altering the interpretation of familiar predicates, and revising
past interpretations of particular utterances in the light of
new evidence.27
Davidson distinguishes what he calls the interpreters prior theory from
his passing theory:
For the hearer, the prior theory expresses how he is prepared
in advance to interpret an utterance of the speaker, while the
passing theory is how he does interpret the utterance. For the
speaker, the prior theory is what he believes the interpreter's
prior theory to be, while his passing theory is the theory he
intends the interpreter to use.28
I shall, following Davidson, assume that there is no harm in speaking as if
the interpreter were using the theory that we use to describe his
competence. It should be noted that at each instant during the exchange
between speaker and interpreter, the hearer possesses a prior theory that
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expresses how he is disposed to interpret the speaker. The hearer's prior
theory may of course be updated during the exchange, as new information
about the speaker's idiolect becomes available, but the hearer's prior
theory is never replaced by his passing theory. To make the distinction
between prior and passing theory clear, on the part of both hearer and
speaker, let us consider the following two cases:
Case A: "Derangement" means arrangement and "epitaph" means epithet
in Mrs. Malaprop's idiolect. She says, "What a nice derangement
of epitaphs," and her interpreter (correctly) understands her to
mean [[What a nice arrangement of epithets]].29 Suppose
further that she does not know the words arrangement and
epithet, so that she is in no way disposed to say "What a nice
arrangement of epithets" and mean anything by it.
Case B: "Derangement" means derangement and "epitaph" means epitaph
in Mrs. Malaprop's idiolect. She is perfectly disposed to say
"What a nice arrangement of epithets" and mean [[What a nice
arrangement of epithets]], but because she's had ti many
martoonis, her tongue slips, and out come the words "What a
nice derangement of epitaphs." Again her interpreter correctly
understands her to mean [[What a nice arrangement of
epithets]].
To simplify the expositiorn, let us suppose that the interpreter is a
competent English speaker who does not suspect Mrs. Malaprop of being a
habitual malapropper. Let s be the sentence "What a nice derangement of
epitaphs."
In Case A as in Case B, the hearer is ex hypothesi predisposed to
interpret s in the "standard" way. Therefore, in his prior theory for Mrs.
Malaprop, s means [[What a nice derangement of epitaphs]]. At the instant
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of interpretation, however, the hearers passing theory tells him that in
uttering s Mrs. Malaprop really means [[What a nice arrangement of
epithets]]. What happens to the hearers prior theory after Mrs. Malaprop
makes her blunder? Should his prior theory incorporate the information
given to him by his passing theory? This depends in large measure on
what the hearer believes the nature of Mrs. Malaprop's mistake to be. If,
as we have described it in Case A, Mrs. Malaprop is quite confused about
the "real" meanings of the words derangement and epitaph, the hearer
should update his prior theory in such a way as to take account of this
fact-especially in the light of evidence that Mrs. Malaprop misuses these
words systematically. If, on the other hand, Mrs. Malaprop shares the
hearer's idiolect (as in Case B), he does best to leave his prior theory for
her unaffected, except perhaps for the parenthetical addition of the
statement that she is under some circumstances liable to pronounce
"arrangement" as "derangement," and "epithet" as "epitaph."
The speaker's passing theory presents us with a different
challenge. According to Davidson, the speaker's passing theory is "the
theory he intends the interpreter to use." 30 But this definition is
ambiguous in at least two ways: Is the speaker's passing theory the theory
he intends the interpreter to use in general, or on just that particular
occasion of utterance? This problem does not surface for Case A, in
which Mrs. Malaprop clearly intends her interpreter to use a theory
wherein s means [[What a nice arrangement of epithets]], both on the
occasion of uttering s and in general. But how do we characterize the
speakers passing theory in Case B? If Mrs. Malaprop catches her error, it
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is likely that she will correct herself, or smile coyly, or otherwise
indicate to her hearer that the form of her utterance was not what she
intended-however clear its intended meaning may have been. But this
tells us nothing about her passing theory. It appears that in Case B there
are two candidates for Mrs. Malaprop's passing theory. On the occasion of
uttering s, Mrs. Malaprop intends that her interpreter use a theory wherein
s means [[What a nice arrangement of epithets]]; in general, however, she
intends that her interpreter use a theory wherein s means [[What a nice
derangement of epitaphs]]. Each of these two intentions determines a
different passing theory for Mrs. Malaprop in accordance with Davidson's
definition. How are we to decide between the two? The solution to this
problem lies in another passage where Davidson writes:
The passing theory is where, accident aside, agreement is
greatest. As speaker and interpreter talk, their prior theories
become more alike; so do their passing theories.31
In Case B, the interpreters prior theory is one in which s means [[What a
nice derangement of epitaphs]], and here Mrs. Malaprop and her interpreter
are in full agreement. The interpreter's passing theory, on the other hand,
has it that s means [,What a nice arrangement of epithets]]. If, as the
above passage suggests, agreement is greatest in the passing theory, then
we should expect the two passing theories-Mrs. Malaprop's and her
interpreter's--to coincide. I will assume, therefore, that Davidson would
have Mrs. Malaprop's passing theory record only her short term intentions
for her interpreters theory.
Davidson nowhere suggests that his talk of prior and passing
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theories is anything more than a fagon de parler. He does not, for example,
predict that the elucidation of prior and passing theories will constitute
the cutting edge of future linguistic theorizing. The picture that Davidson
sketches of what transpires between speaker and interpreter is not an
idea whose time has come, but rather a foil to the "standard" model of our
linguistic competence as given by principles (1)-(2):
I think that the distinction between the prior and passing
theory, if taken seriously, undermines this commonly accepted
account of linguistic competence and communication. Here is
why. What must be shared for communication to succeed is the
passing theory. For the passing theory is the one the
interpreter actually uses to interpret an utterance, and it is
the theory the speaker intends the interpreter to use. ...
... But the passing theory cannot in general correspond to an
interpreters linguistic competence. Not only does it have its
changing list of proper names and gerrymandered vocabulary,
but it includes every successful-i.e. correctly interpreted-use
of any other word or phrase, no matter how far out of the
ordinary. Every deviation from ordinary usage, as long as it is
agreed on for the moment (knowingly deviant, or not, on one, or
both, sides), is in the passing theory as a feature of what the
words mean on that occasion. Such meanings, transient though
they may be, are literal; they are what I have called first
meanings.32
How, exactly, does the distinction between prior and passing
theory undermine the account of linguistic competence given by principles
(1) and (2)? The passing theory, Davidson seems to be saying, yields
meanings for utterances that no compositional semantics could ever give
you; neither could these meanings be arrived at by the rules or heuristics
of some pragmatic theory. My passing theory for Mrs. Malaprop will assign
a meaning to every peculiar construction which she has uttered and which
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I have had the occasion to interpret successfully. With its "changing list
of proper names and gerrymandered vocabulary,"33 and its other
deviations from standard usage, the passing theory will be, by its very
nature, unsystematic. It does not appear that a competent speaker or
interpreter unravels the intended meaning of a malaprop, for example, by
appealing to the semantic properties of its parts and the structure of the
utterance. Our theory of pragmatics is no help to us here either--or so
Davidson appears to claim. There is no system, Davidson is saying, that
will allow us to shift ground appropriately when confronted with radically
nonstandard utterances. So much for principle (1). And if principle (1)
falls, so does principle (2): for if there is no real "system" or "method" of
interpretation, then there is no such system or method for speaker and
interpreter to share.
I have been purposely vague about the nature of the prior and
passing theories in part because it is difficult to nail Davidson down on
this question. He appears to equivocate between two very different
models of the passing theory. In one model, the interpreter's passing
theory is like his prior theory plus a number of "accretions" that
correspond to the idiosyncrasies of the speaker's idiolect. Thus it has its
"changing list of proper names and gerrymandered vocabulary,"34 and also
includes "every successful ... use of any word or phrase, no matter how far
out of the ordinary."35 So, for example, we have a model of the
interpreters passing theory that looks something like the following:
[4a] Core (or prior?) + 1. "Derangement" means arrangement
theory 2. "Epitaph" means epithet
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3. etc.
In contrast to this model, we have one in which "knowing a oassing theory
is only knowing how to interpret a particular utterance on a partirular
occasion"36; it is a theory whose expected field of application is
"vanishingly small."37 This suggests rather a model like
[4b] "A nice derangement of epitaphs" means a nice arrangement of
epithets,
a small piece of propositional knowledge construed separately from the
interpreter's more complete prior theory. Given this model, it is clear
why Davidson says that a passing theory "is not a theory of what anyone
(except perhaps a philosopher) would call an actual natural language." 38
For the rest of this discussion, I will assume that by "passing theory"
Davidson is referring to the latter, more impoverished model, although, as
we shall see, this choice in no way affects the substance of his argument.
The role of the prior theory and the passing theory in Davidson's
argument should now be apparent. Let us, for the sake of brevity, call this
account of our linguistic competence the Passing Theory (PT) model. The
PT model is intended by Davidson to serve as a kind of theory-neutral
description of what transpires between speaker and hearer.39 The
expression "theory neutral description" is, of course, almost a
contradiction in terms, but by this I mean a description that makes very
minimal assumptions about the mechanisms that underlie the phenomena
in question. In this case we have a description of our linguistic
competence that does not invoke the notion of an "interpreting machine"
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shared by both speaker and hearer, and acquired by each prior to the
occasion of utterance. To be sure, Davidson persists in talking about
shared "theories." But I attribute this persistence to his inability to find
a way around our need to give a recursive account of the interpreter's
competence. "We cannot describe what an interpreter can do except by
appeal to a recursive theory of a certain sort," Davidson says, "It does not
add anything to this thesis to say that if the theory does correctly
describe the competence of an interpreter, some mechanism in the
interpreter must correspond to the theory."40 A recursive model of the
interpreters boundless capacity to interpret novel utterances is
apparently something that no serious description of his linguistic
competence could do without. Nevertheless, according to Davidson, what
is essential for successful interpretation is that the passing theory be
shared, and this is little more than the requirement that the speaker and
hearer agree on the intended meaning of the utterance a requirement not
fraught with too many theoretical commitments.
Here, then, is Davidson's argumentative strategy: by "weakening"
his premise (i.e. the PT model), he hopes to make his skeptical conclusions
correspondingly stronger. Furthermore, by showing that his skeptical
conclusions follow from some very minimal assumptions about the nature
of our linguistic competence, he effectively bypasses the methodological
squabbles endemic to linguists and philosophers.
There is, of course, more than one premise to his argument. We
can agree with Davidson that in some sense (to be further explicated) all
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that is needed for successful communication is that speaker and hearer
agree from time to time on a passing theory. But we certainly need not
agree that "there are no rules for arriving at passing theories, no rules in
any strict sense, as opposed to rough maxims and methodological
generalities."4 1
§4 The Ubiquity Hypothesis
Davidson's argument would not be so bothersome if only
malaprops were at issue. But he wants to cast his net more widely than
this:
Malapropisms fall into a different category, one that may
include such things as our ability to perceive a well-formed
sentence when the actual utterance was incomplete or
grammatically garbled, our ability to interpret words we have
never heard before, to correct slips of the tongue, or to cope
with new idiolects.4 2
I will consider this peculiar category of linguistic phenomena more
carefully in Part IV. According to Davidson, these phenomena also
"threaten standard descriptions of linguistic competence."43 Not only do
we interpret malaprops on a fairly regular basis, but we also recover the
intended meanings of grammatically garbled utterances, utterances that
contains words and names that are unfamiliar to us, and utterances that
contain slips of the tongue. In our normal linguistic intercourse with
others we are constantly running up against speakers with idiolects
35
substantially different from our own. These and other similar phenomena
permeate language to such an extent that Davidson concludes, "[T]here is
no such thing as how we expect, in the abstract, to be interpreted. "4 4 The
phenomenon of a speaker's making an utterance which is not interpreted by
the hearer in the "standard" way, but which is nevertheless understood by
the hearer as the speaker intended, is a phenomenon which Davidson
believes is "ubiquitous."45 According to Davidson:
What two people need, if they are to understand one another
through speech, is the ability to converge on passing theories
from utterance to utterance. Their starting points, however
far back we want to take them, will usually be very
different--as different as the ways in which they acquired
their linguistic skills. So also, then, will the strategies and
stratagems that bring about convergence differ.4
There is then, as Davidson claims, "no learnable common core of
consistent behavior,"47 and we therefore engage in a kind of radical
homophonic interpretation all the time. I will call this further claim of
Davidson's the "Ubiquity Hypothesis," and I will postpone a discussion of it
until Part II. Simply put, Davidson's claim is that the fancy guesswork we
must use to recover the intended meaning of the malaprop is the kind of
guesswork that we are compelled to use in all cases of utterance
interpretation.
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§5 Summary
Even the most sympathetic reader would be startled by the
strength of Davidson's conclusions:
The problem we have been grappling with depends on the
assumption that communication by speech requires that
speaker and interpreter have learned or somehow acquired a
common method or theory of interpretation-as being able to
operate on the basis of shared conventions, rules, or
regularities. The problem arose when we realized that no
method or theory fills this bill. ... I conclude that there is no
such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like
what many philosophers and linguists have supposed.48
In the chapter that follows, I will argue that Davidson's skepticism about
"a clearly defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then
apply to cases"4 9 is unwarranted. His mistake, I hope to show, is
essentially one of underestimating the robustness of rule-governed
accounts of interpretation, and of misconstruing linguistic's
self-conception.
I should mention in passing that not everybody agrees with my
reconstruction of Davidson's argument. In a recent paper, Alex George
(George, 1990) offers the following analysis:
Reflection on communication involving 'deviant' speech reveals
that neither the theory used to interpret another's utterances,
nor the theory employed by a speaker to assign interpretations
to his or her own words, plausibly offers characterizations of
a language, in the ordinary sense. This is allegedly so because
the wide range of communicational phenomena in question
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shows that our idiolects (what these theories are theories of)
so vary with the present moment, audience and speaker that no
two people are likely to share an idiolect and even that at no
two times is an individual likely to have the same idiolect.
Thus those linguists and philosophers are mistaken who took
themselves to be characterizing some shared and stable body
of information sufficient unto communication.50
George's line is to argue that Davidson is attempting to support the thesis
of "radical semantic instability"-the major support for this thesis being
"the view that intentions can determine meaning." Contra Davidson,
George argues that Davidson's examples (the malaprop case and others) are
not instances of a speaker's idiolect undergoing modification in the course
of an exchange, but rather of changes in our own beliefs about the
speakers idiolect.
I believe, however, that George has missed the point somewhat of
Davidson's argument. Nowhere does Davidson argue that the speaker's
production of the malaprop gives evidence that there has been a change in
his idiolect. I believe that Davidson is more than willing to admit that in
these cases and others the competence of both speaker and hearer remain
unchanged.
George is correct when he attributes to Davidson the view that
theorists are "mistaken" when they take themselves to be characterizing
"some shared and stable body of information sufficient unto
interpretation"-but Davidson is nowhere concerned with the issue of
stability. Furthermore, on my reading of Davidson's argument, he is also
willing to admit that speaker and hearer share a kind of competence.
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Recall, for example, Davidson's words to the effect that principle (2) of
the TPP model-the requirement that first meanings be shared-survives
"when understood in [a] rather unusual [way]. "51 Here, then, is what I take
Davidson to mean by this claim: What is shared by speaker and hearer is
the ability to converge on the correct passing theory from time to time;
there is, however, no body of rules or principles that can adequately
characterize this ability.52
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Part II
Assessing Davidson's argument
40
Introduction
Davidson's argument is in many ways very unnerving. He tells us
that
... [a] passing theory really is like a theory at least in this, that
it is derived by luck, and wisdom from a private vocabulary and
grammar, knowledge of the ways people get their point across,
and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the
dictionary are most likely.1
The picture that emerges is one that shifts the emphasis from shared
"interpreting machines" to rough and ready maxims, from mechanisms to
luck and pluck, from rules to vaguely articulated personal strategies that
help us find a trajectory through language space. The phenomenology of
language therefore presents the interpreter with a kind of scientific
challenge. The interpreter is compelled to devise a "theory" in which
certain sounds or signs made by the speaker are first recognized as
linguistic, and then integrated into a framework in which it becomes
possible to "make sense" of the speaker's behavior-linguistic and
otherwise. In "Communication and Convention" (Davidson, 1984b),
Davidson tells us that there is no saying what someone must know who
knows a language, "for intuition, luck, and skill must play as essential
role here as in devising a new theory in any field ...@."2 Yet one wonders
how this can be true. For the ability to devise good theories in science is
a specialized skill acquired only after many long years of training; it is a
rare gift among scientists. Yet even the most feebleminded language-user
can devise a correct passing theory from time to time.
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Davidson has two big targets in the Epitaphs paper: (1) the notion
that convention plays some essential role in language; and (2) the notion
of a shared linguistic competence. (In §1 I suggest how these two
subjects might be related.)
Davidson wants to argue that convention plays no essential role
in natural language. He may, for other purposes wish to generalize this to
the thesis that convention plays no essential role in communication
simpliciter, or that it plays no essential role in communication by means
of a language in some more general sense of the term (where this latter
notion of a language is defined appropriately), but this does not appear to
be the thesis that he is defending in the Epitaphs paper.
Here is the general shape of his argument. He asks us to consider
the following phenomenon: A utters malaprop m intending thereby to mean
that p; his hearer B comes to believe (correctly) that by uttering m, A
meant that p. Davidson now argues that there is no preexisting convention
that "links" m-- or the use of m-to meaning that p, and that therefore Bs
coming to believe that A meant that p was accomplished without any
essential appeal to convention. His conclusion?: Convention plays no
essential role in communication by means of a language.
I examine this argument in §1 and I suggest that Davidson's
skepticism about the role of convention in language does not appear to be
well-motivated. I hope to show that the argument of the Epitaphs paper,
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even if sound, fails to engage the thesis of the convention-in-language
theorist (henceforth, the "conventionalist").
Davidson's second target is the notion of a shared, rule-governed
interpretive competenco on the part of both speaker and hearer. Davidson
argues that the speakers utterance of the malaprop catches the hearer's
competence "off guard," and that the hearer is unable, in any rule-governed
way, to forge the necessary link between the sounds made by the speaker
and their intended meaning.
Davidson's argument is essentially three-pronged. He argues: (1)
There is no such thing as a malaprop-interpreting competence; and
because there is no such competence, it certainly cannot be shared; (2)
Even if we could adequately describe a rule-governed process by which B
interprets the malaprop (which we cannot), it would be of such an
idiosyncratic nature that it would be unlikely to be shared by A; (3) This
despair over the possibility cf any shared malaprop-interpreting
competence is extended--via the Ubiquity Hypothesis-to the possibility of
any shared ianguage-interpreting competence (where the implied notion of
a language is extensional). This last move is essential because we might,
for example, object that malaprops and the other interpretive phenomena
that Davidson alludes to are very rare or very peculiar and therefore lie
outside the proper margins of that phenomenon we call communication by
language. To this he responds by saying that "such things happen all the
time; in fact, if the conditions are generalized in a natural way, the
phenomenon is ubiquitous."3 What I have called the "Ubiquity Hypothesis"
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is essentially Davidson's response to an objection of this kind.
The picture of utterance interpretation that I would like to
defend against Davidson's skeptical claims is the following. Speaker A
makes an utterance U and interpreter B recovers the speaker's intended
meaning in two stages: (1) B's (rule-governed) competence generates for U
a range of its possible meanings; (2) Bs knowledCge of the maxims and
principles governing communication by language (the subject of a
well-developed theory of pragmatics) together with his general
intelligence, allow him to choose correctly one of the range of possible
meanings for U, in accordance with the speaker's intentions. Davidson is
arguing that there is no competence that we can attribute to B on the
basis of which B can generate the essential range of meanings for U. He
does not, in other words, believe that stage (1) is possible for the
malaprop-nor, in fact, does he believe that it is possible for utterances in
general (the Ubiquity Hypothesis).
George4 has highlighted an interesting distinction between the
rules that help us to determine what a speaker meant, given that the
speaker was speaking (roughly) English, and rules that help us to
determine which rules the speaker was trying to conform himself to (i.e.
rules for identifying the speaker's idiolect). I am assuming that
Davidson's skepticism is directed against rules of the former kind. The
possibility that the idiolects of speaker and hearer may be quite different
initially only adds to the difficulty of accounting for the hearer's
interpretive competence via the attribution of rules known to both
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speaker and hearer in advance of the occasions of utterance.
In this chapter I will argue that there is good evidence that there
does in fact exist a shared malaprop-interpreting competence, and that
this competence shares many features with the competence that we use to
interpret utterances in general.
In §2, I will counterpoise Davidson's notion of our linguistic
competence with that of the mechanistic program championed by Noam
Chomsky and others of the generative grammar school, and I will defend
the Chomskyan framework of inquiry against Davidson's skeptical claims.
In §3, 1 will argue that this framework can accommodate interpretive
phenomena which do not strictly fall within its theoretical purview.
There is, in other words, a window of some value into which
non-mechanistic accounts of interpretation can fall.
In §4, 1 will argue that the Ubiquity Hypothesis (Part I, §4) is
false.
§1 Some notes on convention
Davidson concludes the Epitaphs paper by writing:
In linguistic communication nothing corresponds to a
linguistic competence as often described: that is, as
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summarized by principles (1)-(3) [of the TPP model].
Principles (1) and (2) survive when understood in rather
unusual ways, but principle (3) cannot stand. ...We must give up
the idea of a clearly defined structure which language-users
acquire and then apply to cases. And we should try again to
say how convention in any important sense is involved in
language; or, as I think, we should give up the attempt to
illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions.5
Principle (3), as the reader will recall, is the requirement that first
meanings be governed by learned conventions or regularities. I will return
to the question of how principles (1) and (2) survive, but my present
concern will be to explore how the argument of the Epitaphs paper
addresses the role of convention in language. In particular, I would like to
explore how Davidson's argument in the Epitaphs paper might settle the
ongoing debate between Davidson and those philosophers who claim that
conventions are somehow essential to the existence of communication by
language.6
It is a rather unfortunate feature of Davidson's argument that he
mentions only one plausible candidate for a convention governing the use
of language:
Because each party has... a shared theory and knows that others
share his theory, and knows that others know he knows, (etc.),
some would say that the knowledge or the abilities that
constitute the theory may be called conventions.7
I have already argued (Part I, §2) that this shared and symmetric
knowledge does not in and of itself constitute a convention; it may be one
of a number of criteria constituting a given convention governing the
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behavior of speaker and hearer, but as it stands it is incomplete. If this is
the only notion of convention that Davidson is willing to countenance, then
we can see how he is drawn to the conclusion that convention plays no
essential role in linguistic communication. For if, as Davidson argues,
there simply is no shared theory, then each party to the communicative
exchange cannot know that the others share his theory, nor can the others
know that he knows, etc. There may, of course, be independent grounds for
arguing that the shared and symmetric knowledge alluded to does not play
an essential role in linguistic communication, but I will not explore this
possibility here.
I believe that it is a safe assumption, however, that Davidson has
a more general conception of convention in mind. The problem for the
interpreter of Davidson's thought, and indeed for the proponents of
convention-in-language theories, is to specify the notion of convention
that might be relevant to understanding the "social aspects" ot linguistic
meaning.
In his paper "Communication and Convention," Davidson hints at
what this essential notion ot convention in language might be There he
tells us that "It is mainly in making the connection, or connections,
between linguistic meaning and human attitudes and acts described in
non-linguistic terms that convention is asked to do its work."8 Here is
what I take Davidson to mean. Linguistic meaning often appears to us in
two different guises. On the one hand, we have the representations of
sentence and word meaning posited by the linguist. The linguist's theory
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of these representations is ultimately a kind of psychological theory: it is
a theory about what psychological states we must attribute to a human
being (or some other appropriately constituted entity) in virtue of which
he is a competent language-user. The linguist thus presents a theory, for
example, of how "smokeless ashtray" means smokeless ashtray for a
normally constituted English speaker, as though the business of assigning
meanings to expressions were independent of assumptions about the
behavior--past, present, and future--of other people. On the other hand, it
appears that my taking the words "smokeless ashtray" to mean smokeless
ashtray somehow reflects my conformity to the behavior-linguistic and
otherwise-of other people in general, and other language-users in
particular. Here we are cleaving closely to the Wittgensteinian intuition
that the meaning of a word is determined by its use in a language, or, more
broadly, its use in a community of language-users.
How, then, do we represent the connection between these two
aspects of linguistic meaning: between meaning as constituted by the
rules of a language, and meaning as constituted by certain kinds of
intentional activity? The convention-in-language theorist believes that
the connection is mediated by the notion of a convention, in a sense that I
will make clearer below.
When we attempt to zero in on the relevant notion of a convention
we have an embarrassment of riches. There appear to be at first blush any
number of conventions at work in language. Few people will deny, for
example, that the connection between the sound pattern or shape of given
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word and its meaning is in some sense conventional.9 We see no reason
why "apple" could not have meant orange, and vice versa. When we were
learning our first language we tried to make our linguistic behavior
conform to the linguistic behavior of others, to adhere to the preexisting
conventions of language use. We would not, for example, have been
accepted into the community of language-users if we had systematically
used the word "yes" to mean no.
I do not believe, however, that Davidson has any real issue with
this notion of convention. Beyond the arbitrary, or, if you wish,
conventional connection between the sound patterns of words and their
meaning, Davidson asks, is there some notion of convention that is
necessary to the existence of communication by language? Is there some
essential regularity that communication by language could not possibly do
without? I put the question this way following Davidson's suggestion that
"If there is to be a convention in Lewis's sense (or in any sense, I would
say), then something must be seen to repeat or recur over time." 10 Here
we must always keep in mind the distinction between those cases in
which the existence of a convention explains the observed regularity, and
those cases in which the regularity simply constitutes-as it were by
default-a given convention. An example of the former would be a game of
chess, and an example of the latter would be the dance of the bumble bee.
What we are after, then, is some notion of convention-or its
equivalent--that is essential to any adequate description of linguistic
phenomena. I stress these words because it is certainly possible to
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disguise the role of some candidate convention by rewriting our
description of the phenomena in such a way that we make no explicit use
of the word "convention."
The linguistic phenomenon that most interests Davidson is, of
course, communication. But even here we must tread carefully. For
Davidson sometimes argues as if the notion of convention were
unessential to an adequate description of existing linguistic
practice-communication between the speakers of a given natural
language, say. At other times he argues as if the notion of convention
were unessential to an adequate description of communication by language
simpliciter.
Knowledge of the conventions of language is thus a practical
crutch to interpretation, a crutch we cannot in practice afford
to do without--but a crutch which, under optimum conditions
for communication, we can in the end throw away, and could in
theory have done without from the start.11
We can, I suppose, imagine a kind of "proto-language" with no discernible
or established syntax; where the referents of various sounds are
established by pointing; and where, by means of an artful combination of
sound-making and miming, we can successfully "communicate" with our
fellow proto-language-users. We can furthermore assume that the
propositions so communicated are just as often false as they are true.
Suppose that a fellow proto-language-user succeeds in expressing the
thought, "Your cave is on fire." If, fearing the worst, I run to my cave in
time to put out the fire and salvage my belongings, has my informant not
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succeeded in communicating with me "linguistically"? Here we have a
plausible "language" without any of the contentious conventions that
Davidson so much objects to,12 and in which verbal or linguistic
communication is still possible. But to proceed in this way is not, I
believe, to engage the arguments of Lewis and others who contend that
some notion of convention is essential to an adequate description of the
way we in fact use language to communicate with one another.13
I have assumed that the structure of Davidson's argument in the
Epitaphs paper is essentially as follows: A's production of the malaprop
constitutes a rupture or breaking of some convention C; B nevertheless
successfully interprets A; therefore, Davidson argues, convention C is not
strictly relevant to the phenomenon of interpretation. From this point on
Davidson can argue that'those philosophers and linguists are mistaken who
take convention C to be inextricably wound up with the the possibility of
communication: if this is what a language is, then there is no such thing
as a language.
The most obvious problem with this reconstruction of Davidson's
argument is identifying which convention or conventions Davidson has in
mind. What will satisfy our demand for a convention C that has the
following properties: (1) convention C is broken by A's utterance of the
malaprop (or, less plausibly, by B's successful interpretation of the
utterance); (2) the convention in question connects linguistic meaning
with human attitudes and acts described in non-linguistic terms; and (3)
linguists and philosophers believe that convention C is inextricably wound
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up with the possibility of communication?
Davidson wants to say to say that it is somehow unconventional
for the speaker to express the thought
[5] What a nice arrangement of epithets
by using the expression
[6] What a nice derangement of epitaphs.
One interesting feature of [6] is that the speaker, in uttering it, does not
intend the hearer to take his meaning to be the literal meaning of [6]. We
see something like this "nonliteral strategy" at work in other ways in
language. The speaker may, for example, intend to express the thought,
"George is anything but a nice fellow" by uttering the sentence, "George is
a fine fellow" with an ironic tone of voice. It is generally supposed that
there exist pragmatic rules or principles that govern the recovery of
nonliteral meanings from utterances such as these. We might, on this
basis, assume that when Davidson denies the role of convention in
language, he means to deny the existence of any pragmatic rules or
principles that might yield the speakers intended meaning [5] from the
speaker's utterance of [6]. 1 believe, however, that this would be a
misinterpretation of Davidson's argument. He is clearly after bigger game.
The speaker's utterance of [6] is set apart from such "standard"
cases of nonliteral speech as irony, metaphor, hyperbole, etc. in another
most peculiar way: unlike these other cases, here the speaker makes an
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utterance and intends that he be interpreted literally. Of course the
speaker does not intend that the sentence he actually succeeds in
producing be interpreted literally, but rather that he be taken by his
hearer to be speaking literally.14 It is here, I believe, that the rupture of
the purported convention lies.
But what can this convention be? The rupture of the convention
consists in the fact that the speaker utters [6] intending that the hearer
should take him to be speaking literally, while at the same time intending
that the hearer should take him to mean [5]. The convention in question
apparently govems what we can and cannot intend to mean literally by
using certain expressions of the language. Pursuing this line of inquiry,
we might suppose that one of the theorems of this convention of literal
meaning would be something like the following:
[7] Theorem M: One cannot utter [6] unless one intends to mean [[What
a nice derangement of epithets]] thereby,
and that it is this principle that the speaker violates when he utters [6]
with the intention that his'utterance be taken to mean [[What a nice
arrangement of epithets]]. Theorem M suggests that our
convention-in-language theory might have something like the following
structure: On the interpretation side, the hearer has before him an
infinitely long list that enumerates all of the expressions of his language.
Next to each expression of the language there is another list that gives
that expression's range of possible meanings:
[8] Expression: Meaning:
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xl P,,P12, P 131 .
X2 P21 , Ppr P239 ..'
X3  P311 P32, P33 ...
etc.
The range of possible meanings is, of course, determined by the given
convention. On the production side, the speaker has a similar list that he
can likewise refer to, only in this case, the roles of expression and
meaning are reversed:
[9] Meaning: Expression:
P1  X11, Xl12 X13 ,f "
P2 X21, X2 , X23 a...
P3 X31, Xr X33, x s,..
etc.
We now come to a lacuna in Davidson's argument, for although our
conventionalist theory specifies the range of meanings for any expression
of the language, there is nothing to imply that the rupture of this
convention will ipso facto disrupt communication.
We might attempt to fill this gap in Davidson's argument as
follows. Imagine a simple language where the range of meanings of an
expression is established by explicit convention, on the model of [8].
Consider, for example, the Revolutionary War convention, "One, if by land;
two, if by sea." Paul Revere and his "signaler" agree beforehand that if the
signaler hangs one lantern in the North Church tower, Revere is to take
this to mean that the British troops will come by land; and if he hangs two
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lanterns, that they will come by sea. An interesting feature of this
convention15 is that it allws for the possibility of Gricean implicature.
Thus if the signaler hangs one lantern and one candle in the tower, Paul
Revere might take this to imply, for example, that most of the British
troops will come by land, but that a small fraction (represented by the
candle) will come by sea.16 What this convention does not appear to make
allowance for, however, is the possibility of malapropism: it is simply not
a feature of this kind of convontion that the signaler can hang one lantern
in the tower and be taken to mean what he would otherwise mean by
hanging two (and vice versa). We might therefore take Davidson to argue
as follows: Whatever kinds of conventions there are that philosophers
generally suppose govern language, this cannot be one of them. If language
were governed by a convention of this kind, then it would not be possible
to utter a malaprop and be understood. We can therefore make room for
the phenomenon of malapropism in language only by dropping the idea that
the sound/meaning link is conventional.
I find this kind of argument less than convincing for several
reasons. First, I disagree that the convention established between Paul
Revere and his signaler does not make room for the phenomenon of
interpretable malapropism. If, for example, Paul Revere was not miles
away from the coast atop his horse, but was instead allowed to see for
himself the comings and goings of the ships in Boston Harbor, and if he
could on this basis conclude that there were no British troops coming by
sea, then he would have good grounds for inferring that by hanging out two
lanterns his signaler had "misspoken." What is missing from this account
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of the communicative exchange between "speaker" and "hearer" is a clear
counterpart of the notion of utterance context. Paul Revere cannot
interpret his signaler to be misspeaking if the only knowledge or
competence that he can apply to the communicative exchange is his
knowledge of the conventionally established meanings of one or two
lanterns in the North Church tower. But neither can , .ssfully
interpret Mrs. Malaprop's utterance if I chance upon it written on some
small piece of paper in the middle of an open field; for I have not thereby
been given the means to recognize it as being a malaprop.
Likewise the conventionalist might respond that the convention in
question governs "standard" or "core" cases of interpretation, and that
competent speakers of the language use other means to arrive at the
intended meanings of malaprops. The issue here, of course, is how much
the conventionalist weakens his theory by granting the possibility of
these other methods of interpretation. Davidson may wish to respond, for
example, by asking why these "other means" cannot govern the
interpretation of utterances generally: How can we, in one breath, claim
that conventions are essential to an adequate description of
communication by language, and in the next say that there are cases where
the notion of a convention does not apply? But contrary to this objection,
I do not see how the conventionalist weakens his theory by making
allowances for non-standard or "unconventional" cases of communication
by language, unless, of course, he wishes to be dogmatic about the
descriptive adequacy of his theory.
In the following section I will argue that there is good evidence
that something like a malaprop-interpreting competence exists for
speakers of a natural language, and that this competence appears to share
many features with the competence that linguists normally attribute to
language-users. The competence of which I speak is, of course, grounded
in some grammar r that is shared by both speaker and hearer. The role of
this competence is essentially that of "mapping" the utterance [6] to the
target utterance "What a nice arrangement of epithets," so that [6]
receives the interpretation that the hearer would, under normal
conditions, assign to the target utterance. There is, I believe, good reason
for assuming that the conventionalist must also avail himself of the
linguist's notion of a shared competence or grammar. Stephen Schiffer
suggests something along these lines in his book Remnants of Meaning. 17
Acting as an apologist for what he calls "Intention-Based Semantics," or
more succinctly, "IBS" theories of meaning, Schiffer argues that Gricean
accounts of expression meaning must ultimately be wedded to what he
calls "psycholinguistic" theories of expression meaning:
The IBS theorist must stand ready to explain--or at any rate to
throw light on-how speakers of L can correlate the sentences
of L with their meanings in L, and it is here that we should
expect the notion of a qrammar of L to play its explanatory
role. If L is used in [a population] G, then some grammar F of L
explains the ability of members of G to correlate the
sentences of L with their meanings in L; this is what makes F
stand in the distinguished relation to G that I, on behalf of the
IBS theorist am trying to explicate.18
The role of the grammar r is essentially that of showing how, using
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"finite means," the language-user can correlate the infinite set of
possible expressions in [8] with their meanings. What I am suggesting in
this paper is t;,at it is this same grammar r that "correlates" Mrs.
Malaprop's utterance of "What a nice derangement of epitaphs" to her
target utterance "What a nice arrangement of epithets." Davidson's denial
of the existence not only of a malapop-interpreting competence, but also
of a general linguistic competence may therefore be seen as a way of
denying the legitimacy of this kind of move on the part of the IBS theorist.
Where does this leave Davidson's argument? If contrary to what I
have urged, we take Davidson to be arguing against the thesis that no
communication-linguistic or otherwise-is possible without essential
appeal to convention, then Davidson is arguing against a straw man. I have
found no evidence that this is a widely held belief among the "linguists
and philosophers" that Davidson so often alludes to. I have also suggested
a way that we might supplement the account of expression meaning given
by the IBS theorist so as to make the interpretation of Mrs. Malaprop's
utterance dependent on the conventional link between the expression
"What a nice arrangement of epithets" and its possible range of meanings.
Someone might object that on my view, communication is a
matter of faith and luck: faith, because the speaker must simply assume
that the hearer will possess the right interpretive "equipment"; and luck,
because fortunately for the speaker, his assumption will often turn out to
be correct. I might myself be accused of rejecting the role of convention
in language-stripping convention of its "social" or "cultural" aspects by
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claiming, for example, that the essential convention consists in nothing
more than the sharing of some mechanism. But I am making no such claim.
I do not believe that communication by language is all a matter of
language-users colliding in the void; on the contrary, I firmly endorse
Lewis's view that "It is a platitude-something only a philosopher would
dream of denying-that there are conventions of language, although we do
not find it easy to say what those conventions are."19 Even the most
dyed-in-wool mechanist must, on pain of negligence, demand some account
of how external conditions affect the maturation and ultimate character
of the language faculty.20 The salient question for my view is how the
notion of a convention might illuminate the process or processes by which
the representations of meaning posited by the linguist acquire their
contents. To say that this process must make essential appeal to
interactions with one's community of language-users is one thing; to say
that this process involves the irreducible notion of a convention is quite
another.
Consider the following scenario: Person A produces an utterance
(in context C) and person B intuits (or understands) the meaning of this
utterance. If, in making this uttvrance, person A produces a token of
sentence S, we say that person B intuits the meaning of sentence S (as
spoken by A in context C). Given the mechanistic account of interpretation
that I will defend in this chapter, I might tentatively venture the
following "definition" of what it means to "intuit" the meaning of S:
[10] Person B intuited the meaning of S (as uttered by A in context C)
"df a representation R of the meaning of S (as uttered by A in context
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C)occurred in person B.
We note in passing that the usual competence/performance distinction
may play a role here as elsewhere. For example, person B might have
intuited the meaning of Sas per our definition, and yet not behaved as if
he had so intuited it, etc. We should, of course, distinguish intuiting the
meaning of a sentence S from simply knowing the meaning of a sentence S.
I assume that we can be said to know the meaning of a sentence in the
same sense that we know that it is a sentence of our language. The
biggest problem with our definition is that it still contains the
unanalyzed term "the meaning of S (as uttered by A in context C)," so that
we are still tempted to ask, What is this meaning? We can attempt to
remedy things by replacing the definiens with the following:
[11] a representation R with property P occurred in person B,
where we say that the representation in question was induced in some
purely mechanistic fashion by the utterance of S (by A in C). We can
assume, perhaps, that the property in question will be specified by our
theory of semantics, and that it is in virtue of having this property that R
is a representation of the meaning of S rather than of some other sentence
S*.
This is fine as far as it goes, but it doesn't go very far. We are
left wondering, among other things, what has happened to our
commonsense notion of sentence or word meaning. And we still have not
explained what it is that hinges on our modeling the representation of Sas
having some property P rather than some other property P. Here is where
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the connection with the world, or with the society of language-users,
becomes manifest.
We might, for example, assume that the representation R of
sentence S has certain "causal powers" in virtue of its having property P
(if it had a different property, call it P, it would have different causal
pows,s). Consider, for example, the sentence
[12] Please bear with me, and at the count of three raise your right hands
in the air.
I have found that by uttering sentence [12] under the right circumstances,
people's right hands have consistently popped into the air after I counted
to three. We can explain this fact by assuming that a representation R of
the meaning of sentence [12] "occurs" (as per our definition [10]) in each
of my hearers; that this representation R has some theory-specified
property P; and that it is in virtue of having this property that R can
"cause" the observed behavior.
Representations of sentence meaning need not always cause or
induce overt behavior, of course. If someone utters the sentence "Dan
Quayle is a troglodyte" within hearing, the occurrence of a representation
of the meaning of this sentence in my brain may simply have a role in
bringing me to believe that Dan Quayle is a troglodyte, and this new belief
of mine may never manifest itself as part of my repertoire of external
behaviors. Which behaviors, beliefs, or other representations the
occurrence of some R induces in me depends in great measure on my
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cognitive state, my environment, and other factors. The so-called causal
powers of some representation may simply be dissipated, or stored, etc.
A!l this talk of "causal powers" is one way of getting at what we
mean when we speak of the "content" of a particular representation of
meaning. On the account I am sketching here, to give the content of a
representation of meaning is to specify the complex of that
representation's connection-actual or potential-with the world. These
connections are mediated by the internal and external behavior of the
person harboring these representations. If I say to my colleague, "My
father is an effete man," and my colleague responds, "Oh he's a snob, is
he?", I can surmise that my colleague's representation of the meaning of
the word effete does not have the property that will allow his use of the
word, or his reactions to the use of this word, to covary in the appropriate
way with the behavior--linguistic and otherwise-of those people who are
said to know the meaning of the word. I assume that my colleague's inner
representation of the meaning of the word effete had some role in
determining that he would respond to me by saying, "Oh he's a snob, is he?"
rather than by saying, "Oh he's worn out, is he?" On the linguistic end of
things, the semanticist might say that my colleague's representation of
the word has the features [-value] (to say that someone is effete is to say
something bad about the person), and [+status], whereas my representation
of the word has only the former feature. 21
We have thus moved out of the cloistered domain of linguistic
representations and into the world. But where are the conventions which
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are to act as the glue binding the linguistic and socia! aspects of meaning
together? I find it hard to say what these conventions might be, and for
this very reason, I find it impossible to rule out a priori the possibility
that some notion of convention will play an essential role in any adequate
description of meaning in language. I believe that the essential
convention or conventions must ultimately be grounded in the notion of a
shared grammar, in the sense that any adequate description of these
purported conventions must make essential appeal to our shared linguistic
competence. But to be a realist about underlying mechanisms is not ipso
facto to be a reductionist about convention.
At the beginning of this section I pointed out the fact that
Davidson concludes the Epitaphs paper by saying that "Principles (1) and
(2) [of the TPP model] survive when understood in rather unusual ways, but
principle (3) cannot stand... 22 Here is what I think Davidson means by
this. Principle (3) obviously cannot stand because it is the requirement
that first meanings be governed by learned conventions or regularities.
But how do principles (1) and (2) manage to survive? Principle (1)
survives because, according to Davidson, "We cannot describe what an
interpreter can do except by appeal to a recursive theory of a certain
sort," and, furthermore, "It does not add anything to the thesis to say that
if the theory does correctly describe the competence of the interpreter,
some mechanism in the interpreter must correspond to the theory."23
What Davidson is suggesting, in other words, is that he does not propose
to be a realist about recursive theories of meaning. Principle (2) survives
because Davidson does not deny that first meanings continue to be shared
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speaker and interpreter do, after all, come to share their passing theories.
Nothing more, I believe, is implied by Davidson's claim that principles (1)
and (2) survive.
In the sections that follow, I will defend the mechanist's account
of our shared linguistic competence against Davidson's skeptical claims.
§2 Davidson versus the Chomskyan mechanist
Davidson's arguing that there is no such thing as a shared
interpretive competence may appear rather anomalous to some readers. It
is. How could the man who championed a Tarski-style theory of truth for
a theory of meaning in natural language claim that there is no such
competence? Another commentator on Davidson's Epitaphs paper, lan
Hacking, has also noted this element of retraction.24 Hacking wonders
what happens to true-in-L in the "no-language story," and he rationalizes
Davidson's apparent break with the past in the following way:
The interpreter can be modeled as interacting with his speaker
by a Tarski-style theory, or so we were told. But now we have
the picture of the interpreter going through a whole series of
constantly modified Is very quickly. Interestingly, Davidson
has from the start always had a slight tendency to elide the L
in T-sentences. ...I am inclined to say that the Ls (often so
happily elided) are not languages at all, in any common sense
of the world [sic.], and one could still keep the Ls even if one
said that there is no such thing as a language.25
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For reasons that may already be apparent (cf. §1), I believe that Davidson
is more than willing to drop his countenancing of Ls altogether, or at least
to adopt a non-realist perspective toward them. When Davidson claims
that malaprops and other such phenomena threaten standard descriptions
of linguistic competence, he acknowledges that these may include
descriptions for which he himself is responsible.26
Neither do I believe that this retraction has no precedent. The
careful reader of Davidson would have already noted a kind of
"ambivalence" toward descriptive theories of meaning in language. In his
introduction to "Radical Interpretation," 27 for example, he writes:
Kurt utters the words 'Es regnet and under the right conditions
we know that he has said that it is raining. Having identified
his utterance as intentional and linguistic, we are able to go
on and interpret his words: we can say what his words, on that
occasion, meant. What could we know that would enable us to
do this? How could we come to know it? The first of these
questions is not the same what we do know that enables us to
interpret the words of others. For there may easily be
something we could know and don't, knowledge of which would
suffice for interpretation, while on the other hand it is not
altogether obvious that there is anything we actually know
which plays an essential role in interpretation.28
The problem, as Davidson sees it, is that "interpreting an agent's
intentions, his beliefs and his words are parts of a single project, no part
of which can be assumed to be complete before the rest is."29 He
therefore despairs of our ability to say anything interesting about the
phenomenon of meaning in language independently of our being able to say
something significant about an agent's intentions and beliefs. In the
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Epitaphs paper, Davidson simply takes his qualms about a theory of
meaning one step further.
In this section I will argue that such phenomena as our ability to
interpret malaprops do not motivate the kind of skepticism that Davidson
now appears to endorse. The kind of linguistic competence described by
Chomsky and other linguists of the generative grammar school appears to
accommodate many of the phenomena which motivate Davidson's
skepticism.
Chomsky's notion of linguistic competence is perhaps the
centerpiece of his linguistic theory. According to Chomsky, to give an
account of a speaker's competence is simply to give an account of his
knowledge of the language--of his "linguistic capacity." He distinguishes
at least two kinds of competence: grammatical competence and pragmatic
competence,30 a distinction which I will assume is familiar to most
readers. This rough taxonomy will certainly not be of much use to the
theorist unless he can further specify the kind of knowledge that
constitutes the speaker's "knowledge of the language"; how the speaker
accesses this knowledge; what constitutes proper grounds for attributing
this knowledge to the speaker; and a myriad of other questions that I will
not address here. As current theory has it, a speaker manifests his
linguistic competence when, for example, he makes grammaticality
judgments, or when he successfully orders a pizza, or when he writes a
history of the French Revolution. The linguist's theory of the speaker's
competence is a pliant repository of everything that the linguist can
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meaningfully say about the speakers knowledge of his language within a
given scientific framework.
Apart from serving as that vague signifier of our linguistic
knowledge, the notion of competence also plays a slightly more polemical
role as foil to the notion of performance. Thus the speakers linguistic
errors are attributed to a-lapse in performance, rather than to an
imperfect knowledge of his own language. The notion of performance does
not stop there, however. A well-articulated theory of performance will
explain, among other things, how the speaker uses his knowledge of the
language to produce utterances and construct interpretations in concrete
situations. Chomsky makes it clear, for example, that a generative
grammar is not in itself a model for a speaker or hearer:
When we say that a sentence has a certain derivation with
respect to a particular generative grammar, we say nothing
about how the speaker or hearer might proceed, in some
practical or efficient way to construct a derivation. These
questions belong to the theory of language use the theory of
performance. 31
We can expect, therefore, that a model of the speakers performance will
incorporate inter alia a model of speech perception, as well as a model of
speech production. Although many of these assumptions have been hotly
debated, I will, for the sake of discussion, assume that they are
essentially correct.
In very broad outline, Chomsky proposes to develop his core
theory of syntax-what he calls Universal Grammar, or UG---in abstraction
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from any concrete occasion of utterance. He gains access to this core
grammatical competence by studying speaker judgments of
well-formedness, judgments of co-reference and anaphora, judgments of
sentence meaning and constituent structure, etc. The interpreters ability
to recover the intended meaning of a malaprop does not ex hypothesi
present any evidence that might bear on the structure of this core
grammatical competence. In careful stages, the theorist builds outward
from the core. He uses his theory of grammatical competence to build his
theory of pragmatic competence. At this stage of theory construction, he
might proceed by attempting to isolate the relevant parameters of an
utterance context, and by observing how utterance meaning changes when
these candidate parameters are changed in a controlled way. Taken
together, the linguist's theories of our grammatical and pragmatic
competence constitute what I will call an account of our overall basic
linguistic competence.32
In the Epitaphs paper, however, Davidson does not appear to share
Chomsky's optimism or enthusiasm for this kind of research program. He
believes that the language theorist is caught between the horns of a
dilemma: if he does not give a direct account of our ability to interpret
malaprops and the like, then his theory of our linguistic competence is
incomplete; if, on the other hand, he does try to explain our ability to
interpret malaprops, he is no longer studying language as such, for the
kind of "competence" that he is attempting to characterize is then no
longer exclusively linguistic. This special competence is not different in
kind from the competence that one generally needs to find one's way
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around in the world.33 It includes a measure of "wit, luck, and wisdom,"
together with a "knowledge of the ways people get their point across, and
rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are
most likely.*34 Davidson despairs of the linguists ability to give an
account of a competence that he believes is not governed by rules or
conventions that are known to both speaker and hearer in advance of the
occasions of interpretation.
Let us attempt to draw the battle lines a little more carefully.
We can best tease out the differences between these two schools of
thought by looking at an example. For the sake of concreteness, let us
suppose that the speaker utters:
[13] Familiarity breeds attempt
and the hearer (correctly) interprets him to mean:
[14] Familiarity breeds contempt.3 5
Davidson finds it easy enough to explain the hearers ability to interpret
the speaker in the way that the speaker intends:
... the hearer realizes that the 'standard' interpretation cannot
be the intended interpretation; through ignorance,
inadvertence, or design the speaker has used a word similar in
sound to the word that would have 'correctly' expressed his
meaning. The absurdity or inappropriateness of what the
speaker would have meant had his words been taken in the
'standard' way alerts the hearer to trickery or error; the
similarity in sound tips him off to the right interpretation.36
69
This reconstruction of how the interpreter recovers the speaker's intended
meaning is certainly one that the Chomskyan linguist might endorse. The
account is also somewhat schematic, for it tells us nothing about what
constitutes a "standard" interpretation. Nor does it tell us how the
similarity in sound between the malaprop and the intended utterance tips
the speaker off as to the malaprop's correct interpretation.
Let us pause to consider how we might go about about filling in
some of the missing pieces. We assume that the ideal interpreter
possesses a basic, or "core" linguistic competence: a general knowledge of
the ways in which words and phrases can be combined to form sentences,
and a knowledge of what these sentences mean. We agree with Davidson
that upon hearing the speaker utter sentence [13], the hearer gives the
sentence its "standard," or literal interpretation. As Davidson points out,
the hearer very quickly realizes, or comes to believe, that the speaker's
words cannot be taken literally in the given context.
It is at this point that our account becomes rather more
anecdotal. The hearer's realization that the speaker could not have meant
his words literally is a kind of "error message" that sets off the search
for an alternative interpretive strategy. In the absence of any evidence
that the speaker was speaking humorously or ironically or sarcastically,
etc., the interpreter might simply venture the hypothesis that the speaker
misspoke that he did not succeed in saying what he in fact wanted to say.
This being the case, there begins on the hearer's part a search through the
space of sentence [13]'s phonological neighbors, until at last the hearer
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chances upon the speaker's intended utterance, "Familiarity breeds
contempt," and its intended meaning (given in [14]).
All that I have said about "error messages" and "searches through
the space of phonological neighbors" is, of course, highly conjectural. In
the absence of any evidence to the contrary, however, there is no reaso,, to
believe that something like this might not be the case. The account which
Davidson himself has given, and which I have embellished, certainly has
some initial plausibility. If we furthermore reflect on those interpretive
occasions when we did not instantaneously recover the speaker's intended
utterance, but rather lingered over his chosen words for a time before the
penny dropped, we might be more inclined to endorse the account given
here. I recall, for example, once having heard a friend complain that after
leaving his parasite-ridden dog in the house for a few days, he was
compelled to "irrigate the whole place." I remember puzzling over what
my friend could have meant by his words. Keying on the water theme
suggested by the word irrigate, I first assumed that the dog's parasites
had destroyed the control of its bladder, and that my friend was thbrGfs
obliged to wash the floors of his house. This chain of reasoning could not,
however, mitigate the oddity of the word "irrigate" in the given context. I
then began running through a list of possible replacement words that
ended with the morpheme -ate--e.g. instigate, imitate, etc.-until I finally
chanced on the intended word "fumigate."
Davidson is not concerned, however, with the empirical
plausibility of our account of malaprop interpretation. For Davidson, even
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my very embellished account of the process may in some sense correspond
to the truth of the matter. What does concern him is the theorist's ability
to give a principled account of the process that we have just described.
The search through a space of phonological neighbors is apparently not a
procedure that Davidson believes is governed by rules and conventions
shared by the speaker and hearer, and learned in advance of the occasion of
interpretation. Neither is perhaps the hearer's choice of an "alternative
interpretive strategy" when confronted by the absurdity of the malaprop.
But Davidson's skepticism appears to be unwarranted. The
analysis of speech error data has revealed many surprising regularities in
the way that we produce slips of the tongue. (I am here taking the
malaprop to be a very special subclass of this larger category.) For
example, Fromkin cites a study by Boomer & Laver who conclude that "The
origin syllable and the target syllable of a slip are metrically similar, in
that both are salient (stressed) or both are weak (unstressed) ... ."37
Fromkin also notes that "when vowels or syllables or parts of syllables or
whole words are substituted or transposed, there is no change in the
stress pattern or contour of the sentence."38 In other research,
Nooteboom has found that "a mistakenly selected word always or nearly
always belongs to the same word class as the intended word ... ."39 Other
speech error studies, that I will not discuss here, have uncovered many
striking regularities that involve smaller units of articulation, like
segments and clusters.40
The implications of this research for our model of malaprop
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interpretation are clear: if the speech errors that we produce are not
entirely random, but are rather tightly constrained by a number of general
principles that research might uncover, then our search through the space
of candidate replacements might be enormously simplified. This research,
generally conducted by assuming an underlying generative model of
grammar, suggests that the mechanistic description of our linguistic
competence may well be able to accommodate the ability that Davidson
finds to be the cause of so much skepticism. What I am here suggesting,
in other words, is that the hearer recovers the speaker's intended meaning
by first recovering the speaker's target sentence ("Familiarity breeds
contempt") from the sentence the speaker utters ("Familiarity breeds
attempt") by a kind of "mechanical empathy," and that it is the shared
knowledge of the rules of their language, together with a knowledge of the
ways in which these rules are likely to be broken, that makes this
empathy possible. Nothing in all of this rules out the possibility that
other kinds of knowledge or competence may be involved in the process-a
possibility which I explore in §3.
We might ask to what extent the Chomskyan framework we are
discussing here corresponds to the TPP and PT models discussed earlier.
The TPP model of our linguistic competence posits three principles that
govern first meanings in language. Briefly put, these are the requirements
that first meanings be (1) systematic, (2) shared, and (3) prepared. As for
requirement (1), part of the burden of UG is to show how the "semantic"
and other idiosyncratic properties of words conspire with sentence
structure to determine sentence meaning. This relation between form and
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meaning is systematic, and is mediated by a number of general rules and
principles. Literal meanings are further "processed" to yield utterance
meanings. This "interpreting machine" is acquired in advance of the
occasions of utterance and, as required by principle (3), is conventional in
character (when this last proviso is understood in a highly attenuated
sense; cf. §1). As for requirement (2), in the framework under discussion
it is an idealization to say that both speaker and hearer will share this
basic grammatical (and pragmatic) competence. In a heterogeneous speech
community this condition may never obtain: there may always be large or
small differences between the idiolects of speaker and hearer. It is a
sufficient condition for communication that speaker and hearer share the
same "interpreting machine,"4 1 but it is by no means a necessary
condition. We can, however, make sense of condition (2) in the Chomskyan
framework by asserting that members of the same "language community"
(as identified by certain gross features of speech, for example) tend to
have grammatical competencies that look pretty much the same, when this
"sameness" is measured by some theory-internal metric. Thus, for
example, any random subset of native speakers of American English will
possess grammars that share many identifying, or "key," features. On the
view that I am developing here, speaker and interpreter share a kind of
second-order ability-"second-order" in the sense that for any one
language-user, many different instantiations of his syntax and lexicon
will constitute the same competence with respect to some set of
malaprops or other misspeakings. Suppose, for example, that A knows the
meaning of the word "palimpsest," whereas Bdoes not If this is the only
difference between the languages attributable to A and B, we can expect
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that they will coincide in their interpretation of the malapropper who
utters, Ida's sick, so we sent her a card expressing our symphonies," as
the interpretation of this utterance does not involve the meaning of the
word "palimpsest" in any direct way. In this case I would say that with
respect to this malaprop, and a host of other misspeakings that we might
enumerate, A and B essentially share the same malaprop-interpreting
competence. It is this possibility that Davidson wishes to guard against
when he argues that there is "no learnable common core of consistent
behavior. "42
It is not difficult to find the correspondences between the PT
model and the Chomskyan framework that I sketched above. Consider first
the prior theory. In the PT model, the hearers prior theory describes how
he is prepared in advance to interpret the speaker, whereas the speaker's
prior theory describes what he (the speaker) believes the hearer's prior
theory to be. In the Chomskyan framework, the hearers prior theory
corresponds to the hearers basic linguistic competence supplemented
whatever knowledge the hearer may have about the speaker's linguistic
idiosyncrasies (also leaving some room for the intervention of
non-linguistic faculties of mind in the interpretive process). The
speakers prior theory is not really all that interesting, for in effect it
expresses the speaker's "best guess" at what the hearers basic linguistic
competence might be. This guess is conditioned by a number of
extra-theoretic factors--among them, the country or language community
that the speaker believes himself to be in, the speaker's prior knowledge
of the hearers linguistic behavior, etc. It is, of course, typical for the
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speaker simply to assume that the hearers prior theory is exactly like his
own. The dogged persistence of this assumption can be seen in those rude
American tourists who believe that by raising their voices and making
pointed gestures they can get their monolingual French-speaking waiters
to understand English.
In the PT model, the hearers passing theory is how the hearer
interprets the speakers utterance. In the case of Mrs. Malaprop, the
hearers passing theory consists of the following bit of propositional
knowledge and little more:
[15] "What a nice derangement of epitaphs" means [[What a nice
arrangement of epithets]].
Here we must sharply distinguish between what the hearer interprets Mrs.
Malaprop to mean (this is given on the right hand side of [15]), and how the
hearer arrives at this interpretation. The latter is given by the linguist's
theory of the hearer's basic linguistic competence, supplemented by
whatever special knowledge of the speaker the linguist can attribute to
the hearer.
On the speaker's side, the passing theory is how he (the speaker)
wishes the hearer to interpret his utterance. For reasons discussed above,
the speaker's passing theory is of no great theoretical interest.
We are now in a position to interpret Davidson's claims about
prior and passing theories in a general Chomskyan framework. Davidson
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asserts, for example, that as speaker and hearer talk, "their prior theories
become more alike; so do their passing theories.*43 We must here proceed
carefully, however, for a little reflection will show that each of both
speaker and hearer has two prior theories (and two passing theories). The
hearer, for example, has a prior theory that describes how he is prepared
in advance to interpret the speaker; but the former hearer may in turn
become the new speaker, and this new speaker will have a prior theory
that describes how he believes the new hearer will interpret his
utterances. I will assume, therefore, that when Davidson uses the plural
form, "prior theories," as he does here, he is referring to the prior
theories of hearer and speaker on the occasion of a particular utterance.
How comes it, then, that prior theories become more alike? The
answer to this question is quite straightforward: as hearer and speaker
exchange words, they learn more and more about each others idiolects.
The hearers prior theory comes to reflect not only his own basic
linguistic competence (which we assume remains constant throughout the
exchange), but also his knowledge of the speaker's special speech patterns
and lexical idiosyncrasies. The speaker also grows more confident that he
will be interpreted as he intends; or, if not, he adjusts his speech to fail
in line more closely with the hearers expectations.
A similar story goes for the passing theory: the more that speaker
and hearer know about each other's idiolects, the more likely it is that
their passing theories will coincide.
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This is little more than what Davidson has already told us. The
problems begin, however, when we make further inquiries about the
interpreters passing theory. " ... [T]he passing theory," Davidson tells us,
"cannot in general correspond to the interpreters linguistic
competence, "44 On one rather narrow reading of this passage, the claim
is obviously true. A passing theory like that given in [15] cannot, of
course, correspond to anybody's basic linguistic competence. As Davidson
himsslf tells us, "its expected field of application is vanishingly
small.A4 5 He persists, however, in calling it a "theory" for the following
reasons:
... when a word or phrase temporarily or locally takes over the
role of some other word or phrase (as treated in a prior theory,
perhaps), the entire burden of that role, with all its
implications for logical relations to other words, phrases, and
sentences, must be carried along by the passing theory.
Someone who grasps the fact that Mrs. Malaprop means
'epithet' when she says 'epitaph' must give 'epithet' all the
powers 'epitaph' [sic.] has for many other people. Only a full
recursive theory can do justice to these powers.46
We can agree with Davidson that only a full recursive theory can do
justice to these powers, but we certainly need not agree that we must
invoke these powers in order to adequately describe the interpreters
passing theory. As already noted, the interpreter need not "update" his
prior theory in order to accommodate the new influx of linguistic
information from Mrs. Malaprop. He need only record the fact that on that
particular occasion of utterance Mrs. Malaprop meant arrangement by
"derangement" and epithet by "epitaph." Exactly what role this kind of
explicit knowledge plays in utterance interpretation is difficult to say.
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However we decide this question, we are left with Davidson's
assertion that "there are no rules for arriving at passing theories, no rules
in any strict sense, as opposed to rough maxims and methodological
generalities. •47 And this, as we have seen, is where the mechanist and
Davidson have chosen to disagree.
§3 Other cognitive faculties
At this stage in the argument, we can reply to Davidson in one of
several ways. We can, for example, simply demur on the question. In the
absence of any well-articulated and widely accepted theories of
grammatical or pragmatic competence, we are simply tilting at windmills.
It is still too early to tell whether or not the mechanists theory of our
basic linguistic competence will have anything mearingful to say about
our ability to interpret malaprops. There is, as I indicated above, some
suggestive research on the question, but nothing that is conclusive.
Linguists continue to pitch battles for the allegiance of future theorists;
psycholinguists are forced to make some rather provisional assumptions
about the syntactic and computational models that they use to interpret
their results; all is flux.
Underlying all this talk of future theorizing, however, is the
assumption that our ability to interpret malaprops falls within what
Chomsky has called our "cognitive capacity":
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An intellectually significant science, an intelligible
explanatory theory, can be developed by humans in case
something close to the true theory in a certain domain happens
to fall within human "science-forming" capacities.... Thinking
of humans as biological organisms in the natural world, it is
only a lucky accident if their cognitive capacity happens to be
well-matched to scientific truth in some area. It should come
as no surprise, then, that there are so few sciences, and that
so much of human inquiry fails to attain any intellectual depth.
Investigation of human cognitive capacity might give us some
insight into the class of humanly accessible sciences, possibly
a small subset of those potential sciences that deal with
matters concerning which we hope (vainly) to attain some
insight and understanding.4 8
If Davidson's analysis of our malaprop-interpreting ability is correct, if,
in fact, much of what we do in this domain is "derived by wit, luck, and
wisdom,"4 9 then we might have grounds for pessimism. It would then
appear that any explanation of our malaprop-interpreting abilities would
have to include some account of how wit, luck, and wisdom
intermingle-and in what measure-to yield the intended interpretations. I
am here speaking figuratively of that mysterious process wherein past
experience, beliefs and desires, sudden flashes of inspiration, and other
factors that we cannot even name, cooperate and contend to determine our
behavior-linguistic and otherwise. But although I am myself skeptical
about the possibility, why is Davidson so certain that wit, intuition, and
skill--the factors that he claims are necessary for utterance
interpretationcannot be given an adequate rule-governed description?
Whether or not we accept Chomsky's assessment of our
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biologically limited cognitive capacity, we might worry over the question
of how we, as theorists, can give a rule-governed account of an ability
that takes us so far into the storms of human intentionality. Can there be
a rule-governed account of our ability to recover the intended meaning of
a malaprop? Need our account be rule-governed in order to achieve some
measure of explanatory and descriptive adequacy? There is, I believe, no a
priori answer to these questions, for the sciences-old and new--continue
to make conceptual inroads to previously recondite domains. A scientific
study of the nature of human cognitive capacity might, as Chomsky
suggests, "give us some insight into the class of humanly accessible
sciences,' 50 but we are from the stage when we can talk meaningfully
about the a priori limitations of any inquiry into this domain.
Davidson may be right when he argues that much of what the
interpreter can do "ought not to count as part of his linguistic
competence.' 5 1 But then there is nothing to rule out the possibility that
other non-linguistic faculties of mind may have a role in the process of
utterance interpretation and production. There are several senses in
which this observation is trivially true. We hear the spoken word, or see
it written on the page, or feel it spelled in our hand--but certainly none of
these faculties is exclusively, or even primarily, linguistic. We use
language to recount our memories, express our thoughts, and signal our
intentions; but again those faculties of mind that make it possible for us
to harbor memories, thoughts, and intentions are not, exclusively,
linguistic faculties. As an example of a non-linguistic faculty of mind
intervening in the process of interpretation, consider my leftist friend
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who turns to me and says, "George Bush is a fine president." Even if the
conventional signals of ironic speech are missing-the sarcastic tone of
voice, the rolled eyes, the pause for effect-I nevertheless take him to
mean the exact opposite of what he has said. What has intervened in this
case is my knowledge of my companion's strong political likes and
dislikes. In order to interpret him correctly, I had to exercise a
non-linguistic as well as a linguistic faculty of mind.
Chomsky has written quite extensively about these "interactions"
of the language faculty with other non-linguistic mental faculties. In his
Reflections on Language (Chomsky, 1975), for example, he writes:
The place of the language faculty within cognitive capacity is
a matter for discovery, not stipulation. The same is true of
the place of grammar within the system of acquired cognitive
structures. My own, quite tentative, belief is that there is an
autonomous system of formal grammar, determined in
principle by the language faculty and its component UG. This
formal grammar generates abstract structures that are
associated with "logical forms" ... by further principles of the
grammar. But beyond this, it may well be impossible to
distinguish sharply between linguistic and nonlinguistic
components of knowledge and belief. Thus an actual language
may result only from the interaction of several mental
faculties, one being the faculty of language. There may be no
concrete specimens of which we can say, These are solely the
product of the language faculty; and no specific acts that
result solely from the exercise of linguistic functions.52
The extent to which the language faculty interacts with other systems of
knowledge and belief is, of course, a matter for empirical discovery.
There is no saying a priori what kinds of competencies are needed for the
82
interpretation of utterances. It is an idealization to assume that it is
possible to "isolate" the language faculty from the other faculties with
which it is intertwined-but it is an idealization whose theoretical utility
has been tested and proven by many linguists and philosophers.
We can summarize and sharpen our response to Davidson as
follows. Modern linguistic theory, as least one very influential school of
it, assumes that a language-user has a certain core grammatical
competence that is characterized by the theory which the linguist calls
UG. Chomsky writes:
... it is hardly to be expected that what are called "languages"
or "dialects" or even "idiolects" will conform precisely or
perhaps even very closely to the systems determined by fixing
the parameters of UG. This could only happen under idealized
conditions that are never realized in fact in the real world of
heterogeneous speech communities. Furthermore, each actual
"language" will incorporate a periphery of borrowings,
historical residues, inventions, and so on, which we can hardly
expect to-and indeed would not want to-incorporate within a
principled theory of UG. 53
The mechanist assumes that the interpretation of actual utterances is not
achieved by this core grammatical competence alone, but is rather aided
and abetted by the interpreters pragmatic competence. To put the whole
thing rather crudely, grammatical competence gives us sentence meaning,
whereas pragmatic competence gives us utterance meaning. The
assumption underlying this distinction is that the sentence used to make
an utterance has a well-defined meaning which I shall, following standard
practice, call its literal meaning. Our pragmatic competence allows us to
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"build on" or "fill ourt" the literal meaning by using material taken from the
context of utterance. Building in this way, we thus recover the speaker's
intended meaning. I shall discuss these and other underlying assumptions
in Part III. There is room in this modular picture of the language faculty
for the intervention of our other cognitive faculties. We can expect the
language faculty qua biological system to interact with other such
systems, in part as a matter of utility, in part as a matter of historical or
evolutionary accident, and in part as a result of forces that we cannot
even begin to name or understand.
Against the background of this theory or, more precisely, this
framework of inquiry, we can ask a number of meaningful questions about
the phenomena which Davidson claims "threaten standard descriptions of
linguistic competence .... "54 The manner in which we interpret
malaprops, for example, may or may not be affected by our basic linguistic
competence-it is still too early to tell-although, as we have seen, there
have been a number of suggestive experiments in this domain. As far as I
know, no one has yet proposed a detailed model of how grammatical and
pragmatic competence interact in the interpretation of malaprops. What I
have called "alternative interpretive strategies" may be involved, but
whether or not these strategies are governed by shared rules and
conventions known to both speaker and hearer in advance is still an open
question, as is the question of the extent to which these strategies should
count as part of our basic linguistic competence.
I believe, however, that the very fact that within the mechanist
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framework we can raise meaningful questions about the phenomena
alluded to by Davidson, suggests that this framework or model may not be
far wrong. It is now only a matter of working out the all-important
details.
§4 Davidson's Ubiquity Hypothesis
Davidson's Ubiquity Hypothesis (Part 1, §4) is a little difficult to
assess. Even on Davidson's own account, it appears to be obviously false.
In his own outline of the process whereby the hearer recovers the
speakers intended meaning from the malaprop (§2, above), Davidson makes
essential reference to the hearer's "standard interpretation" of the
utterance in question. It is the ludicrousness of this standard
interpretation (in the given context) that alerts the hearer to the fact that
something has gone wrong with the speaker's utterance. In this case can
we not say, contra Davidson, that there was such a thing as how the
speaker could expect, in the abstract, to be interpreted? If, for example,
the speaker could assume that both he and the hearer share a "standard"
knowledge of English in which "derangement" means derangement and
"epitaph" means epitaph, could not the speaker, if he carefully uttered the
words "What a nice derangement of epitaphs" in the proper context, expect
to be interpreted in the "standard way"?
Davidson might counter that this hardly constitutes a case in
which the speaker could expect to be interpreted in a certain way in the
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abstract. The description we have given of the context in which the
speaker could expect to have his words in'terpreted literally is thick with
felicity conditions: the speaker and hearer must share a standard dialect;
the speaker must not misspeak his words; and the context of utterance
must be appropriate.
And yet it appears to me that these felicity conditions are far
from rare, and are in fact met much of the time. Of course these
conditions are not met all the time: there certainly is no such thing as
how we can expect, in the abstract, to be interpreted, if the only
language-users we are likely to encounter are monolingual speakers of
Yoruba. How, then, do we interpret Davidson's Ubiquity Hypothesis?
Davidson discusses the Ubiquity Hypothesis in the following
passage:
The less we know about the speaker, assuming we know he
belongs to our language community, the more nearly our prior
theory will simply be the theory we expect someone who hears
our unguarded speech to use. If we ask for a cup of coffee,
direct a taxi driver, or order a crate of lemons, we may know
so little about our intended interpreter that we can do no
better than to assume that he will interpret our speech along
what we take to be standard lines. But all this is relative. In
fact we always haVe the interpreter in mind; there is no such
thing as how we expect, in the abstract, to be interpreted. We
inhibit our higher vocabulary, or encourage it, depending on the
most general considerations ...55
Thus Davidson agrees that we often assume that our speech will be
interpreted along "standard lines," but he implies that because we always
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have our interpreter in mind, "there is no such thing as how we expect, in
the abstract, to be interpreted." Much depends, of course, on the extent to
which we incorporate our knowledge of the hearers linguistic
idiosyncrasies into our prior theory for the hearer. Oftentimes, however,
it appears that we have no such prior knowledge; and that we make few, if
any, adjustments in those cases where we have ample knowledge of our
hearers. If, under fairly standard circumstances, and under little more
than the assumption that my hearer belongs to the same language
community, I order a crate of lemons by using the words, "I would like a
crate of lemons," then it is true that I can do little better than expect that
my hearer will interpret me to mean that I would like a crate of lemons. I
simply assume, in this case, that my utterance will be interpreted along
staindard lines-however groundless my assumption may later turn out to
be. Here is a case in which, as Davidson suggests, I clearly had my
interpreter in mind. Why is it not, however, also a case in which I
expected, in the abstract, to be interpreted in a certain way? I may, as
Davidson says, have inhibited my higher vocabulary by choosing to say, "I
would like a crate of lemons," rather than, "I would like a crate of the
yellow, egg-shaped fruit of the spiny evergreen Citrus limonia." But how
would this consideration play against the fact that I had in this case a
clear foreknowledge of how I would be interpreted?
Perhaps Davidson is arguing that I am not licensedto expect my
words to be interpreted in a certain way unless I have good grounds for
believing that my hearer shares my language, or, perhaps, my idiolect. The
question now becomes: What constitutes good grounds for this belief?
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This epistemological question, however, has no real bearing on the ability
of a speaker and hearer to communicate successfully. The mechanist
asserts that speaker and hearer interpret each other successfully because
they share a knowledge of the same language, or, at the very least,
because they share a kind of second-order interpretive competence with
respect to a wide range of possible utterances (see §2, above). At the
beginning of a conversational exchange, the speaker may assume--rightly
or wrongly-that he will be interpreted in accordance with the rules of the
posited common language. Communication succeeds if they share a certain
competence , and fails if they do not-however well-motivated or
unmotivated the speaker's assumptions about the hearer's competence may
have been
§5 Rule-governed versus "mechanical"
Davidson sometimes speaks as if the issue at hand were the
theorist's inability to provide a strictly mechanical algorithm for
recovering the intended meaning of a malaprop. In the same passage
where he asserts that passing theories are derived by a combination of
wit, luck, and wisdom,56 he also makes the following claim:
There is no more chance of regularizing, or teaching, this
process than there is of regularizing or teaching the process of
creating new theories to cope with new data in any field-for
that is what this process involves.57
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Here is what I think Davidson is after. He wants the theorist to (1)
provide an effective method for deciding whether a given utterance is, or
is not, a malaprop, and (2) give an algorithm that constitutes a model of
all the steps that the interpreter takes to recover the meaning of the
malaprop, with the further proviso that none of these steps should appeal
to abilities or judgments which are not themselves given the same kind of
mechanical description. I will call such an account a mechanical
description of our ability to interpret malaprops. I believe, however, that
Davidson's requirement is much too strong. It does not follow that
because a cognitive process is rule-governed, it can also be given a
mechanical description, and our mechanist/pragmatist, despite his name,
is not committed to such a view. Consider, for example, a candidate "rule"
for the recognition of ironic speech:
[16] The speaker is speaking ironically if the utterance made by the
speaker, when interpreted literally, does not jive with what the hearer
knows about the speakers previous statements and/or his past or present
behavior and/or his beliefs, desires, etc., and the hearer detects a note of
irony in the speaker's voice.
I have stipulated that no mechanical account of a cognitive process C
occurring in person P can make explicit appeal to some judgment
(conscious or otherwise) on the part of P unless that judgment also be
given a mechanical description. Assuming that the kind of judgments
appealed to in [16] cannot be given a mechanical description, and assuming
further that these judgments are essential elements in the recognition of
ironic speech, it then follows that it is not possible to given a mechanical
account of how we recognize ironic speech. Nevertheless we would be
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flying in the face of intuition to say that the recognition of ironic speech
was not somehow governed by rules or conventions. There is, of course, no
a priori reason why we cannot achieve some measure of descriptive and
explanatory adequacy in these domains without invoking these
"mechanical" descriptions.
§6 Summary
It would be unfair to Davidson to say that he was not anticipating
the kind of response that I am formulating here. Many of the ideas that I
have reviewed were and are in common currency, and Davidson's own
references to the work of Chomsky and other linguists indicate that he
was au courant of modern trends in linguistic theorizing. What, then, can
account for Davidson's profound skepticism? The answer is, I believe, the
very peculiar nature of the phenomena that he chose to study. Malaprops,
misspeakings, and the like-what I will henceforth call Class M
phenomena-were to Davidson the unruly offspring of our unguarded
tongues, oftentimes appearing suddenly in mid-sentence or mid-speech,
leaving the interpreter no time to "accommodate" his linguistic
competence to them, and yet finding themselves nonetheless successfully
interpreted. To another theorist, with perhaps stronger allegiances to the
Chomskyan framework that I have sketched above, the fact that we can
spontaneously interpret malapropisms together with the fact that this
ability appears to be universal, suggests that it might be possible to
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explain the phenomenon in part by appealing to our basic linguistic
competence. I have argued that there is good evidence for believing that
such is the case.
Davidson, on the other hand, imagines that language can and does
break out of whatever bounds theory might impose on it. Not for him the
view in which meanings march in step with syntactic forms and the laws
of pragmatics. Furthermore, linguistic behavior is not as far different in
kind from other human behavior as some theorists now imagine. Hence his
assertion that by accepting his skeptical conclusions, "we have erased the
boundary between knowing a language and knowing our way around the
world generally."5
Davidson's explicit attempt to ward off a Chomsky-style response
to his skeptical argument is seen in the following passage:
Perhaps it will be said that what is essential to the mastery
of a language is not knowledge of any particular vocabulary, or
even detailed grammar, much less knowledge of what any
speaker is apt to success in making his words and sentences
mean. What is essential is a basic framework of categories
and rules, a sense of the way English (or any) grammar may be
constructed, plus a skeleton list of interpreted words for
fitting into the basic framework. If I put all this vaguely, it is
only because I want to cunsider a large number of actual or
possible proposals in one fell swoop; for I think they all fail to
resolve our problem. 59
The "problem" that Davidson refers to is, of course, our inability to
satisfy the demand for "a description of an ability that speaker and hearer
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share and that is adequate to irnterpretation."60 The problem with
"general frameworks," according to him, is that any such framework, "by
virtue of the features that make it general, will be itself be insufficient
for interpreting particular utterances.' 61 He explains that our general
framework or theory "can't be all that is needed since it fails to provide
the interpretation of particular words and sentences as uttered by a
particular speaker. 462 This is, of course, a very odd claim for Davidson to
make, for Chomsky would be the first to admit that UG is not a theory of
utterance meaning, nor does it purport to be such a theory. Linguists of
the generative grammar school would agree with Davidson that a
language-user's knowledge of grammar is only one element of what is
needed for sentence interpretation. Therefore Davidson's worry cannot
simply be a worry over the distinction between sentence meaning and
utterer meaning.
At the beginning of the Epitaphs paper the issue for Davidson
appears to be the rather singular nature of much of what we come to
interpret successfully. Starting with our ability to interpret malaprops,
grammatically garbled sentences, new words and idiolects, slips of the
tongue, etc., Davidson finds cause to doubt the standard account of
linguistic competence given by linguists and philosophers. Very quickly,
however, what was once seen as a fairly peculiar set of abilities, is now
seen to permeate all of language, so that Davidson ends by
concluding-incorrectly, I believe-that "there is no such thing as how we
expect, in the abstract to be interpreted"63
92
Contra Davidson I have argued, among others things, that (1) there
is good reason to believe that the range of possible meanings of an
utterance-malaprops included--is sharply restricted by the rules of the
language; (2) Davidson has not shown that malaprops and the like are any
more a problem for competence theories than "standard" demonstrative
utterances. Even if we accept Davidson's claim that passing theories are
derived in large measure by wit, luck, and wisdom, he has given us no
reason to believe that these capacities cannot themselves be formally
modelled.
It appears to me that Davidson has essentially misconstrued
linguistic's self-conception, at least insofar as he has misjudged its
awareness of its own present limits. He has, as it were, proclaimed
nescience the victor before the final count was out-in fact, before the
mechanist could even be said to have been knocked onto the canvass. I do
not believe, therefore, that Davidson accomplished what he set out to
accomplish, namely: to show, on more or less a priori grounds, that
rule-governed accounts of interpretation cannot keep up with our ability
to recover meanings from utterances, and thus arguing, to successfully
motivate a profound skepticism for the current direction of linguistic
theorizing.
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Part III
Some details of the mechanist response to Davidson
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Introduction
As we have seen, Davidson has tried to motivate his skeptical
conclusions by pointing to such phenomena as our ability to recover the
intended meaning of a malaprop, and, on that basis, arguing that the
"standard" model of our linguistic competence cannot explain our broadly
ranging interpretive abilities.
After a few preliminaries (§1), I will in §2 describe a little more
carefully the standard interpretive model that I believe is the proper foil
to Davidson's skeptical argument. It is this model that I will use to
continue exploring the question of how much in the interpretive domain
lies outside the reach of theory.
§1 Some preliminaries
The model of language use that emerges from the Epitaphs paper
is one in which both speaker and hearer essentially "make up" a language
as they go along, exploiting whatever strategies they can to understand
other speakers and to make themselves understood. Davidson admits that
shared grammars and the like may be "key ingredients" in what is needed
for interpretation,1 but he plays down their role, and assumes instead
that much of what transpires between speaker and hearer lies outside the
pale of theory.
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On the mechanist's account, speaker and hearer are not entirely
free to make up their language as they go along. Speaker and hearer can,
of course, construct an artificial language-like Esperanto-and agree to
use it in their conversational exchanges, but this kind of explicit
treatment of language is not what our mechanist has in mind when he
asserts that our use of language is constrained by our linguistic
competence. What he does have in mind is this: the speaker cannot, for
example, say
[17] John believes that Mary likes himself
and expect that his hearer will take him to mean that John believes that
Mary likes him (John). According to the mechanist. this interpretatioh-t is
simply not provided for by their shared grammar (assuming that speaker
and hearer are speaking what we may loosely refer to as "English").
Speaker and hearer may, of course, conspire to use [17] in this
non-standard way, but even here it is unlikely that their new method for
interpreting [17] will "percolate" to other sentences that contain similar
constructions, for example:
[18] John believes that Sam likes himself.
The basic linguistic competence shared by speaker and hearer does more
than simply constrain the kinds of sentences that they can produce; it is
in fact what makes it possible for them to interpret each other in the
spontaneous-oftentimes unerring-manner that they do.
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Thus the theorist by no means plays down the role that shared
grammars may have in the phenomenology of utterance interpretation. And
he leaves open the question of how much of what transpires between
slspeaker and hearer lies beyond the grasp of theory. It is in fact sound
methodology to assume that his theory can "tell all," and then to test the
limits of his theory on the basis of that assumption.
In the next chapter I will explore the extent to which a
mechanistic theory cannot account for our ability to recover meanings
from utterances. As it stands, this question is hopelessly vague, for I
have left unanalyzed the notion of "recovering a meaning"; I have given no
account of what I wish to include or exclude from the idea of a language;
and I have said precious little about the "theory" that I would like to
endorse, or about what might constitute an acceptable "account" of the
phenomena in question.
Let me first, by way of circumlocution, begin to address the
question of what it means to "recover a meaning."
What we might broadly call our "interpretive powers" are not
confined to language alone. Imagine, if you will, a panel of musical
cogniscienti who are invited to sit and "interpret" a Haydn symphony.
These experts are of course familiar with the "language" of music. Where
the untutored ear hears only an admixture of sound and silence, they
discern a remarkable amount of structure. Within the overall construction
of the piece, they notice, for example, that the first movement is written
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in sonata form. They also notice that the composer begins developing his
main theme in the A section of this movement. This theme has a complex
structure all its own and includes a motive marked mainly by its rhythm,
etc. Some of our experts might even be able to recognize individual chords
and notes within the piece. When it comes to interpreting the whole of
this wonderfully elaborate structure, or any of its parts, we are, however,
likely to find wide disagreement among our panel of experts. What to one
panelist sounds "airy' and "delicate" to another sounds "anemic" and "thin."
One expert concludes that the symphony as a whole explores the struggles
of the Viennese working class, whereas another believes that it expresses
Haydn's contempt for Italian opera. It is, I suppose, an interesting fact
about our cognitive makeup that we can extract these rather abstract
"meanings" from a medium that is almost purely form. (There might also
be some good reason why interpretations of music are so seldom
expressed as complete predications, given that it is often the mark of a
good piece of music that it "makes a complete statement.") But the lack
of agreement among our panelists, and our inability to say how these
various judgments have their point of origin in the music-to say, in
effect, how symphonic structure maps onto symphonic meaning, leads us
to despair of any theory in this domain. De gustibus non est disputandum.
Contrast the above scenario with one in which an expert panel of
language-users--rhetoricians, poets, philosophers, and linguists-is invited
to sit and interpret the disco urso of a speaker. As was the case with the
Haydn symphony, there is a remarkable amount of structure discernible in
the speaker's discourse. There are, for example, such minutiae as the
98
phonetic features of his words, the contours and rhythms of his
utterances, the lengths of his pauses-all of which flavor his discourse.
At the other end of the spectrum, we find the more extended features of
his speech: the division of text into such gross units as "paragraph" and
"syllogism." It is also quite possible that in this new scenario we will
find some of the disagreements that plagued our former panel of experts:
no two panelists will agree, for example, on how to interpret the
speaker's discourse as a whole. Is the speaker presenting an argument to
the effect that missiles are peacekeepers, or is he speaking with profound
irony?
At the level of sentences and sentence structure, however, we
find quite a different story. There appears to be a remarkable congruence
of opinion when we ask our panelists to interpret individual sentences,
when construed both inside and outside the context of the speaker's
discourse. All of our panelists agree, for example, that in the sentence
[19] Who did these scoundrels expect to attack them?
these scoundrels and them can be coreferential, whereas in the sentence
[20] These scoundrels expect to attack them
they cannot. And so on, for a myriad of other sentences comprising the
speaker's text and a myriad of other judgments of interpretation. From a
scientific point of view, this universal agreement on judgments of
utterance meaning is a remarkable fact-one that cries for explanation.
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Consider now how Davidson proposes to account for this
phenomenon. Using the language of the PT model, his claim is that each
member of our panel of experts comes to share a passing theory with the
speaker. According to Davidson, each panelist comes to the interpretive
session equipped with a number of "rough maxims and methodological
generalities"; each derives his passing theory "by wit, luck, and wisdom
from a private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of the ways people get
their point across, and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations
from the dictionary are most likely."2 Given the highly personal nature of
their interpretive arsenals, however, we might ask how our panel
members come to achieve such wide agreement over the meanings of
particular sentences. If each panel member uses a different road map,
then how do they all end up at the same place?
By putting the question in this way, we have, in a sense, upped the
ante for Davidson. No longer is it a matter of two language-users-speaker
and hearer-in private cabal, attentively observing and recording each
other's speech habits and idiosyncrasies, quietly yearning to break each
other's linguistic codes. Now we have the spectacle of one speaker
addressing an entirely assembly of hearers, with each hearer unerringly
zeroing in on the speaker's intended meaning and, most importantly, with
all the hearers agreeing amongst themselves as to how the speaker should
be interpreted. This added dimension of intersubjective agreement
amongst many hearers makes Davidson's talk of private interpretive
strategies appear suspect.
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If each member of our language panel goes about interpreting the
speaker in his own idiosyncratic and unsystematic way, then how cora
they to share so many judgments of utterance meaning? We cannot
explain this agreement by appealing to the fact that they are all aiming at
the same target- namely, what the speaker means by uttering S-for none
of the hearers knows in advance of the utterance what the speaker intends
to mean by making his utterance. Put another way, the hearers will not
know what target they are aiming at until after they have hit it. The
purpose of each hearer's interpretive strategy is certainly to recover the
intended meaning of the speaker's utterance by whatever means he can,
but this observation buys us nothing. Each hearer is undeniably "aiming at"
and hitting the same target-i.e. each hearer comes to agree that by
uttering s the speaker meant m. The question is how so many different
interpretive strategies could so accurately converge on the same meaning
for a particular utterance.
I have already argued, contra Davidson, that it is possible to give
an account of a shared "interpreting machine" that is adequate to the
interpretation of particular utterances, along the lines that Chomsky and
others have sketched. I will therefore assume that we can attribute some
such basic linguistic competence to each language-user, and that this
basic competence furthermore comprises the "core" of the language-user's
"interpretive mechanism." I will give some of the details of this
"mechanism" below. Against the background of these assumptions, we can
now attempt to sharpen our original question: Are there cases of an
interpreter "getting meanings" from language that theory cannot account
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for?
If we are talking about one interpreter in isolation from all the
others, then the answer to this question is almost certainly "yes": we
cannot expect our theory of linguistic competence to anticipate the
idiosyncrasies of each particular language-user. Whatever theory we
devise will have to be general enough to account for the competence of
each member of our language panel, for example, and yet also be flexible
enough to accommodate their individual idiolects. Here I leave open the
exact nature of this "accommodation." When I refer to the interpreter's
"getting a meaning" from an utterance, I therefore intend those meanings
that we might expect our interpreter as a member of a larger speech
community to recover-meanings that a significant fraction of our speech
community might agree upon.
Assuming, then, that we are talking about a "normally
constituted" language-user, in a homogeneous speech community, what can
we say about the limits of his linguistic competence? Do recovered
meanings far outstrip theory, as Davidson suggests? We can begin to
answer these questions by considering a little more carefully the kind of
theory that our skeptic might expect recovered meanings to outstrip. I
have sketched one such "theory," or model, in figure A.
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Figure A. A model for sentence and utterence i~nerpretation.
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§2 A model for sentence and utterance Interpretation
The model shown in figure A is a distillation of some leading
ideas in linguistics and the philosophy of language, together with some
brash interpolations about what occurs in the process of utterance
interpretation. It is, in short, a conceptual Frankenstein's monster, one
whose details I will not too jealously defend. My purpose in presenting
this model is to make explicit the kinds of processes that I assume take
place when we interpret the speech or text of another. The purpose of this
section is not to undertake a detailed, critical analysis of the
assumptions underlying the mechanistic picture of interpretation, but
rather to sketch some of its salient features and to touch on some of the
problems associated with models of this kind. I do hope in the process to
motivate a particular reading of the notion of literal meaning, one which I
believe is motivated by current work in linguistic theory. I ask the reader
to postpone asking too many probing questions until I have had a chance to
establish the commitments of this model.
Here are its gross features. Figure A shows the "path" followed
by a phone sequence or written string string S (as produced by P in context
C) through the linguistic modules of an interpreter. This path is indicated
by the solid arrows. Initially S is "scanned" by the parser and assigned a
constituent structure. The solid line connecting the parser to the
grammar is put there to suggest the idea that in assigning a constituent
structure to S, the parser-in one way or another-accesses the
information represented in the grammar. I will explore this connection in
104
more detail in Part IV. The output of the parser, a representation of the
constituent structure of S, is further processed (hence the "Processor" in
figure A), and the output of the entire module that I have labeled the SID
(for Sentence Interpretation Device), is what I!nguists of the GB school
call the LF-representation of S.
The LF-representation of S is, in effect, a representation of what
I take to be the "literal meaning" of S-putting aside Davidson's qualms
about this notion. I have construed it here as the output of the so-called
"LF" level of syntactic structure, this being the level that serves as the
interface between the formal grammar and a representation of the
meaning of S. According to Lasnik (Lasnik, 1988), "LF represents the
contribution of the grammar to the meaning of particular sentences." 3 I
will return to these assumptions, but let us now continue to follow S
through our enigmatic interpreting machine.
The LF-representation of S now enters waters that I believe are
fairly well unchartered by theory. What I have sketched to the right of the
LF-representation of S in figure A is something very much like those maps
of ancient cartographers who knew only the rough outlines of the
continents, and who, through simple ignorance, altogether excluded some
very large land masses and sea passages.
Here the LF-representation of S is assigned a semantic
representation by the Standard Semantic Unit (or SSU, for short). For the
purposes of my discussion it is not entirely essential that we assume that
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any such level of representation exists. It is enough for my purposes that
we have in our model something the corresponds roughly to the literal
meaning of S (i.e. its LF-representation) and something that corresponds
to its utterance meaning (i.e. the output of the entire system-what P
meant by producing S in context C). An intermediary level of semantic
representation may, however, be motivated on certain grounds that I will
discuss shortly.
What I have provisionally labeled the Pragmatics Unit in our
model is really a catch-all for rule systems, heuristics, principles of
conversational cooperation-whatever they might be that help the
interpreter do some or all of the following: (1) disambiguate ambiguous
sentences; (2) identify the speaker's intended referents; (3) figure out
conversational implicatures; (4) interpret ironic, sarcastic, figurative,
and other non-literal speech; etc. Connected to the module that I have
called the UID (for Utterance Interpretation Device), but lying outside of
it, are the other cognitive faculties that we might exploit to recover the
utterer's intended meaning-among them, our common sense. I place these
cognitive faculties outside the UID only because I wish to suggest their
independence from the language faculty. I expect that these faculties play
key roles in other domains that are not essentially linguistic (e.g.
scientific or mathematical reasoning, etc.).
Finally, out of this interpretation machine comes what our
interpreter takes to be the utterance meaning of S-in a sense that I will
make clear below. There I will argue that the LF-representation of S
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delivered by the SID is essentially schematic and must be "filled in" by the
Pragmatics Unit and its associated cognitive faculties.
This, in very broad outline, is how our interpretation machine
works. I will now spend some time "fine-tuning" the machine: providing
more details of its operation and fielding anticipated objections.
Consider first the Sentence Interpretation Device. My model of
the SID follows from two central assumptions: (1) the theory of grammar
endorsed by Chomsky and others of the GB School is essentially correct;
and (2) it is still too early to determine the exact nature of the
relationship between the parser and the grammar. According to Chomsky,4
a grammar can be modeled as a number of interdependent levels of
syntactic representation, as shown in [21]:
[21] D-structure
S-structure
Phonetic Form Logical Form
I assume that the oversimplified model I have presented here is familiar
to most readers. Very briefly, the rules of the "base" of the grammar,
which itself consists of a categorial component and a lexicon, generate
D-Structures that are related to S-Structures by the transformational
component (or, equivalently, by the rule Move-a). S-Structure is further
related to the so-called "interpretive" components, Phonetic Form (PF) and
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Logical Form (LF). According to Chomsky:
... rules of the LF component ... convert S-structures to
representations in LF, where scope and other properties are
represented. PF and LF constitute the "interface" between
language and other cognitive systems, yielding direct
representations of sound, on the one hand and meaning on
the other as language and other systems interact, including
perceptual and production systems, conceptual systems and
pragmatic systems.5
Given these and other similar comments in the literature about the LF
component's constituting a kind of "interface" between the formal
grammar and representations of meaning, I have taken the liberty of
assuming, in the model given in figure A, that the syntactic domain (the
SID of figure A) connects with the semantic domain (the SSU and the
Pragmatics Unit) via the LF-representation of the given phone sequence or
word string. This picture of the SID is, I believe, entirely natural, and it
makes some rather minimal assumptions about the mechanisms involved.
Chomsky has stressed, on a number of occasions, that a grammar
of the kind outlined in [21] is not to be taken as a model for a speaker or
hearer. This is not to say, however, that the grammar will have little or
no role in a reasonable model of language use. Indeed, if it is to have any
explanatory value vis A vis the phenomenology of language, the grammar
must play a central role in an interpretive model like that given in figure
A. As Chomsky puts it:
No doubt, a reasonable model of language use will
incorporate, as a basic component, the generative grammar
that expresses the speaker-hearer's knowledge of the
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language; but this generative grammar does not, in itself,
prescribe the character or functioning of a perceptual model
or a model of speech production.6
Thus we cannot simply ask how a correctly specified grammar will assign
a structural description to an incoming phone sequence or word string S;
but we must ask rather how the parser together with the grammar will
cooperate in such a way as to yield (eventually) the appropriate
LF-representation of S. The reader will notice that in figure A I leave the
connection between the grammar and the sentence recognition device, or
parser, rather ill-defined, suggesting it only by a single line connecting
the two modules. I will return to some nagging questions about the parser
in Part IV.
I urge the reader not to make too much of the role of the
"Processor" in figure A. I include it there only because I need something
that will map the structural representation of S (yielded by the parser) to
the LF-representation of S (the output of the SID).
So much then for the SID. Its primary characteristic, as we have
seen, is its ability to use grammatical information to generate a
representation of the literal meaning of the phone sequence or word string
in question. (Henceforth I will refer to phone sequences and word strings
simply as "strings.") It is common among language theorists to assume
that one can make a clear distinction between sentence meaning and
utterance meaning, both at the level of common parlance and at the level
of linguistic theory. In the model under discussion, I simply equate the
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literal meaning of S with what is represented by the LF-represea;tation of
S. This, I believe, is a natural move, given what linguists have told us
about the nature of LF.
If indeed the LF-representation of a string S represents
something like what theorists have called the literal meaning of S, then
how is it that we can access the literal meaning of S? The problem is
this. The LF-representation of S appears as an intermediate step in the
derivation of the utterance meaning of S. When we as interpreters hear a
phone sequence or read a word string, it is always in the shadow of some
utterance context. That is to say, we are never presented with the literal
meaning of a given string directly, but rather with its utterance meaning.
If by happenstance we were to find S scribbled on a small piece of paper
in the middle of an open field, we would not be able to help guessing at the
intentions of its author, or at the context in which it was written, and we
would therefore interpret S against the background of this assumed
context. Even the most sterile laboratory of the most cautious
psycholinguist would be to us rich in suggestive context parameters. Put
another way, it looks as if we can access the LF-representation of a
string only after it has been doctored by the Pragmatics Unit.
On the other hand, it appears that we do in fact have access to the
literal meanings of sentences, whatever their context of utterance might
be. For I take it that part of what it means to know the literal meaning of
a sentence S is knowing what context parameters are relevant to the
interpretation of S, and I assume that we demonstrate our knowledge of
110
these relevant context parameters when, for example, we reason
counterfactually about the meaning that S would have when uttered by
different speakers on different occasions of utterance.
I suppose that in principle there is no bar to our being able to
access what is in effect an intermediate step in the mental "derivation" of
utterer meaning-although we cannot yet say what this means. Let rLF be a
theory-internal name denoting the representation of the literal meaning of
some sentence s as uttered by p in context c, and let rU be the name for
the representation of the meaning of the speaker's utterance. Let us
suppose that when we assert that person p "knows" or "intuits" the
meaning of an utterance, we are essentially saying that p stands in a
well-defined (computational) relationship R to a representation of that
meaning. We represent p's state of knowledge by saying, in the language
of our theory, that pRra Can we also assert that at some time before, or
even after, the mental derivation of ru that pRrLF? Do we cognize the
representation of a literal meaning in the same way that we cognize the
representation of an utterance meaning? These, of course, are matters
for research to decide.
Perhaps even more vexing is the question of how we can claim to
know the literal meaning of something that is essentially schematic.
Consider, for example, the following sentence in abstraction from any
occasion of utterance:
[22] Ramona's pet chicken likes home fries.
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There are many things that we do not know about this sentence. To begin
with, we do not know if anyone has ever actually uttered this sentence in
some concrete situation. We can, of course, imagine sentence [22] being
uttered in various contexts; and we can have some foreknowledge of what
this sentence would mean in these contexts. But how do we answer the
person who asks us what sentence [22] means literally? The
disquotational theory of meaning is useless to us here, for we cannot very
well say that the sentence "Ramona's pet chicken likes home fries" means
that Ramona's pet chicken likes home fries. Saying this would leave our
interlocuter with the impression that we were being evasive. To begin
with, who on earth is Ramona, and which of her (possibly many) pet
chickens are we referring to? Does this chicken like to eat the home
fries, or does it rather feel an unnameable attraction to them? It is for
this and other reasons that I say that the literal meaning of a sentence is
essentially schematic. In the case of sentence [22], we need a theory of
reference that shows us how to "locate" the referent of the name Ramona
and of the noun phrase Ramona's pet chicken. We need contextual
information to decide which of the many senses of the verb like the
speaker intends. Nevertheless, in spite of our fragmentary knowledge, we
do not hesitate to say that we know the literal meaning of sentence [22].
How can this be?
Consider an analogy. How is it that we might claim to know the
meaning of an n-place function, f(x,,x2,x,...,x)? To know the meaning of
this function is to know how to compute different values of ffor different
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values of its independent variables. We can do a lot of interesting
mathematics with f without ever knowing the value of a single variable.
Likewise we might suppose that to know the literal meaning of a sentence
S is to know how to compute the meaning that S would have in context C
with context parameters (C1,C2,C , ...,CrO . We need not know the values of
these context parameters; we need only know how utterance meaning
varies with (Ci,, ,C3,..., Cn).
Returning now to the interpretation machine of figure A, we can
inquire a little more carefully after the nature of the module that I have
called the "Pragmatics Unit." Consider first the Standard Semantic Unit,
or SSU. Why, for example, have an SSU in the first place? We have already
said that the LF-representation of S represents the contribution of the
formal grammar to the meaning of S. Why not simply assume that this
representation suffices for a determination of the utterance meaning of
that string? Why posit an intermediary level of semantic representation?
In answer to these questions, I ask the reader to consider again a sentence
like [1], repeated here:
[23] The ham sandwich barked at my wristwatch.
A typical speaker judgment concerning this sentence might read as
follows: the sentence is syntactically unimpeachable; semantically,
however, it is a little "odd." The semantic oddity of this sentence is, of
course, attributable to the fact that ham sandwiches are not animate, and
are certainly not the kinds of things that would behave like dogs. We can,
however, slice things a little differently and say that sentence [23] is
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semantical!y impeccable-it does, after all, appear to express a
meaningful proposition about a rather bizarre ham sandwich. We can
imagine ourselves having uttered sentence [23] in a dream filled with
playful lunch items. Upon waking, we might have concluded that it was
not our language that had changed in the dreamscape, but rather what we
had accepted to be our model of the world. On this construal, we would
essentially be positing three possible levels of representation for
sentence [23]: (1) the syntactic level, where we judge that [23] is a
well-formed sentence of English; (2) the semantic level, where we judge
that [23] expresses a meaningful proposition; and (3) the level of cognitive
coherence (for lack of a better name), where we determine that [23] does
not mesh with our beliefs about the world. As to judgments of
well-formedness, our grammar can give us those, and judgments of
cognitive coherence might be forthcoming from our Pragmatics Unit. But
how do we come to conclude that [23] is semantically unassailable? It is
here that we begin to feel the temptation for including something like a
Standard Semantic Unit in our model of sentence and utterance
interpretation. We would certainly like our SSU to account for simple
judgments of semantic well-formedness, or coherence. But we might also
like it to make a principled distinction between sentences like [23], whose
oddity might disappear in the appropriate context, and sentences like
[24] My stepfather is taller than himself
whose oddity no context can erase. As I said earlier, it is not essential to
my argument that there be anything like the SSU in our interpretation
machine; and I do not mean to suggest anything by making the SSU a
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subcomponent of the Pragmatics Unit rather than an independent
component of the UID altogether. I therefore leave any decision
concerning its status to the reader.7
As mentioned earlier, I have held the Pragmatics Unit responsible
for almost all of what goes on at the non-syntactic end of language. Other
than the exigencies of exposition, there really is no good reason for doing
this. The Pragmatics Unit, as we have seen, subsumes our ability to
disambiguate sentences, identify speaker referents, interpret non-literal
forms of speech (irony, sarcasm, etc.), recognize conversational
implicatures, and perform a host of other functions that involve, among
other things, correctly identifying the intentions of the speaker. We
certainly cannot expect such an odd assortment of abilities to be
subsumed under one theory. By including them under one rubric, I do not
mean to suggest that they are in any way consubstantial. There is,
however, one feature that they all share: they are all abilities that help us
determine the intended meaning of the speaker by drawing on features of
the utterance context.
This raises its own set of questions. We assume that the process
whereby we integrate contextual information with syntactic information
to construct utterance meaning is rule-governed. Can these rules be
properly studied within a science of language? or do these rules reflect
abilities that are not exclusively linguistic and are better studied in the
context of some other domain of human behavior? If we wish to cleave as
closely as possible to our "core" grammatical competence, we might, for
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example, ask how this competence "informs" or "constrains" our pragmatic
competence. What clues can our grammatical competence provide as to
the structure of our pragmatic competence? On this matter Higginbotham
writes:
Perhaps nothing at all that people say has its meaning
wholly independently of context. It does not follow that
semantic theory has little to say, or that it is in any way
intrinsically incomplete. On the contrary, it is only through
the context-independent features of meaning that we know
what aspects of a context to take as relevant in the first
place to the interpretation of the utterances around us.8
The suggestion here is that our theory of grammatical competence will
itself be able to suggest which context parameters are relevant to the
interpretation of particular utterances. But things might also happen the
other way around: a well-articulated theory of pragmatics might show us
how certain aspects of utterance meaning can be extracted from the
context proper, thus relieving somewhat the burden of the formal
grammarian. Much of what we call pragmatics might very well walk
lockstep with our theory of grammatical competence. Or, as some
theorists have suggested, certain subfields of pragmatics might be more
naturally incorporated into some broader cognitive theory-a theory of
convention-governed behavior, say, or a theory of names.
Closely allied with this question of boundary drawing is the
question of where utterance-meaning begins and where it ends. Where it
begins is fairly clear: a theory of pragmatics must pick up where a theory
of grammar leaves off, assuming, of course, that the latter can in large
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measure be developed independently of the former. Where utterance
meaning ends, however, is a little harder to say. Part of the reason for
this is the ambiguity in the way we have chosen to circumscribe
pragmatics's domain: we say that pragmatics is essentially concerned
with the contributions of context to utterance meaning. But our notion of
context may be too all-inclusive. Consider, for example, the husband who
asks his wife, in a very pointed way, the whereabouts of his "power tie."
We can imagine his wife turning to their befuddled child and explaining,
"This means that Daddy's meeting with a client today." Of course literally
his request means nothing of the sort, and the question we must ask is
whether this implied meaning should count as part of the speaker's
utterance meaning.
Here we have strayed rather far from the picture I outlined
earlier where literal meanings are modeled as n-place functions waiting
to have their argument places filled. In that picture, all we need do is
throw a few context parameters into our meaning function, and out comes
the recovered utterance meaning. This may be a useful picture for
imagining what transpires between the speaker and his hearer, but the
model becomes somewhat strained in the case of our suburbanite in search
of his power tie: the connection between the implied meaning of his
utterance and its literal meaning is much too oblique. Recall that the
"meaning function" under discussion is essentially a representation of the
utteranca's literal meaning, this representation being derived from the
structure of the utterance together with the meanings of the individual
words used in the utterance. In this case, the purported "meaning
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function" would have to be very strange indeed to yield the utterance
meaning recovered by his wife (essentially, "I am meeting with a client
today"). It might, of course, be possible to draw a line between "proper"
utterance meanings (the possible values of the proposed meaning
functions), and speaker implicatures that bear only a distant relationship
to the utterance's literal meaning. We are not yet at the stage, however,
where we can adequately address this question.
What, then, is the utterance meaning of a phone sequence or word
string S as produced by P in context C? On my account, it is, or rather,
can be, many things to many people, depending in large measure on their
ability to pick up contextual clues; their knowledge of the beliefs,
desires, etc. of the speaker; their own willingness or desire to understand
the full import of the speaker's words, or draw inferences from them, etc.
The speaker, on the other hand, may fully intend that his hearer interpret
him, for example, to be speaking ironically, and he may in fact provide all
the requisite signals of ironic speech, and yet all these clues as to his
intended meaning may fall on deaf ears. This observation need not, of
course, affect our theory of the relevant context parameters vis vis the
identification of ironic speech. It might, however, move us to update inter
alia our theory of the hearer's knowledge of these parameters or, perhaps,
our theory of the hearer's cognitive state.
In short, the Pragmatics Unit as I have sketched it is a
hodgepodge of interpretive strategies, some perhaps fitting neatly into
their own domains of inquiry, other fading imperceptibly into the
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maelstrom of our other cognitive faculties. The interpretation machine
that I have presented in figure A is, on this account, much too "modular."
It is unlikely that the neatly packaged "cognitive faculties" and other
modules that I have sketched there correspond in any interesting way to
what we find in nature, unless, of course, the phrenologists have been
right all along. There is no reason why we should not expect the various
modules sketched in figure A to affect each other in unforeseen ways.
There is no bar to the existence of essentially "pragmatic" principles that
intervene, as it were, in the affairs of syntax. Such, for example, is the
suggestion made by Chomsky on the question of what conditions determine
the choice of "controller" in syntactic representations that involve the
empty category PRO.9 Other such "interventions" are certainly possible.
The machine outlined in figure A and defended here is a useful idealization
that helps us picture the gross features of that very complex and
multi-layered phenomenon we call language.
We can fully expect that some phenomena relating to the recovery
of speaker meaning will not so neatly fit our "useful idealization." We
have assumed that any well-forrmed, sentence of English has a literal
meaning that the hearer can use to construct an appropriate speaker or
utterance meaning. But are there sentences for which the initial
"semantic integration" is itself not possible without key clues provided by
the context? In his paper, "Boundaries and Components of Linguistics"
(Fillmore, 1984), Charles Fillmore suggests that expressions known as
contextuals may belong this category:
If the customer who has ordered a ham sandwich is referred
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to by the waitress as the ham sandwich ..., if the one tour
bus in a multi-bus tour that is scheduled to stop at a
pumpkin farm is known briefly as the pumpkin bus ..., it
might seem reasonable for us to say that these sentences do
not have literal meanings outside of their context of use.10
Fillmore is drawn to the conclusion that "...we need to bring into our
account of language the fact that code-changing as well as
code-exploiting creativity is an important part of linguistic competence,
and that perhaps ad hoc name creating occurs in everyday language on a
large scale,"11 but I am unconvinced that any such "code changing" occurs
in these cases, if by code-changing Fillmore means an adjustment or
addition to the rules or maxims that we use to "locate" the referents of
noun phrases. The problem, as I see it, is not one of how context might
shape the representation of literal meaning, but rather one of how the
speaker might get the hearer to associate a given noun phrase with some
object in his field of cognition. The "ham sandwich" and the "pumpkin bus"
of the above passage may be no more or no less problematic for a theory of
reference than the definite description "the man who wrote Waverley," and
their meaning may be no more or no less schematic. As with the
development of syntax in the past ten years, we may only now be
discovering the relevant paradigms for an adequate theory of reference,
and contextuals may be more properly construed as primary data for this
theory. Imagine that the waitress says to her co-worker,
[25] The ham sandwich wants another cup of coffee,
and that her co-worker unambiguously understands her to mean that the
gentleman who ordered the ham sandwich wants another cup of coffee.
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Fillmore suggests that [25] has no literal meaning, and that "semantic
theory will have to take into its scope the principles by which contexts
figure in informal naming." 12 This last claim might certainly be true, but
I do not believe that we need abandon the assertion that [25] has perfectly
well-defined literal meaning. I have suggested that knowing the literal
meaning of an utterance is knowing what context parameters are relevant
to the interpretation of that utterance, or, what may be equivalent,
knowing how to reason counterfactually about the meaning that the
utterance would have when uttered by different speakers on different
occasions, and Fillmore obviously has a somewhat different view of what
the literal meaning of an utterance consists in. On my view, the waitress
of our example can utter [25] and get away with it because (1) she knows
its literal meaning, and (2) she knows how, in the given context, this
meaning will "react" with her hearer's theory of reference to yield her
intended referents. Thus in answer to Fillmore I would not say that our
waitress has "changed the code," but rather that she has exploited her
knowledge of the code in order to refer in a hitherto novel way. By looking
at the example this way we are essentially shifting the explanatory
burden from our theory of semantics to our theory of reference, but in the
process we are helping to preserve the sharp line that theorists have
drawn between literal and utterance meaning.
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§3 Summary
Having originally set out to explore the extent to which recovered
meanings outstrip theory's ability to deliver them, I have to this end made
explicit the kind of "meanings" and "theory" that I intend. I have presented
a candidate "interpretation machine"-warts and al--one that I believe
satisfies Davidson's request for "a machine, which when fed an arbitrary
utterance (and certain parameters provided by the circumstances of the
utterance), produces an interpretation." 13
Putting aside the possibility of an intermediate level of semantic
representation (as given by the Standard Semantic Unit of figure A, for
example), there are basically two kinds of meaning that we might expect
our theory to have some say about, and I have very broadly called these
literal meaning and utterance meaning. To put the matter as neutrally as
possible, pragmatic "strategies" go to work on representations of literal
meaning to yield, ultimately, representations of utterance meaning. It is
of course entirely possible that an utterance meaning may "evolve" in a
number of well-defined stages. For example, the first order of business
might be the determination of the referents or exact senses of the various
formative elements of the utterance, yielding an initial representation of
utterance meaning. Next, the "disambiguation unit" might go to work on
the representation (or representations), yielding a second, hopefully more
accurate, representation of the speaker's intended meaning, etc. Thus the
utterance meaning may pass through several stages, arriving finally at a
fairly stable representation that w~ might venture to call the utterance
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meaning. It is also entirely possible that the recovery of utterance
meaning is a process that is rather more parallel and rather less serial
than the one I have described here. In this case, we might expect the
utterance meaning to be delivered to the interpreter without passing
through several intermediate levels of representation.
Against the background of this theory of interpretation, one of
the central questions of this paper becomes: Can a normally constituted
member of a homogeneous speech community recover literal or utterance
meanings that our interpretation machine cannot deliver to him? We of
course want the meanings recovered by our interpreter to agree with
those recovered by other members of our speech community. We are not,
in other words, talking about highly individualistic interpretations of
speaker meaning, but rather about the kind of widespread agreement on
judgments of meaning that we might expect a scientific study of language
to explain. By putting the question in this way, I am essentially asking
from which quarter will come the challenger to the rather mechanistic
account of utterance interpretation that I have sketched above, an account
which I believe accurately reflects much current thought on the process of
utterance interpretation.
As we have already seen, Davidson has tried to argue, on more or
less a priori grounds, that our interpretive abilities are much too ad hoc,
much too unconstrained, to walk lockstep with any "theory" that we might
devise. The motivation for his skeptical argument, he has told us, derives
from a consideration of certain abilities that I have elsewhere called
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Class M phenomena, abilities which "threaten standard descriptions of
linguistic competence ... .w14 In the chapter that follows, I will explore
the ways in which these phenomena might threaten to topple our
interpretation machine.
There may, of course, be other phenomena that can bring our
neatly circumscribed interpreting machine to grief, and which Davidson
has failed to consider. I believe, however, that Davidson's list of
contenders provides us with a good launching point for our discussion.
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Part IV
Class M phenomena
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Introduction
In §1 I will consider Davidson's list of Class M phenomena in the
following order: (1) our ability to interpret malaprops and to correct slips
of the tongue; (2) our ability to interpret words we have never heard
before; (3) our ability to cope with new idiolects; and finally, (4) our
ability to interpret grammatically garbled utterances. I will argue that
this last ability constitutes the strongest contender to our standard
picture of the interpretive process.
In §2 1 will take a more detailed look at our ability to interpret
the ungrammatical.
§1 A brief look at Davidson's list of Class M phenomena
Malaprops and slips of the tongue fall into a much broader
category of linguistic phenomena known as speech errors. Speech errors
have been given a lot of attention in the literature, but as far as I know,
few, if any, researchers have proposed detailed mechanisms that might
explain how competent language-users go about interpreting utterances
that harbor them. Very often, speech errors have been seen to provide a
kind of indirect evidence which supports the formative units and
grammatical rules posited by linguists.1 According to Fromkin, a
prominent speech error researcher, if the formatives and rules of the
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linguists are found necessary to explain certain aspects of linguistic
performance, then "there is little reason to doubt their existence as part
of grammars, particularly when their grammatical 'existence' is
necessitated by other linguistic evidence."2 Another researcher, D. B. Fry,
asserts that speech errors "cannot be accounted for except by attributing
to speakers a knowledge of a language system certainly similar to and
even in many details coincident with that constructed by linguists."3
We must be careful how we interpret these claims, however. For
in the absence of any widely attested model of performance, it is unclear
how we might relate the evidence concerning the production of speech
errors to the putative process whereby we interpret the utterances that
harbor them.
Consider first the case of the malaprop. We can break down the
process of malaprop interpretation outlined earlier (Part II, §2) into a
number of steps:
[26] (a) Recover the literal meaning of the sentence containing the
malaprop.
(b) Come to realize that the literal meaning cannot be the speaker's
intended meaning.
(c) Conclude that the speaker misspoke-i.e. that he produced a
malaprop.
(d) Search the space of the phonological neighbors of the sentence
used to make the malaprop.
(e) Continue to do step (d) until you locate a sentence that makes
sense in the given context.
At first glance it appears that much of what we do from step (b) onward
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is shrouded in mystery. I assume that there is some process whereby we
detect a "mismatch" between a sentence's literal meaning and the context
within which it is produced, and I further assume that this process is
rule-governed. But how is it that we come to decide what kind of error, if
any, the speaker has committed in making the utterance (step (c))? I
suppose that our knowledge of the context and a number of pragmatic
princir les might help us here. We might very quickly come to realize, for
example, that none of the usual methods of sentence construal apply in the
given context: we find no evidence, for example, that the speaker is
speaking ironically, or sarcastically, or figuratively, etc. On the contrary,
there might be good positive evidence that the speaker has indeed
misspoken--for example, we may know from past experience that he is a
habitual malapropper, or his face may somehow register the fact that he
has committed an error, etc.
The fun really begins at step (d). What kind of mechanism or
mechanisms can we propose for our "search" through the space of
phonological neighbors? The problem with any proposed search
mechanism is the potentially large space of candidate replacement
sentences. Consider, for example, the malapropism
[27] We sent her a card expressing our symphonies.
We might, on pragmatic or semantic grounds, begin by determining that
the word symphonies makes little sense in the context "We sent her a card
expressing our ... ," and we might therefore attempt various replacements
of this word:
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[28] We sent her a card expressing our syntheses
... cynosures
... slim ponies
... etc.
until we finally arrive at the speaker's intended utterance, *We sent her a
card expressing our sympathies." Suppose that we can give a mechanical
procedure for searching through the space of [27]'s phonological
neighbors-by scanning the lexicon or a subsection of it in some kind of
dictionary order, for example. We might nevertheless find that the list of
candidate replacements for sentence [27] (like that given in [28]) will
grow too large for us to scan in the time that it usually takes us to
recover the intended meaning of the malaprop.
This, of course, is not a good reason for abandoning a model that
has as much initial plausibility as does [26]. We might, for example,
assume that a number of search principles or heuristics operate to
constrain the list of candidate sentences that we search through. I have
already suggested one such simplifying principle above: we should attempt
to replace only those words that appear to be out of place in the sentence
that we have decided contains a malaprop. In sentence [27], for example,
we do not attempt to find substitutions for the word sent, or the word
card, etc. Other possible heuristics might dictate that we search only for
replacements in the same word class, or with the same number of
syllables, or with the same syllabic stress, etc.-these heuristics being
suggested, for example, by our study of speech errors.
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I spend as much time as I do dwelling on the case of malaprop
interpretation because contrary to what Davidson has suggested, there is
no a priori reason for believing that the phenomenon in any way threatens
standard descriptions of our linguistic competence. Admittedly, much of
what happens in the interpretation of a malaprop appears to happen at the
pragmatic end of the meaning spectrum, where our knowledge of the
relevant mechanisms is rather sketchy. But this in itself is no cause for
pessimism. The very fact that the production of malapropisms and other
speech errors appears to be fairly rule-governed suggests that it may also
be possible to uncover the principles underlying their interpretation.
Davidson has suggested that our ability to interpret words we
have never heard before also threatens standard descriptions of our
linguistic competence. This is, in some ways, a very odd claim for
Davidson to make, for we can expect that an explanation of this ability
will figure prominently in the linguist's description of first language
acquisition.
The phenomenon is of course ubiquitous. We will often guess at
the meanings of new words that we encounter in speech and in literature,
with varying degrees of success. I have found, for example, that people
systematically misconstrue the word effete to mean something like
"elitist" or "snobbish." It is quite possible that these people have
attempted to extract the meaning of this word from such phrases as
"effete intellectual" or "effete aristocrat," spoken in disparaging tones. In
such cases, we would say that context was unable to provide any gocd
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clues as to the meaning of the word, and that the meanings that people
reconstructed for this word were correspondingly far off the mark.
In other cases, context will provide us with the initial semantic
integration of a new word, but nevertheless leave us quite unable to use
the word in any meaningful way. Fillmore has described his own struggles
with the word steeplechase:
Some time ago I had occasion to realize that I didn't know the
meaning of the word steeplechase. I didn't know whether it
was
* the name of a kind of place where a certain kind of horse
racing takes place;
* the name of a sport (so that I could say I enjoy
steeplechase);
* the name of'a particular contest within this sport (so
that one could say The final steeplechase of the day is
about to begin);
* the name of the kind of horse that is trained to race in
the way we associate with the concept of
steeplechase-with hedges, wall, and ditches as
obstacles.
I think I completely understood the brute and institutional
facts underlying the meaning of the word, but I didn't know
how the word "keyed" into the schema.4
I take it as a given that learning the meaning of a new word
essentially involves learning its categorial, selectional, and semantic
features.5 Each new context in which we encounter the word--including
any session we might have with the dictionary--helps us to assign new
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features to a representation of that word in our mental lexicon. It is also
possible that new contextual information will cause us to modify
previously assigned features that we now take to be incorrect. All of
this, of course, happens without any conscious effort on our part, and it
behooves the theorist to give an adequate account of this process.
Although I have not indicated this in figure A, I have assumed that
our knowledge of the lexicon is connected in some way with our knowledge
of the grammar. This is not to say, of course, that other cognitive
modules cannot somehow access this knowledge (I will in fact describe
one such possibility below). It is, however, one thing to assert that an
adequate description of our linguistic competence must make essential
appeal to the notion of a lexicon, and quite another to say how it is that
we go about constructing such a mentally represented list of words and
their idiosyncratic features. The current division of labor would have the
grammarian asserting the former, and the psycholinguist attempting the
latter.
If, as Davidson appears to claim, it is true that correctly
interpreting the meaning of a new word involves a lot of inspired
II
guesswork, then it is also true that we guess incorrectly much of the
time. It may take us a number of exposures to a word, in a number of
revealing contexts, before we can begin to place the word in the overall
schemum of word meanings-and even then we might get it wrong. The
meanings of some words may be so recherch6 that it would be impractical
for us to expect normal contextual exposure to reveal their meanings. If
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our ability to interpret new words depends in large measure on wit, luck,
and wisdom (Davidson's words), then why hold the linguist accountable for
an explanation of this ability? It appears to me that we should then also
demand from the linguist an explanation of our ability to write clever
limericks, create palindromes, and play Wheel of Fortune.
It may appear to Davidson a small miracle that we can interpret
new words at all-never mind the fact that it may be a hit or miss affair.
In which case I can only respond to Davidson by agreeing that it is no mean
task to give an adequate account of this ability. I would also argue,
however, that it is impossible to set any a priori limits to progress in
this domain. I must again conclude that Davidson is being overly
pessimistic when he suggests that this phenomenon threatens standard
models of our linguistic competence.
Turning now to our ability to cope with new idiolects, we first
need to agree on what exactly constitutes an idiolect that is essentially
different from our own. An idiolect is of course the language spoken by an
individual, but it is usually construed as a pattern of language use that is
unique in some way among the members of that individual's speech
community. But even here a wide range of interpretations is possible. On
one reading, no two people ever share what is essentially the same
idiolect. Their portable speech interpretation and production machines
may be the same as ever you please, but any two people will always differ
in their speech habits and other matters of performance. On the other
hand, we might stipulate that two people have the same idiolect when, for
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example, they share the same grammar, or when they share the same
grammar and Pragmatics Unit-leaving theory to decide the metric by
which we measure "sameness." On this latter interpretation, if two
people share the same idiolect, they will essentially agree on all
judgments of grammaticality and utterance meaning. At the other end of
the sameness metric, we might find the monolingual speaker of English
and the monolingual speaker of Walbiri staring at each other mutely.
When Davidson talks about our ability to cope with new idiolects,
I assume that he means a new idiolect of what is essentially our own
language- more specifically, an idiolect whose features differ in some
interesting way from our own. Here too we have a wide range of
possibilities.
I have already discussed our ability to recover the meaning of a
new word, and this would cover the case of a language user whose idiolect
differed from our own only in matter of vocabulary. But what about the
fellow who uses whole constructions that sound to us unfamiliar or odd or
downright uninterpretable? Let us consider a few examples.
At one time I had occasion to puzzle over the oddity of the
sentence
[29] She defies me like Turk to Christian.
The sentence is perfectly interpretable and it makes complete sense in its
own context. What I find most interesting, however, is the charming way
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that it breaks parallel structure. Instead of expressing the parallelism
with the clunkier "She defies me like Turk defies Christian," the author
has opted for a more compact and, I would say, more elegant, expression
of his thought. In this case I would say that the difference between our
idiolects lay in the domain of performance rather than in the domain of
competence. The author of [29], being a much better wordsmith than I,
chose to exploit his mastery of the simile and of the preposition to's
ability to express-among other things-opposition or confrontation.
I recently had the pleasure of running across the following noun
phrase in a book by Lynda Barry6:
[30] scary pink fish condiment that the smell would make you start
running
Ms. Barry was attempting to capture the very unguarded and oftentimes
ungrammatical speech of preadolescents (very successfully, I would say).
We have probably all at one time or another heard someone use a
construction similar to that in [30]. In a child's mouth, we would simply
say that it was a performance error that time would correct. But what if
we were to find an adult who used this kind of relative clause
construction with some frequency? Would we then say that this person
was speaking an idiolect fundamentally different from our own?
This last question is tightly wound up with the question of how
we go about attributing one grammar rather than another to a language
user. If we have independent reasons for believing that our subject's
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grammar "rules our such constructions as [30], then we say that the
production of [30] is essentially a performance error, and we are left with
the quite different problem of explaining why our subject uses these
constructions with as much frequency as he does. If, on the other hand,
we have reason to believe that our subject's grammar licenses such
constructions as [30], then, depending on how we choose to slice idiolects,
we might conclude that our subject's idiolect is essentially different
from our own. To put the matter simply, it appears that most interesting
differences of idiolect have a grammatical component That being the
case, !et us now pursue the subject of ungrammaticality.
Davidson has included our ability to interpret grammatically
garbled utterances in his list of Class M phenomena. An ad hominem
argument for this inclusion might go as follows. Suppose that person A
utters a sentence which is novel to person B, e.g. Mermaids and aquamen
alike care nothing for the opera. As good scientists we record the fact
that person B has no problem interpreting this utterance: he recognizes
familiar words arranged in a novel but nevertheless appropriate way. As
linguists we attempt to explain this phenomenon in part by assuming that
A and B share a knowledge of the same language, their knowledge being
characterized in part by a finite set of structure-forming rules, and
licensing and interpretive principles that we call a grammar. Roughly
speaking, we construct a grammar in such a way as to capture the
regularities of a language. Thus we say that sentences produced by the
speaker A are not sui generis, but rather have their point of origin in a
human "language faculty," a faculty that is partly characterized by A's
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knowledge of the grammar of his language. Hearer B, sharing a knowledge
of these rules, has no problem interpreting sentences produced in
accordance with them.
What happens, however, when our speaker produces a sentence
that is grammatically garbled, or ungrammatical? Suppose, for example,
that person A utters
[31] It is known George to be silly
and person B unhesitatingly interprets him to mean that George is known
to be silly. Most linguists, I believe, would judge [31] to be ill-formed, or
ungrammatical. But if that is the case, then how did person B come to
interpret the utterance successfully? The problem is this: sentence [31]
breaks the grammatical rules that person B assumes person A uses to
produce his utterances. How, then, can person B so unerringly recover the
speaker's intended meaning? Is this perhaps a bona fide example of our
ability to recover meanings that theory cannot deliver?
Two things must be said here. First, this is not an argument that
I endorse. I hope to show in §2 that the argument simply will not wash.
Second, I am not asserting that this is an argument that Davidson would
himself endorse. I am simply taking the part of that philosopher or
linguist who is skeptical about rule-governed accounts of language
interpretation, and who would point to such phenomena as our ability to
interpret grammatically garbled utterances as evidence for his skeptical
position. I will henceforth refer to this person simply as the "skeptic."
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There are several reasons why our ability to interpret the
ungrammatical might seem a stronger challenger to our mechanistic
picture than the other abilities in Davidson's list of Class M phenomena.
First, recall that grammars have been the traditional bread and butter of
linguists; theories of grammar lie at the very heart of explanations of our
linguistic abilities. If it now appears that we can interpret a very broad
clais of sentences (like [31]) without appealing to shared grammars, then
the entire enterprise built on these grammars falls into question.
When we correctly interpret the intended meaning of a malaprop,
we begin by recovering the literal meaning of the speakers utterance. The
ludicrousness of this literal meaning in the given context acts as a kind of
"error signal" that sets off the search for a phonological neighbor of the
sentence produced by the speaker. Notice, however, that we interpret
sentences like [31] spontaneously and unerringly, oftentimes not even
noticing their ungrammatical status. There is, in this latter case, no
"error message" that might let us know that something has gone wrong
with the speaker's production mechanism. There is no apparent
intermediate step in the interpretation of sentence [31] wherein we
acknowledge, for example, that because sentence [31] is ungrammatical it
therefore has no literal meaning of its own.
Recall that in order to recover the speaker meanings of malaprops
and other slips of the tongue we must make essential appeal to
mechanisms that lie outside of the SID (the Sentence Interpretation
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Device). We must appeal to these mechanisms in part to recover the
sentence that the speaker intended to utter. In §2 1 will argue that no
such intermediate step of "sentence recovery" is essential to the
interpretation of the grammatically garbled utterance. Unlike our ability
to interpret slips of the tongue, our ability to interpret ungrammatical
utterances does not appear to be much different from our ability to
interpret the meanings of their grammatical counterparts. That is to say,
when we interpret sentence [31] to mean that George is known to be silly,
we are in fact recovering its literal meaning. Furthermore, in the case of
tongue slips, new words, and the like, it is too easy to write off the
skeptical argument as being much too premature: our knowledge of the
relevant mechanisms at the pragmatic end of things is rather sketchy, and
we are obliged to play a "wait and see" game with the skeptic. Such, I will
argue, is not the case with our ability to interpret the ungrammatical,
where we appear to have a fairly good--though admittedly
tentative-knowledge of the relevant mechanisms.
In the following sections, I will explore the ways that our ability
to interpret grammatically garbled utterances might threaten standard
descriptions of our linguiStics competence. I will, so to speak, give this
phenomenon a full run for the money, attempting to show in the process
that the mechanistic paradigm is much more powerful than many people
imagine.
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§2 The challenge of ungrammaticality
I have previously argued that it is not possible to motivate
Davidson's skeptical argument on the basis of our ability to interpret
malaprops. In this section I will explore how we might motivate the
skeptical argument on the basis of our ability to interpret ungrammatical
utterances.
The skeptic would like to argue that this ability threatens
standard descriptions of our linguistic competence. Standard models of
our linguistic competence are built around the notion of a shared sense--on
the part of both speaker and hearer--of the ways in which sentences of the
language can be constructed and understood. This "shared sense" is
codified as a grammar, which is, quite simply, the linguist's theory of the
language-user's linguistic competence. We assume that speaker and
hearer somehow access the information codified in this grammar when
they produce and interpret utterances and other linguistic signs. (I will
again assume that there is no harm in speaking as if speaker and
interpreter were using the theory that the linguist uses to describe their
competence.) The skeptic now points to the fact that the hearer can
unambiguously interpret the speaker even when the speaker produces an
utterance which does not "adhere" to the proposed grammatical rules. The
skeptic asks whether or not this obviates the need for shared grammars,
since it now appears that speaker and hearer can get along without them.
Does not this phenomenon compromise the explanatory value of shared
grammars in the interpretation of utterances? Do we have here a good
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candidate for a case where the interpreter recovers an utterance meaning
that theory cannot deliver to him?
The answer to both of these questions, I will argue, is clearly no.
In this chapter I hope to show (1) that the skeptic has misconstrued the
notion of a grammar and a grammatical "rule," and (2) that modern
grammatical theory has made significant progress toward providing an
explanation of this phenomenon.
A few preliminaries
A first step in understanding a language user's native ability to
produce and interprat ungrammatical sentences is getting clear on the
notion of ungrammaticality. How do we give a principled account of
which sentences are and which sentences are not to count as
ungrammatical or ill-formed? We may decide, for example, to leave this
distinction entirely to the judgment of native speakers. Language is, after
all, a public entity; everything from the rarefied thoughts of the great
philosophers to the most playful banter of the schoolyards finds its
expression in a language. Why not simply leave it to the tribunal of
English speakers to decide which sentences of the language should be
classed "ungrammatical"?
Paul Ziff suggested something along these lines in an early paper
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titled "About Ungrammaticalness" (Ziff, 1964a). In this paper, he argues
that an intuitive idea of grammaticalness is a nececsary precondition of
our ability to assess the correctness of a grammar. According to Ziff, no
grammar is adequate unless it somehow captures this intuition. His
characterization of the ungrammatical is as follows:
... a sentence of a language is ungrammatical if and only if
first, native speakers of the language balk when an arbitrary
token of the type is uttered, and secondly the sentence type
has an associated structural descri9tion that is classed as
nonaccepted on theoretic grounds.
Ziff's definition goes a long way toward capturing our pre-theoretic
notion of the ungrammatical. He capitalizes on our tendency to "balk" at
sentences whose structure we deem ill-formed or deviant. But he also
notices that native speakers of English have a tendency to balk at
sentences like
[32] He had a green idea.8
This sentence, according to Ziff, is perfectly grammatical: although the
thought expressed by the sentence is "odd," its form is nevertheless
unassailable. Correspondingly, it is the task of the linguist constructing a
grammar for English to insure that this grammar assigns to [32] an
acceptable structural description. If the grammar in question assigns to
[32] an acceptable structural description, then by Ziffs criteria the
sentence cannot be ruled ungrammatical-a desirable consequence.
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Ziff's characterization of the ungrammatical has several
undesirable consequences, however. Consider the following "deviant"
sentence:
[33] More people have been to France than I have.
It is a remarkable fact that this sentence often passes undetected as a
piece of pure nonsense. On the dozen or so occasions that I have deployed
sentence [33], 1 have never encountered anything that I might characterize
as "balking" behavior: my listeners consistently assumed that I meant
something along the lines of "There are others who have been to
France-not just me," or "There are people who have been to France more
often than I." By Ziff's criteria, therefore, sentence [33] is simply not
ungrammatical-a consequence that I suspect few linguists are willing to
accept. This suggests a rather tenuous link between speaker judgments of
sentence acceptability and the notion of grammaticality that we would
want theory to preserve.
The unreliability of speaker judgments can also be seen with
respect to what linguists call "garden path" sentences, such as
[34] The horse raced past the barn fell.
This sentence, and others like it, often elicit "balking" behavior: those
hearing sentence [34] for the first time assume that the predication is
complete once the word barn is pronounced; the final word fell is judged
semantically adventitious, and its presence makes the sentence sound
"odd." Speakers who make this judgment fail to construe The horse raced
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past the barn as a complex noun phrase (a restrictive relative clause, to
use the linguistic jargon), and thereby fail to interpret sentence [34] along
the following lines:
[35] [Np The horse which was raced past the barn] [VP fell].
Clearly we cannot expect every speaker of a given language to be
equally sensitive to the subtleties of sentence construction and the
possible pitfalls of sentence interpretation. Perhaps if we restrict
grammaticality judgments to a distinguished panel of language users, we
might overcome the problems associated with sentences like [33] and [34],
and thereby salvage Ziffs characterization of the ungrammatical. The
publishers of dictionaries, it will be observed, have already adopted this
policy. It is common practice for lexicographers to commission a "usage
panel" consisting of novelists, essayists, poets, journalists, and others
who have "demonstrated their sensitiveness to the language and their
power to wield it effectively and beautifully."9 This usage panel decides,
for example, whether it is or it ain't good English to use the word anxious
in the sense of eager.
The notion of ungrammaticality that I would like to develop,
however, is rather more theory-internal. This notion depends first and
foremost on the proper characterization of a grammar and an assessment
of its role in explaining various aspects of our ability to acquire and use
language. To put the matter as succinctly as possible, I will simply
assume that an ungrammatical sentence is one whose structure violates
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one or more rules of a given grammar, where the "grammar" in question is
of the kind that might be proposed by a linguist of the generative grammar
school. I will put aside for the moment the question of exactly which
"rules" I mean, or how the structure in question might "violate" these
rules. These matters will emerge in the course of my exposition.
Recall, however, that we are restricting our attention to
interpretable ungrammatical sentences. Thus our list of candidate
ungrammatical sentences might include anything from the mildly
unsyntactic
[36] To who are you speaking?
where the interrogative pronoun has been given the wrong case, and
[37] The child seems sleeping,
which is interpreted as a raising structure:
[38] NP seems [t Predicate];
to the chaotic
[39] anyone lived in a pretty how town
with up so floating many bells down, 10
where it is more difficult to pinpoint the source of the sentence's
deviance. I say that our list "might" include the above sentences because
in the absence of any widely attested theory of grammar, we can only
guess at what this list might include. We will, however, temporarily
145
exclude from our lit such "word salads" as
[40] is of and lying the the Ronald Reagan,
which are simply uninterpretable.
Also excluded from consideration are such sentences as
[41] Colorless green ideas sleep furiously,
and
[42] John solved the pipe.
These sentences are traditionally judged deviant on the basis of their
content rather than on the basis of their form. Which rules, if any, are
broken by sentences like these depends very much on the internal
organization of one's theory of the language faculty. There may be, for
example, a level of semantic representation where [42] is assigned a
structure that is ill-formed or unlicensed in some way (e.g. a
representation where the semantic features of the constituent the pipe do
not match the semantic features of the context John solved ...). We may,
on the other hand, find that we should rather attribute the oddity of [42]
to a clash between the proposition it expresses and our beliefs about
pipes. These same considerations may also apply to analytically false
sentences like [24], repeated here:
[43] My stepfather is taller than himself.
I will, for the sake of brevity, call these sentences and others like them
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unsemantic, their distinguishing feature being the fact that their
semantic oddity coexists with their syntactic well-formedness. I am not
claiming that the unsemantic sentences form a natural kind; the existence
of any such class of sentences may turn out to be a mere epiphenomenon. I
only wish to point out the fact that there are other kinds of sentential
"deviance" not covered by the rubric ungrammatical.
There may, of course, be yet a third way of accounting for the
oddity of sentences like [41]-[43]: it may, for example, turn out that a
properly specified grammar will account for the oddity of these sentences
on purely syntactic grounds. Chomsky addresses this question of the
proper division of labor between syntax and semantics in section 2.3.1 of
Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.11 There he presents two contrasting
lists of sentences (here numbered [44] and [45]):
[44] 0]
pi]
[iv]
[v][vi]
[vii]
[viii]
[ix]
[x]
[45] [i]
pi]
[iii]iv]
[v][vi]
The boy may frighten sincerity
sincerity may admire the boy
John amazed the injustice of that decision
the boy elapsed
the boy was abundant
the harvest was clever to agree
John is owning a house
the dog looks barking
John solved the pipe
the book dispersed
sincerity may frighten the boy
the boy may admire sincerity
the injustice of that decision amazed John
a week elapsed
the harvest.was abundant
the boy was clever to agree
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[vii] John owns a house
[viii] the dog looks terrifying
[ix] John solved the problem
[x] the boys dispersedl2
The expressions in [45] are grammatically irreproachable; there is nothing
unexceptional about their form or diction. But most readers will find
some or all of the sentences in [44] "odd" or "deviant." Each of the
sentences in [44] can be obtained from the corresponding sentence in [45]
by a word substitution, an interchange of grammatical function (e.g.
moving an NP from subject to object position, and vice versa), or some
other simple operation. It should be noted that at the time of writing
Aspects, Chomsky considered the sentences of [44] to have a rather
"borderline character," in the sense that it was not entirely clear how to
explain their aberrant status.13 The issue for Chomsky was the proper
division of labor between what he called the syntactic and the semantic
components of the grammar. Some deviant sentences, he noted, presented
clear cases of the violation of purely syntactic rules, for example:
[46] sincerity frighten may boy the;
while other deviant sentences were only semantically incongruous:
[47] I knew you would come, but I was wrong.
The sentences of [44], however, presented a special problem for the
theorist. The linguist acknowledged two important facts about these
sentences: (1) they were in some way "aberrant," and (2) they were, to
some extent, interpretable. With an eye to the internal organization of his
theory, the linguist had to decide whether to extend the methods of
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syntactic or semantic analysis to account for these facts:
A priori there is no way to decide whether the burden of
presentation should fall on the syntactic or the semantic
component of the generative grammar. If the former, we must
design the syntactic component so that it does not provide for
the sentences of [44] directly, but assigns them
Phrase-markers only by virtue of their structural similarities
to such perfectly well-formed sentences as those of [45] ...
Altematively, if we conclude that the semantic component
should carry the burden of accounting for these facts, we can
allow the syntactic component to generate the sentences of
[45] as well as those of [44], with no distinction of
grammaticalness, but with the lexical items specified in such
a way that the rules of the semantic component will determine
the incongruity of the sentences of [44] and the manner in
which they can be interpreted (if at all).14
Thus even at this early stage in the development of generative grammars,
the problem of how to account for our ability to successfully interpret
ungrammatical sentenced was acknowledged. In a later passage, Chomsky
assumed that it fell to the syntactic component of the grammar to explain
the aberrant status of sentences like those in [44]. I do not wish to give
the reader the impression, however, that I take the sentences of [44] to be
perfect paradigms of ungrammaticality. This, I have argued, is a
theory-intemal matter. I will, in the course of my exposition, come to
consider a very broad range of "deviant" sentences, some of which have
been classed ungrammatical by those linguists whose theories I here
endorse, and some sentences whose statuses have yet to be decided.
The skeptic, as I have described him here, is one who believes
that standard grammar-based models of our linguistic competence cannot
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account for our ability to interpret utterances that are ungrammatical.
Thus we find philosophers like Mario Bunge, for example, who argue that
"since ... an ideal speaker-hearer is supposed to handle only grammatical
(well-formed) sentences, grammars are prescriptive or normative,
contrary to Chomsky's claim and in agreement with classical
linguistics."l 5 Furthermore, "The function of a grammar is to generate all
and only the infinitely many grammatical (well formed) sentences of the
language."16 The roots of this skeptical view have been traced by
Chomsky to the early influence that the study of formal languages had on
the development of modern linguistics:
... the study of formal languages was misleading in this regard.
When we study, say, the language of arithmetic, we may take it
to be a "given" abstract object: an infinite class of sentences
in some given notation. Certain expressions in this notation
are well-formed sentences, others are not. And of the
well-formed sentences, some express arithmetical truths,
some do not. A "grammar" for such a system is simply some
set of rules that specifies exactly the well-formed sentences.
... It is easy to see how one might take over from the study of
formal languages the idea that the "language" is somehow
given as a set of sentences or sentence-meaning pairs, while
the grammar is some characterization of this infinite set of
objects, hence, it might be thought, a construct that may be
selected one way or another depending on convenience or other
extraneous concerns. The move is understandable, but
misguided, and it has engendered much pointless discussion
and controversy.17
The "move" discussed by Chomsky is one in which we equate a language
with an "externalized" object-a set of sentence/meaning pairs, say.
Chomsky attributes this extensional, or "E-language," view of language to
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such philosophers as Quine and Lewis, for whom, he argues, the notion of a
grammar is essentially derivative. 18 On their account, "the linguist is
free to select the grammar one way or another as long as it correctly
identifies the E-language. 19 In "On Semantics," 20 Higginbotham tells us
that there is an essential element missing from Lewis's description of a
language, where "Sentences or their structural descriptions are paired
with meanings, or with ranges of meaning, so that what is excluded from
the range of meaning of a sentence comprises those things that it does not
mean ... .21 Higginbotham writes:
Here ... is what I think is missing from Lewis's picture. In that
picture, sentences have various ranges of meaning, and some
are meaningless, but nonsentences do not have any meanings.
However, the last statement is false to natural languages:
nonsentences must have definite meanings, as full-blooded as
those of ordinary sentences ...22
It is sometimes difficult to resist the neat idealization of a
language as an infinite collection of well-formed structures. And the
view is not endemic only to philosophers. In their Introduction to the
Theory of Grammar, Riemsdijk and Williams, two linguists of the
Chomskyan school, have written that "A language ... is a set of objects that
we call sentences."23 I have noticed that in beginning linguistics courses
it is common practice to ask students to picture a grammar as a set of
rules that generate the well-formed sentences of a language.
Non-sentences are left out of the picture, except when they are needed by
linguists to motivate some grammatical rule or other. The going
assumption seems to be that there are no grammatical principles that are
obtainable only by considering the interpretation of ungrammatical
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paradigms.
In all fairness it should be said that there is some initial
plausibility to the view that there exists a correlation between
well-formedness and interpretability. We notice, for example, that
(roughly speaking) the farther a sentence moves away from full
grammaticality, the more difficult it becomes to interpret. We can
imagine, for example, taking a well-formed sentence and, one by one,
randomly shifting the position of each of its words. At a certain point in
the process, our original sentence will evolve into a word string with
little or no discernible constituent structure, and the grammatical
functions of its words will be lost. There are, of course, many "axes"
along which a sentence can approach the limiting case of complete word
salad. Not only can we shift the constituents of sentences around in
strange ways, but we can, also make the appropriate constituents disagree
in person, number, gender, tense, mood, etc.; we can assign the wrong
cases to pronouns; we can add extraneous words; etc.
Intuitively speaking, it appears that the more "grammatical
structure" a sentence preserves, the more likely it is that it will be
interpretable. Previous attempts to explain our ability to interpret
ungrammatical sentences exploited this intuition. The idea was in some
sense to find the "shortest path" between the ungrammatical sentence and
one that was fully grammatical, as I will show in the next section.
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A Ilittle historical perspective
In this section I will briefly consider a former avatar of the
problem of ungrammaticality, one that appeared more or less around the
time of the printing of Chomsky's Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. I will
focus on this period for two reasons: (1) There were several papers
published around this time that dealt exclusively with the language-user's
ability to recover the meaning of ungrammatical utterances. Since then
the subject has all but disappeared from the literature (for reasons that
will soon become apparent). (2) Previous attempts to solve this
perceived "problem" are instructive vis A vis modern efforts to deal with
the same phenomenon. I will show how the theorists' proposed solutions
to the problem might well have engendered a certain skepticism toward
the whole enterprise.
I will consider the problem of ungrammaticality from the point of
view of the generative grammarian of the middle 1960s, and I will refer
to this linguist as the "linguist," or "theorist."
I should begin by saying that the general picture of the
interpretive process which I have outlined in figure A (p. 103) is one that
our linguist might have gladly endorsed. Our linguist, however, would have
had a different theory of grammar, and this would have colored not only
his perception of the problem of ungrammaticality, but also his approach
to a solution of that problem. I will, for the sake of discussion, refer to
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this early notion of a grammar as grammar , where the subscript "e" is
appended to suggest the word "early." There are two key differences
between grammars, and their more modern counterparts (as described by
the GB school, for example): (1) Unlike modern theories of grammar,
grammars, had no LF level of representation to act as an interface
between syntax and the "semantic component," or, as Lac!w;k has put it,
"between formal grammar and something in the'rer' world'. "24 (2) Unlike
their modern counterparts, grammarse were very much in the business of
"generating" well-formed structures--in a sense that I will make clear
below.
Consider first the organization of one of these early grammars.
Chomsky used the word "grammar" to refer very broadly to system of rules
having three major components: syntax, phonology, and semantics. 25 The
syntactic component of a grammar, consisted of an iterative system of
rules with two major subcomponents: (1) a base that generated a "highly
restricted (perhaps finite) set of basic strings, each with an associated
structural description called a base Phrase-marker'2 6; and (2) a
transformational subcomponent, "concerned with generating a sentence,
with its surface structure, from its basis." 27 The base Phrase-markers
were taken to be the "elementary units" from which deep structures were
constructed.2 8 I assume that this description of a grammar e is familiar
to most readers.
Linguists of the time assumed that it was the deep structure of a
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sentence that determined its semantic interpretation, and its surface
structure-as yielded by the transformational component of the
syntax-that determined its phonetic interpretation.29 I think it is fair to
say that subsequent research has shown this model to be essentially
incorrect; the model was nevertheless successful in guiding linguistic
research for quite some time.
The key to our inquiry lies in the relationship between the deep,
structures and their associated surface structures-this relationship
being mediated, on Chomsky's account--by the rules of the
transformational component. Chomsky writes:
What, then, is the test that determines whether a generalized
Phrase-marker is the deep structure of some sentence? The
answer is very simple. The transformational rules provide
exactly such a test, and there is, in general no simpler test. A
generalized Phrase-marker MD is the deep structure underlying
the sentence S, with the surface structure Ms , just in case the
transformational rules generate Ms from MD.30
And there is a further condition on the surface structure Ms: it must be
well-formed.
A deep structure is a generalized Phrase-marker underlying
some well-formed surface structure. Thus the basic notion
defined by a transformational grammar is: deep structure MD
underlies well-formed surface structure Ms . The notion "deep
structure" is itself derivative from this. The transformational
rules act as a "filter" that permits only certain generalized
Phrase-markers to qualify as deep structures.3 1
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The force of the requirement that the surface structure Ms be well-formed
is made clearer in another passage where Chomsky describes a possible
sequence of steps that we might use to recover the deep structure, and
hence the meaning, of some well-formed sentence of the language:
The base rules and the transformational rules set certain
conditions that must be met for a structure to qualify as the
deep structure expressing the semantic content of some
well-formed sentence. Given a grammar containing a base
component and a transformational component, one can develop
innumerable procedures for actually constructing deep
structures. These will vary in exhaustiveness and efficiency,
and in the extent to which they can be adapted to the problems
of producing or understanding speech. One such constructive
procedure is to run through the base rules (observing order) so
as to form a generalize Phrase-marker M, and then through the
transformational rules (observing order) so as to form a
surface structure M'from M. If M' is well-formed, then M was
a deep structure; otherwise, it was not. All deep structures
can be enumerated in this way, just as they can all be
enumerated in many other ways, given the grammar. 32
Assuming, as Chomsky does, that an ungrammatical sentence S violates
one or more rules of the grammare, it may not be possible, using this same
sequence of steps that he describes, to recover its deep structure. When
we, for example, "run through" the base and transformational rules of the
grammar, in our attempt to form the surface structure of S, which of
these rules do we "relax" and how? It was considerations like these, I
believe, that led linguists of the time to take such an active interest in
our ability to recover the meanings of ungrammatical sentences.
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I will now pause to consider some early attempts to bring
ill-formed sentences into the sway of linguistic theory.
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Noam Chomsky's "Degrees of Grammaticalness," 1961
In this early paper, Chomsky suggests a way that the current
theory might be extended to accommodate the phenomenon of
ungrammaticality. His approach is outlined as follows:
Given a grammatically deviant utterance, we attempt to
impose an interpretation on it, exploiting whatever features of
grammatical structure it preserves and whatever analogies we
can construct with perfectly well-formed utterances. We do
not, in this way, impose an interpretation on a perfectly
grammatical utterance.3 3
Chomsky does not, however, detail how the language user "exploits" the
grammatical structure that an ungrammatical sentence preserves, or how
he "constructs" the relevant analogies. According to Chomsky, the first
step in the interpretation of a deviant sentence S is the recognition that
S deviates from one or more of the grammatical rules.34 This
recognition on the part of the interpreter initiates a series of steps which
includes, among others, the construction of the aforementioned
"analogies" between the deviant sentence S and other well-formed
expressions of the language. These well-formed expressions in turn
provide the key to the interpretation of the deviant sentence S. But there
is no description of how the interpreter actually goes about constructing
the crucial analogies. It is possible that a description of this process
belongs properly to the theory of performance. The ability to construct
analogies--that is, to detect structural similarities between sentences-is
not necessarily language specific and may depend on more general
cognitive capacities.
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Ziffs "On Understanding 'Understanding Utterances'," 1964
In this paper, Ziff is concerned with the problem of explaining our
ability to understand syntactically deviant sentences. For Ziff,
syntactically deviant sentences of English include those sentences
exemplifying problems of co-occurrence,35 as well as sentences
traditionally classed as ungrammatical. Before we can understand a
syntactically deviant sentence, Ziff claims, we must apprehend the
syntactic structure of that sentence.36 He writes:
Apprehending the syntactic structure of a syntactically
deviant utterance is ... a matter of grasping the simplest
relation between the utterance and the set of non-deviant
utterances. ... A deviant utterance has that structure that
constitutes the terminus of the simplest route from the
regular grammar to the utterance in question.3 7
In order to make clear the concept of a "simplest route" let us consider
one of Ziff's examples:
Consider the utterance "He expressed a green thought": it might
seem as though the utterance were deviant owing simply to the
combination of green and thought. That this is not the basic
reason is indicated by the fact that the class of elements that
can occur without syntactic deviation in the environment "He
expressed a green ..." is null, e.g. "He expressed a green tree" is
also deviant. Hence, the deviance of "He expressed a green
thought" cannot be attributed to thought. It can only be
attributed to green. Let Ei be the class of elements that can
occur without syntactic deviation in the environment "He
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expressed a ... thought": then we can relate the utterance to the
regular grammar by invoking the rule Ei -+ green.
On the other hand, the utterance "Over there is a green thought"
is deviant owing to the occurrence of thought. Let Ej (where i
*j) be the class of elements that can occur in the
environment "over there is a green ...": then by invoking the rule
Ej -+ thought we can relate the utterance to the regular
grammar. 38
It is rules like
[48] Ei - green
and
[49] Ej - thought
in the above examples that map the simplest route from the regular
grammar, to the syntactically deviant sentence in question. Ziff also
presents a number of other possible rules:
I should like to suggest that there are five basic types of
routes from the regular grammar to a syntactically deviant
utterance. In consequence, there are five types of rules that
may be involved; (where capital letters are variables for word
classes and lower case letters are variables for words) these
five types of rules may be rendered schematically as follows:
[50] ...A ...B ... - ... B ...A ...
[51] ...A ... B ...-+...A ...
[52] ...A ...- * ...A ... B ...
[53] A -*a
[54] (A -, a) B -i b
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The first is the rule of inversion, the second of deletion, the
third of addition, the fourth of word-class extension, and the
fifth of word-class contraction.39
As an example of the use of inversion (rule [50]), consider the ill-formed
string:
[55] The man the cake ate.
According to Ziff, the simplest route from the grammare to this
syntactically deviant sentence is given by the inversion rule
[56] NPI V NP2 - NP 1 NP2 V.
Under this classification of rules, rules [48] and [49], discussed above,
would count as word-class extension rules. There Is a great deal of
flexibility in how we are allowed to define word-classes. In [48], for
example, the word-class Ei is the class of those elements that can occur
without syntactic deviation in the environment "He expressed a ...
thought"-a relatively small class of words. On the other hand, the
word-classes used to express rule [56] are the very broad lexical
categories NP and V.
According to Ziff, finding a route from the regular grammar e to
the deviant sentence is primarily a matter of isolating the source of the
sentence's deviance.40 Once the source of the sentence's deviance is
identified, we can construct a rule or rules (on the model of rules [50] to
[54]) that map a grammatical string to the deviant sentence in question.
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Although Ziff does not state this explicitly, understanding the deviant
sentence is a matter of understanding the grammatical string to which it
is mapped. More precisely, the meaning of the deviant sentence is exactly
the meaning of the grammatical string to which it corresponds.
Ziff's task is to account for our ability to understand or interpret
syntactically deviant sentences. What then is the status of those
syntactically deviant sentences that we cannot straightforwardly
interpret? Consider, for example, the "ill-formed" sentence
[57] My the believes in a just god,
where the anomalous element the is being used, not mentioned. There
exists a very simple route from the set of fully grammatical sentences to
sentence [57]. Consider the rule
[58] B -+ the,
where B is the class of all words that can occur in the context "My ...
believes in a just god" without syntactic deviation. In this case, we have
followed Ziff's prescription very closely: (1) we have isolated the source
of deviance for sentence [57], namely, the occurrence of the word the in
the given context; and (2). we have given a simple rule, [58], that relates
the set of fully grammatical sentences to the deviant sentence [57]. The
reader will note, however, that we are no closer to understanding [57]
than we were before. I will grant Ziff a pinch of salt and assume, for the
sake of discussion, that his theory is meant to apply only to the class of
interpretable deviant sentences.
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Now consider the interpretable deviant sentence [37], repeated
here:
[59] The child seems sleeping.
When we attempt to isolate the source of [59]'s deviance, we are faced
with a dilemma. Is the source of [59]'s deviance (a) the occurrence of the
verb seems in the context "The child ... sleeping," a context that can
accept such verbs as is, was, and hates, or (b) the absence of the
infinitival element to be before the word sleeping , or perhaps even (c)
the occurrence of the word sleeping in the context "The child seems ...", a
context reserved for such words as happy and desperate ? Certainly the
fact that we naturally interpret sentence [59] along the lines of
[60] The child seems to be sleeping
would suggest option (b), but this is not how Ziff would have us proceed.
According to Ziff, we interpret an ill-formed sentence by finding the
"simplest route" from the regular grammare to that sentence. Let us now
consider the rules suggested by options (a), (b), and (c) above. Option (a)
suggests the word-class extension rule
[61] C1 -seemns,
where CI is the class of verbs that can appear in the context "The child ...
sleeping" without syntactic deviation. Option (b) suggests a deletion rule
along the lines of
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[62] NP seems to be h-ing NP seems V-ing.
Option (c) suggests the word-class extension rule
[63] C2 -+ sleeping,
where C2 is the class of words (e.g. adjectives) that can appear in the
context "The child seems ..." without syntactic deviation. We are now bade
to choose the simplest of these rules. But by what criterion of simplicity
are we to do so? There is nothing about any of the rules [61], [62], or [63]
that mark it as the rule relating the deviant sentence [59] to the regular
grammar,. Ziff's theory does not appear able to get off the ground.
Jerrold Katz's "Semi-Sentences," 1964
In this paper Katz addresses our ability to interpret the
semi-sentences of a language. The class of semi-sentences includes
sentences that fall short of full grammaticality as well as sentences that
are "semantically ill-formed." 4 1 Katz does not make clear what he means
by a semantically ill-formed sentence. I will assume, for the sake of
discussion, that the class of semantically ill-formed sentences includes
those sentences that Chomsky labels "unsemantic," e.g. I knew you would
come, but I was wrong (sentence [47]), as well as those sentences that
result from violations of selectional rules, e.g. He hada green idea.
Nothing hinges on our defining the class of semi-sentences in this way;
for our purposes, it is only important that this class include those
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sentences that we previously characterized as ungrammatical.
Katz argues that it is incumbent on the linguist to provide what
he calls a "theory" of semi-sentences:
A theory of semi-sentences, a theory that characterizes the
set of ungrammatical strings that the speaker's knowledge of
linguistic structure enables him to understand and explains
why the members of this set are comprehensible, is ... to be
regarded as an integral part of the description of a language,
not as a bonus it is nice but not necessary to have.42
Semi-sentences, according to Katz, differ as to the extent of their
departure from full grammaticality, but nothing is a semi-sentence that
"goes too far." 4 3 Katz therefore seeks to partition the set of
ungrammatical sentences into two exclusive and jointly exhaustive
subsets: the set SS of semi-sentences and the set NS of nonsense
strings.44 The set of nonsense strings is the set of those strings that
depart so far from full grammaticality that they are thereby rendered
incomprehensible; they are, in effect, what I have elsewhere called "word
salad," a word string in which grammatical relations are obscured and the
grammatical functions of the constituents are undeterminable. An
example of such a string might be
[64] the the and is smokeless ashtrays.
Strings in the set NS may exhibit some structure--for example, in
sentence [64] smokeless ashtrays constitutes a noun phrase-but the
structure exhibited may not be enough or of the right kind to render the
sentence interpretable. The sentences in the set SS, however, do
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preserve enough grammatical structure to enable competent speakers of
the language to interpret them. The proposed theory of semi-sentences
must therefore account for the various ways that a speaker uses his
linguistic knowledge to interpret the sentences of SS.
Katz's theory proceeds as follows:
A speaker knows (in the sense in which he knows the rules of
the grammar of his language) a system of rules that enables
him to associate a non-null set of grammatical sentences with
each semi-sentence. This association is performed on the
basis of the structure that the semi-sentence has and the
speaker's understanding of the semi-sentence is nothing other
than his understanding of the sentences in the set in with
which the semi-sentence is associated ... Let us call the set
of sentences that have their meaning(s) transferred to a
semi-sentence its comprehension set and let us call the rules
which accomplish this transference transfer rules .45
A system of transfer rules may be regarded as containing at
most a rule for each rule of the grammar (the same transfer
rule may relate to more than one rule of the grammar). Each
transfer rule tells how the rule(s) of the grammar to which it
corresponds can be violated without leading to derivations
whose terminal lines are strings in NS. A theory of
semi-sentences thus generates semi-sentences (without
generating any nonsense strings) when the transfer rules are
used to construct their "semi-derivations." The comprehension
set for a semi-sentence must be constructible from its
semi-derivation.46
Katz's theory is fairly complex, and it is worth being clear about its
general structure: (1) Each element of the set SS is derivable from a
combination of transfer rules and rules of the grammare . We saw the
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reason for this stipulation earlier: the derivability of the sentence will
insure that hearer will be able to recover its deep structure. (2) The
comprehension set for the derived semi-sentence is mechanically
constructible from its semi-derivation. (3) Each element of the
comprehension set is a possible interpretation of the semi-sentence in
question.
I see several problems with Katz's proposed theory as outlined.
Assuming that the members of SS are in some way identifiable and
derivable, why should it be expected that the invoked transfer rules will
bear some relation to the normal rules of a grammar,? According to Katz,
each transfer rule will correspond to one or more rules of the regular
grammare, and it will indicate how these rules of the grammare can be
violated without generating a derivation whose terminus is a string in NS.
But how do we know a priori that each element of SS can be derived by
violating (or relaxing) one or more of the normal rules of the grammare?
What if relaxing the appropriate rules amounts to little more than the
license to "derive" whatever string we want? Furthermore, what licenses
the assumption that we will be able to construct the comprehension set
for a semi-sentence from its semi-derivation? These are just some of
the questions that Katz leaves unanswered.
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Summary and discussion
In each of the papers discussed above, an attempt was made to
associate an ungrammatical sentence with one or more grammatical, or
well-formed, sentences. Chomsky spoke of our "imposing" an
interpretation on the ungrammatical sentence by exploiting whatever
grammatical structure the sentence preserved, and by using "whatever
analogies we [could] construct with perfectly well-formed utterances 4 7;
Ziff showed how we might attempt to find the "simplest path" from the
deviant sentence to one that was perfectly well-formed; and Katz
sketched a theory wherein each "semi-sentence" was associated with a
"comprehension set" of well-formed sentences, each sentence of this set
providing a possible interpretation of the given deviant sentence.
Behind these attempts to beat a path back to the grammar lay, I
believe, something like the following chain of reasoning: (1) The sentence
perception device, or parser, would take a well-formed phone sequence or
word string as input and deliver as output something that was much
"closer to a surface structure than a deep structure; (2) our knowledge of
the grammar would then enable us to recover the deep structure, and hence
the meaning, of the given sentence; (3) if, however, the input to the parser
was an ungrammatical sentence, and the parser delivered a surface
structure that was not well-formed, then we might not be able to use our
knowledge of the grammar to recover the necessary deep structure;
therefore (4) it was first necessary to "fix up" or repair the input to or
the output of the parser, by somehow replacing the ill-formed sentence by
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one that was fully grammatical.
Note that both Chomsky and Ziff appealed to abilities that were
left further unanalyzed--namely, (for Chomsky) the ability to construct the
relevant "analogies," and (for Ziff) the ability to intuit the "simplest
route" back to the regular grammar. Our skeptic may well point to these
special talents as evidence, for example, that our ability to recover the
meanings of utterances is rather less "mechanistic" and rather more a
product of "wit, luck, and wisdom" than our theorist will allow-at least in
the domain of the ungrammatical.
Katz had a different approach altogether. His suggestion was
simply to create a whole new theory of semi-sentences, one that would
supposedly work side by side with the theory for well-formed sentences.
Katz was therefore in the business of placing constraints on a theory that
he was not even sure existed-a move that does not seem well-motivated.
All of these approaches assumed that there was an essential
difference between the process of interpreting a u;eviant sentence and one
that was fully grammatical. This assumption wes later dropped, as we
shall see in the next section.
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Current theory
The complexion of grammatical theorizing is very different today
from what it was 25 years ago when those early papers on
ungrammaticality were published, and I will not attempt to reconstruct
all the relevant shifts of focus and methodology. Higginbotham has
already expressed what I believe to be the going assumption among
theorists, and I will repeat his words here:
... non-sentences must have definite meanings, as full-blooded
as those of ordinary sentences, if the source of their intuitive
uninterpretability (or merely partial interpretability) is just
the violation of a rule of formal grammar. 4 8
Thus, contrary to Katz's original proposal, you shouldn't need two
interpretive mechanisms to accommodate both sentence and
non-sentences, but one. There have been a number of significant changes
in grammatical theory that have made this consolidation possible, and I
will very briefly sketch some of these below.
My aim in this section is to defend the mechanistic account of
interpretation against the skeptic who argues that this account cannot
explain our ability to interpret deviant utterances. I will show how
current grammatical theory can accommodate this ability, and how this
accommodation might necessitate a shift in commonly-held notions of a
grammar and a grammatical rule.
One of the most salient features of the overall organization of UG
170
is the addition of the LF, or "logical form," level of syntactic
representation--the LF-representation of a sentence being, roughly, a
representation of the contribution of the grammar to the meaning of that
sentence. It is the task of the linguist to determine which aspects of
meaning are represented at LF and how they are represented. In many
cases, the LF-representation of a sentence will be the same as its
S-structure representation. Consider, for example, the sentence
[65] George eats poor people for breakfast,
with S-structure representation
[66] [NP George] INFL [VP eat [NP poor people] [pp for breakfast]].
(The abstract element INFL represents the tense and agreement properties
of the verb eat .) Loosely speaking, the S-structure [66] contains all the
information relevant to the interpretation of sentence [65]. The noun
phrase George is assigned the O-role agent by the transitive verb eat, and
the noun phrase poor people is assigned the O-role patient; the
prepositional phrase for breakfast modifies the verb phrase. The
grammatical functions of all the elements in sentence [65] are indicated
in the S-structure representation [66], and the mapping from S-structure
to LF is correspondingly trivial: [66] is also the LF-representation of
sentence [65]. Other sentences do not map so straightforwardly from
S-structure to LF. The sentence
[67] Everybody loves somebody sometime,
for example, is assigned the S-structure
171
[68] [NP [QP Everybody]] INFL [VP love [NP [QP somebody]] [ADVP some-
timel],
where the QPs indicate that the elements everybody and somebody are
quantifier phrases. Sentence [67] is ambiguous with either the universal
quantifier everybody or the existential quantifier somebody enjoying
wide scope. The quantifier movement (QR) rules of the LF component thus
map the S-structure [68] into two corresponding LF-representations,
[69] everybodyx [S somebodyy [S x loves y [ADVP sometime]]]
[70] somebodyy [S evqrybody, [S x loves y [ADVP sometime]]],
where, for the sake of clarity, I have omitted the abstract element INFL.
[69] and [70] receive their interpretations in accordance with the usual
rules of quantifier-variable binding: [69] asserts that each person will
love some (unspecified) person sometime; [70] asserts that there is at
least one person that everybody will love sometime.
Another salient difference between previous incarnations of
generative grammars and their more modern counterparts is the
elimination, or perhaps more accurately, the reinterpretation of the
transformational component:
In early work in generative grammar it was assumed, as in
traditional grammar, that there are rule such as "passive,"
"relativization," "question-formation," etc. These rules were
considered to be decomposable into more fundamental
elements: elementary transformations that can compound in
various ways, and structural conditions ... that are themselves
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formed from elementary constituents. In subsequent work, in
accordance with the sound methodological principles of
reducing the range and variety of possible grammars to the
minimum, these possibilities of compounding were gradually
reduced, approaching the rule Move-a as a limit.49
Chomsky is here suggesting that the rules of the transformational
component might essentially reduce to one: Move-a, meaning "move any
category anywhere," with some parametric variation on the choice of
and possible landing sites for the moved category. Chomsky calls this a
"reasonable hypothesis," and further claims that "many particular cases
appear well-substantiated."50 An example of the application of the rule
Move-a may be seen in the derivation of the S-structure [72] from the
D-structure [71]:
[71] np is believed [George to be an evil capitalist]
[72] Georgei is believed [ti to be an evil capitalist],
where np is a position reserved for a noun phrase, and t is the coindexed
trace left by the movement of the noun phrase George from the embedded
clause to the position occupied by np.
One dominant perspective on the organization of UG construes the
grammar as a complex system of interacting principles. These principles
divide naturally into a number of subsystems:
[73] [a] X-bar theory
[b] 9-theory
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[c] Case theory
[d] Binding theory
[e] Bounding theory
[f] Control theory
[g] Govemment theory 51
I will assume that X-bar theory is familiar to the reader in one or another
variant. Loosely speaking, X-bar theory, together with the 0-marking
properties of the lexical entries, determines the categorial constituents
of representations at D-structure and their ordering.
0-theory is concerned with the rules governing the proper
assignment of thematic roles.
Case theory is concerned with those conditions that govern the
assignment of abstract Case to those elements that appear in
Case-marking positions. (When used in this technical sense, the word
case is capitalized.) Consider, for example, an application of J.-R.
Vergnaud's Case Filter .52 This principle states that every noun phrase
with phonological content must be assigned Case. The Case Filter explains
why the noun phrase George in D-structure [71] must be moved to the
subject position of the matrix clause: infinitivals are not Case assigners,
and the noun phrase must move to a Case-marked position in order to
receive Case.
The binding theory is concerned with the relation of anaphors and
pronominals to their antecedents.
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Bounding theory places constraints on possible applications of
the rule Move-a. In particular, there appear to be constraints on "how far"
certain elements can be moved in a given structure, and what positions
these elements can be moved to.
The theory of control determines possible antecedents for the
abstract element PRO. I will have little to say about this theory.
The concept of government plays a central role in most of the
subsystems discussed above. Without getting bogged down in the
technical details, the theory of government explores the relation between
the head of a construction and the elements or categories governed by it.
A verb, for example, governs its complements, and in the prepositional
phrase [pp P NP], P governs NP.
We can best appreciate the functioning of this elaborate machine
by considering an example. Suppose that our speaker were to utter the
ill-formed:
[74] *It is believed George to be an evil capitalist.
We interpret the speaker to mean that George is believed to be an evil
capitalist. How do we dothis? Looking at our Sentence Interpretation
Device (figure A), we can begin by making some very minimal assumptions
about the structure delivered by the parser. Let us suppose that the
parser simply scans [74] from left to right and assigns to it a constituent
structure along the lines of:
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[75] *It is believed [S' [S George to be an evil capitalist]],
where I have suppressed labeling those constituents not strictly relevant
to our discussion. By simply "accessing" the lexicon, the parser would
know that the verb believe takes a clausal complement, and little else
apart from some basic X-bar theory would be needed by the parser to yield
a structure like [75]. If we were now to assume that [75] mapped
isomorphically to the LF level of syntactic representation, so that [75]
was also the LF-representation of [74], we could account directly for the
recovered meaning. As an LF-structure, [75] shows that George is
assigned the e--role agent or subjectby the embedded verb phrase. 53 The
pleonastic interpretation of it would be suggested by the fact that it was
not coindexed with any trace in the structure [75]. And this, it appears,
would be enough to account for the recovered meaning. Notice that the
structure [75] is not licensed by the Case Filter discussed earlier: George
is not in a Case-marked position and must therefore move from the
subject position of the embedded clause to receive Case. Nevertheless,
this violation of the Case Filter does not seem to affect the interpretation
of [74]. This would be possible, for example, if there existed general
semantic principles that applied to linguistic structures independently of
their well-formedness. We can put this observation in the form of a
putative operative principle, one which, on the basis of empirical
evidence, we might later find cause to modify or drop altogether:
[76] Unlicensed LF-structures can, under certain conditions, still be
processed by the semantic component (i.e. interpreted).
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I should mention that from the semanticist's point of view, it is simply
sound methodology to assume an operative principle of the form [76]. If
one is going to specify the semantics for a language in the most general
way possible, then one does not a priori want to exclude the semantic
processing of syntactically ill-formed structures.
Alternatively, we could have assumed that the pleonastic it in
structure [75] first loses its phonetic content, yielding a structure like
[71], repeated here:
[77] np is believed [S' [S George to be an evil capitalist]].
"Normal" grammatical processes (e.g. an application of the rule Move-a)
would then convert [77] to the well-formed LF-structure:
[78] Georgei is believed [S' [S tito be an evil capitalist]].
The choice between these two alternatives, it must be stressed, is not a
matter of stipulation, but rather one of empirical discovery.
It is certainly true that our lack of knowledge about the parser
and its relation to the grammar makes our account of sentence
interpretation somewhat provisional. I think it is fair to say that this
relationship is little understood at present. One of the central questions
in this domain is the following: To what extent does the parser employ the
kind of information that is represented by grammatical rules? A recent
proposal by Clifton and Frazier54 has it that identifying the the
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grammatical structure of a sentence "is accomplished by identifying and
categorizing the lexical items of a sentence as they are read or heard and
then analyzing them in terms of the possible phrase structure
configurations of the language."55 It should be noted that a consideration
of potential phrase structure configurations is not enough to rule out a
structure like [75] as the possible "output" of this parser, unless, of
course, we stipulate that constraints on possible structures (like the Case
Filter) also be included among the parser's "considerations."
But why mention the parser at all? Chomsky and other linguists
have already made it clear that the grammar is not to be taken as a model
of sentence production or interpretation. If, as theorists have suggested,
the interpretation of ungrammatical sentences is to be treated no
differently than the interpretation of fully grammatical ones, then why
worry over the details of the parser in the former case any more than in
the latter?
Part of the special worry over the parsing or processing of
interpretable ungrammatical sentences concerns the fact that they are not
"constrained" in the same way that grammatical sentences are. An
example will help make my meaning clear. I have already shown how a
sentence like [74] might very straightforwardly be assigned an
LF-structure that is fully "interpretable." But now consider the
ill-formed sentence:
[79] *Love are in we.5 6
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When I first encountered this sentence, I interpreted the author to mean
"We are in love." Sentence [79] is a very odd kind of poetic inversion, this
inversion being more commonly expressed by the sentence, "In love are
we." Given our arsenal of grammatical devices we might say that the
meaning we recover from sentence [79] is derived from an LF-structure
like:
[80] [NPj Love] ti [VP are [ in [NPi we] t ]],
where the traces mark the positions from which the noun phrases have
been moved. Structure [80] is certainly not licensed by the grammar-it is,
in fact, monstrous-but we can appeal to our operative principle [76] and
say that this does not affect the ability of the semantic component to
"interpret" the structure. The parser, for all we know, may simply deliver
the well-formed structure:
[81] [NP We] [VP are [a in love]].
The issue that I am pursuing here is not the ability of the semantic
component to process a structure like [80], but rather the question of how
we might come to assign an LF-structure like [80] or [81] to sentence [79]
in the first place. We have assumed that the LF-structure of a sentence is
what determines its interpretation, and that the parser, in one way or
another, accesses the information coded in the grammar to assign to
sentence [79] a structure (not necessarily an LF-structure). It appears
that on the basis of some very simple knowledge about the lexicon, and a
little X-bar theory, our parser might have assigned the structure
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[82] [NP Love] [VP are [ in we]],
to sentence [79]; whereupon we might have recovered the interpretation
"Love is in us." We note, for example, that a lack of agreement between
subject and verb does not affect the interpretation of such paradigms as
[83] Love are a many splendored thing;
and a pronoun with incorrect case-marking does not affect the
interpretation of
[84] He gave we the flowers.
Why, then, do we come to interpret [79] the way that we do?
We might suppose that there is something about sentence [79]
that prompts the parser (or the "processor" of the SID) to modify the
structure that it would, under normal circumstances, assign to this
sentence. The lack of agreement in number between the subject and tha
verb; the wrong case-marking on the pronoun; and the fact that both these
shortcomings can be put aright by exchanging the positions of the noun
phrases-all of these factors can co-conspire to determine an LF-structure
substantially different from the one that we might expect (viz. [82]) if the
parser were simply to consider the structure-forming rules of the
grammar. Here we move away from the view that there exists a a kind of
direct mapping from the processes of the grammar to the rules -and
heuristics of the parser. It appears that the perceptual model must be
"fleshed out" with certain processing mechanisms that have no clear
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counterpart in the grammar. Stemberger writes that "Many researchers ...
assume a one-to-one relationship between elements of a syntactic theory
and the production of utterances,"57 and a review of the literature will
show that a similar assumption is often made in the case of sentence
interpretation . This kind of perceptual model may work well for a
sentence like [74], where simply ignoring a licensing principle can yield
the appropriate LF-structure. But it does not appear to work for the more
complex case of sentence [79], where other processing rules may apply.
Many questions still remain unanswered in this domain. Why, for
example, can we recover a meaning for sentence [79], but cannot do the
same for
[85] John Bill loves?
I am assuming, of course, that [85] is not ambiguous as between the two
readings "John loves Bill" and "Bill loves John"; I am simply assuming that
[85] is quite literally meaningless. I now ask why our sentence perception
device cannot assign, for example, a structure like
[86] [NP John] [NPi Bill] [VP loves tj,
to sentence [85]. Why not simply construe the noun phrase Bill (or John)
as a moved element? There is, after all, a gap after the verb loves to
license this assumption.
These considerations, far from posing any kind of threat to the
mechanist program, actually help to define it. If, as in the generation of a
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structure like [75], the parser or sentence processor must act as if one or
more rules of the grammar has been "relaxed," then the theorist must ask
what limits there are on the operation of "relaxing a rule of the grammar."
It then becomes part of his research program to inquire which rules of the
grammar can be relaxed, when they can be relaxed, and how.
If, in order to recover the LF-structure of an ungrammatical
sentence, the parser or processor must employ rules or heuristics that
have no clear counterpart in the grammar, then the theorist might still
profitably ask the extent to which the parser or processor accesses the
kind of information that the grammar provides. In the case of sentence
[79], for example, the grammar might be able to "inform" the sentence
processor that the mismatch of features (number and case) can be put
aright by exchanging the positions of the two noun phrases.
Our concern over the parser is, of course, a concern over what has
been generally called the "psychological reality" of our linguistic theory.
Joan Bresnan (Bresnan, 1983) has suggested that a "realistic grammar"
should be "realizable" in the following sense:
...we should be able to define for it explicit realization
mappings to psychological models of language use. These
realizations should map distinct grammatical rules and units
into distinct processing operations and informational units in
such a way that different rule types of the grammar are
associated with different processing functions.58
If these "realization mappings" were not possible, then, Bresnan argues,
"the grammar could not be said to represent the knowledge of the language
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user in any psychologically interesting sense*59 This would, of course,
severely compromise the explanatory value of any such grammar vis A vis
the problem of sentence production and interpretation, and it would be
unclear what role, if any, such a grammar would have in our linguistic
theory. We might, on this basis, assume that the intuitions of the early
grammarians were not far off: if we wish to preserve the value of the
grammar in explaining our ability to interpret sentences--ungrammatical
or otherwise--then we might suppose that ungrammatical sentences are
interpreted in part by first establishing how they have departed from full
grammaticality. We assume, of course, that detecting these departures
from full grammaticality is an automatic (unconscious) process--a process
that it will take no little amount of empirical research to uncover.
We can now focus somewhat our inquiry into our ability to
interpret ungrammatical sentences: Supposing that we can recover a
(literal) meaning M from an ungrammatical sentence U, will the SID (cf.
Part III, §2) be able to deliver an LF-structure S for U that yields
recovered meaning M? We of course want the SID to deliver these
LF-structures in some some purely mechanical fashion. We would, in
other words, like to avoid a homoncular view of the SID in which, for
example, the interpretation of an ungrammatical sentence U depends on
our being able to "intuit" a close grammatical neighbor of U (leaving
furt;her unanalyzed the nature of this "intuition"). This is not to deny that
it may be possible to find a mechanism that yields the close grammatical
neighbor, but the theorist's account is made all the more plausible if he
has no need of invoking these adjunct mechanisms.
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It is true, in a sense, that grammar-based theories of our
linguistic competence cannot (at present) account for our ability to
recover the meanings of ungrammatical utterances. But in the same sense
it is also true that these theories cannot account for our ability to
recover the meanings of sentences that are fully grammatical. The
grammar is merely a repository of our knowledge of the language-a
knowledge of the ways it can go right and the ways it can go wrong-and
too little is known about the actual mechanisms that access this
knowledge and produce interpretations.
As to our skeptic, we must distinguish between two claims that
he might be making: (1) Current theory is unable to account for the
LF-structures that we apparently recover from ungrammatical sentences;
and (2) no future natural extension of this theory will be able to account
for the recovery of these meanings. The first claim is certainly true-but
then again, no linguist ever denied that it was. The second claim, it
appears, flies in the face of the considerable progress that has already
been made in this domain.
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In this paper I set out to explore one of a fairly broad class of
skeptical arguments that seek to undermine rule-governed accounts of our
ability to produce and understand language. This argument, proposed by
Donald Davidson in his paper "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," attempts
to show that our interpretive abilities reach far beyond what standard
accounts of our linguistic competence can explain. Davidson attempts to
motivate his skeptical argument by pointing to such phenomena as our
ability to recover the intended meaning of a malaprop. This ability on the
part of the hearer, he argues, depends not on any internalized "interpreting
machine" that the hearer shares with the speaker, but rather on the
hearers possession of a good measure of "wit, luck, and wisdom," which
allow him to construct correct "passing theories" of what the speakers
words mean. The hearer's ability to construct proper passing theories is
therefore not any different in kind from his ability to find his way around
in the world generally.
In Part I of the paper I presented Davidson's argument in
abstraction from those views that we might have been tempted to
attribute to him on the basis of his other works on language. My aim in
that chapter was not to play the part of the philosophical historian, but
rather to isolate the kind of skeptical argument that would become the
focus of this paper. Davidson's claim was that phenomena like our ability
to interpret malaprops threatened what he called standard descriptions of
linguistic competence, including, by his own admission, descriptions for
which he was himself responsible. (I take this to be an allusion to his
championing the use of Tarski's Convention T in descriptions of our
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semantic competence.) In this section, I sketched the assumed model of
our linguistic competence-what I called the Three Plausible Principles
model-and I presented Davidson's objections to it.
In Part II I assessed Davidson's objections to the standard
account of our linguistic competence, and I argued that his skepticism
was not well-motivated. I attacked Davidson's argument on several
fronts: (1) I defended the mechanist framework of linguistic inquiry
championed by Chomsky and other theorists of the generative grammar
school, arguing that this framework could accommodate the interpretive
phenomena upon which Davidson based his skeptical challenge; (2) 1
suggested that mechanistic accounts of our ability to use language need
not be held accountable for every aspect of ability to recover utterance
meanings, and that there could in fact be phenomena (malaprop
interpretation included) that lay beyond the grasp of this theory; (2 I
argued, contra Davidson, that there are no good grounds for extending a
skepticism about rule-governed accounts of interpretation from
malaprops to utterances in general.
In Part III, I explored some of the details of the mechanist
response to Davidson's argument, as well as some of the assumptions
underlying this response. Davidson sought to argue that rule-governed
accounts of interpretation could not account for our ability to recover
certain meanings from speaker utteranlces. In §1 I explored a little more
carefully the notion of "recovering a meaning" from an utterance; and in §2
I "fleshed out" the interpretation machine which I had briefly sketched in
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Part II, and which, I suggested, constituted the proper foil to Davidson's
skeptical claims.
In Part IV, §1, 1 took a closer look at Davidson's list of "Class M"
phenomena-phenomena which he claimed threatened the standard model.
In §2 1 examined our ability to recover the meaning of a grammatically
garbled sentence, one of the phenomena which Davidson claimed
threatened standard descriptions of our linguistic competence. After
defining the notion of ungrammaticality, I gave a "historical snapshot" of
theorists' attempts to accommodate the phenomenon. I showed how these
attempts appealed to abilities that were left further unanalyzed by these
theorists, and which therefore provided no real explanation of the
phenomenon. These shortcomings, I argued, disappeared with the
subsequent development of grammatical theory, in which the
interpretation of ungrammatical sentences was put on par with the
interpretation of fully grammatical sentences. I showed how several
features of the new theory made this consolidation possible. I concluded
that our ability to interpret ungrammatical utterances, which, at the end
of §1, I had argued constituted the great white hope of the skeptic, fell
squarely within the purview of current linguistic methodology, and as
such was no real threat to the mechanist program.
I conclude, therefore, that there is very little to recommend the
kind of skeptical argument that Davidson has outlined in his Epitaphs
paper. If the skeptic were to try arguing along these lines he would face a
number of formidable challenges.
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It is difficult to see, for example, how the skeptic might
successfully argue that language-users can recover utterer meanings that
the mechanistic picture cannot account for. It is not clear, at present,
that the mechanist can account for any of the utterance meanings that we
in fact appear to recover: too little is known about the relevant
mechanisms operating at the pragmatic end of the UID (figure A, p. 103).
Furthermore, the mechanist's enterprise would appear well-motivated
even if all it could do was account for our intuitions about literal
meanings.
At the SID-end of our interpretation machine, the skeptic's task
looks equally thankless. The entire enterprise of the linguist is geared to
providing an explanation of our ability to recover the literal meanings that
we do in fact recover. That an ungrammatical string can mean
such-and-such is not something that the theorist vaguely hopes his theory
of our linguistic competence will illuminate. It is for him a primary
datum that will shape and constrain his grammar-based theory of
linguistic processes.
I take it to be an interesting feature of grammar-based theories
of our linguistic competence that they can so naturally accommodate our
ability to interpret the ungrammatica•a feature which, I believe,
provides good evidence that our theory is on the right track.
Finally, the existence of a scientifically adequate mechanistic
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model of language use is consistent with the existence of interpretive
phenomena which fall outside the range of this theory. It is unreasonable
to expect that any model will do full justice to a real-world phenomenon
as complex and richly variegated as language.
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14. Ibd, p. 438.
15. bid, p. 445.
16. Ibid., p. 438.
17. Ibid., p. 440, italics mine.
18. Ibid
19. bid., p. 437.
20. Ibid., p. 446.
21. Ibid., p. 437.
22. bid., italics mine.
23. Davidson (1984b), p. 279, italics mine.
24. Davidson (1986), p. 446.
25. Ibid
26. Ibid., p. 441.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., p. 442.
29. The double bracket convention will be used as follows: [[ s ]] refers to
the literal meaning of sentence s. Thus when I say that Mrs. Malaprop's
interpreter takes her to mean [[What a nice arrangement of epitaphs]], I
mean that her interpreter takes her to mean whatever she would mean
literally by uttering the sentence "What a nice arrangement of epithets."
30. Davidson (1986), p. 442.
31. Ibid., my italics.
32. bid., pp. 442-443.
33. bid., p. 442.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 443, my italics.
37. Ibid
38. Ibid.
39. Dummett has a stronger reading of the PT model in mind: "The
apparatus of prior and passing theories ... is required to explain the
phenomena, of malapropisms and of deviant and unfamiliar uses, that
interest him. It is also sufficient to explain linguistic communication in
general." Dummett (1986), p. 466, my italics. Given any reasonable
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interpretation of the notion of explanation, this is much too strong a
reading of Davidson's claims for the PT model.
40. Davidson (1986), p. 438.
41. Iid, p. 446.
42. Ibid, p. 437.
43. Ib
44. IbId, p. 443.
45. Ibd, p. 433.
46. Ibd, p. 445.
47. bid
48. Ibd., p. 446.
49. Ibid
50. George (forthcoming).
51. Davidson (1986), p. 445.
52. Dummett has a much stronger reading of Davidson's argument:
"Davidson would like to believe that our whole understanding of another's
speech is effected without our having to know anything: 'there is no such
thing' as a language, he says, 'to be learned or mastered', and the
implication is that there is nothing to be learned or mastered." Dummett
(1986), p. 474. Davidson's argument does not, I believe, support this
"implication."
Part II: Assessing Davidson's argument
1. Davidson (1986), p. 446, my italics.
2. Davidson (1984b), p. 279.
3. Davidson (1986), p. 433.
4. Cf. George (forthcoming).
5. Davidson (1986), p.446.
6. Cf. Davidson (1984b).
7. Davidson (1986), p. 442.
8. Davidson (1984b), p. 266.
9. bid., p. 265.
10. Ibid, p. 277.
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11. Ibid., p. 279, italics mine.
12. Some of these are described in Davidson (1984b).
13. Cf. Lewis (1983), p. 168.
14. At the very least, the speaker does not intend that the hearer should
take him to be speaking non-literally.
15. Many thanks to Jim Higginbotham for suggesting this example.
16. Alternatively, Revere might assume that it is most likely that the
British troops will come by land, there being only a small chance that they
will come by sea.
17. Schiffer (1987), p. 254.
18. Ibid.
19. Lewis (1983), p. 166.
20. How would our semantic theory for a language-user be different if, for
example, he belonged to a speech community in which utterances were
true only 25% of the time?
21. I am not suggesting that these are the actual features in question.
22. Davidson (1986), p. 445.
23. Ibid., p. 438.
24. Hacking (1986), p. 448.
25. Ibid., p. 453.
26. Davidson (1986), p. 437.
27. Davidson (1984a).
28. Ibid., p. 125, italics mine.
29. Ibid., p. 127.
30. Cf. Chomsky (1977), p. 40.
31. Chomsky (1965), p. 9, italics mine.
32. This is somewhat of a deviation from standard usage.
33. Davidson (1986), p. 446.
34. Ibid.
35. Irene Heim has pointed out that if the speaker utters [13] and means it
literally (that is, if he really does mean to say "Familiarity breeds
attempt," for comic effect, say), we nevertheless get an echo of the
expression in [14]. It appears that we cannot help making certain
phonological associations.
36. Davidson (1986), p. 434.
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37. Fromkin (1973), p. 231.
38. Ibid., pp. 231-232.
39. Ibid., p. 233.
40. Ibid., pp. 218 ff.
41. This is much too strong a claim and must be softened somewhat by the
addition of ceteris paribus clauses.
42. Davidson (1986), p. 445.
43. Ibd., p. 442.
44. Ibid
45. bid., p. 443.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid., p. 446.
48. Chomsky (1975), pp. 24-25.
49. Davidson (1986), p. 446.
50. Chomsky (1975), p. 25.
51. Davidson (1986), p. 437, italics his.
52. Chomsky (1975), p. 43.
53. Chomsky (1981), pp. 7-8.
54. Davidson (1986), p. 437.
55. Ibid., p. 443.
56. Ibid, p. 446.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid, p. 445.
59. Ibid, p. 444.
60. Ibid.
61. ibid
62. lbid
63. Ibid., p. 443.
Part IIl: Some details of the mechanist response to Davidson
1. Davidson (1986), p. 444.
2. Ibid, p.445.
3. Lasnik & Uriagereka (1988), p. 1.
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4. Cf. Chomsky (1986).
5. lbid, p. 68.
6. Chomsky (1965), p. 9.
7. A key question here is whether or not we can motivate the
analytic/synthetic distinction at some other level of representation.
8. Higginbotham (1985), p. 547.
9. Chomsky (1981), p. 76.
10. Fillmore (1984), p. 103.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Davidson (1986), p. 437.
14. Ibid.
Part IV: Class M phenomena
1. Fromkin (1973), p. 13.
2. Ibid.
3. Fry (1973), p. 157.
4. Fillmore (1984), p. 90.
5. Cf. Chomsky (1965), (1981).
6. Lynda Barry, The Fun House (1987) (New York: Harper & Row).
7. Ziff (1964a), p. 208.
8. Ibid., p. 210.
9. Morris Bishop, "Good Usage, Bad Usage, and Usage," in The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, William Morris (ed.) (1978)
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Company), p. XXIII.
10. E. E. Cummings, 100 Selected Poems (1959) (Grove Press), p. 73.
11. Chomsky (1965).
12. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
13. lbid., p. 77.
14. Ibid., p. 78.
15. Bunge (1984), p. 123.
16. Ibid., p. 124.
17. Chomsky (1986), p. 30.
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18. Ibid., p. 20.
19. Ibid.
20. Higginbotham (1985).
21. Ibid., p. 548.
22. Ibid., p. 550.
23. Riemsdijk & Williams (1986), p. 4, italics mine.
24. Lasnik & Uriagereka (1988), p. 1.
25. Chomsky (1965), p. 16.
26. Ibid., p. 17.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 16.
30. Ibid., p. 138.
31. Ibid., pp. 138-139.
32. Ibid., p. 140.
33. Chomsky (1961), p. 384.
34. Ibid., p. 385.
35. Sometimes referred to as "type crossings" or "category mistakes" in
the literature.
36. Ziff (1964b), p. 393.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 395.
39. Ibid., p. 398. Ziff explains the word-class contraction rule as follows:
"... the expression to the right of the vertical line is invoked on the
supposition expressed by the expression to the left of the vertical line."
Ziff's examples are none too clear.
40. Ibid., p. 396.
41. Katz (1964), p. 400, note.
42. Ibid.
43. lbid., p. 402.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid., p. 411.
46. Ibid., p.412.
47. Chomsky (1961), p. 384.
48. Higginbotham (1985), p. 550.
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49. Chomsky (1981), p. 7.
50. Chomsky (1986), p. 73.
51. 1 follow the order of exposition in Chomsky (1982).
52. Cf. Chomsky (1981).
53. Assuming that O-roles can be assigned at this level of representation.
54. Clifton & Frazier (1989).
55. Ibid., p. 273.
56. Cummings, op. cit., p. 115.
57. Stemberger (1982), p. 314.
58. Bresnan (1983), p. 3.
59. Ibid.
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